Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07CONAKRY1268
2007-11-26 15:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Conakry
Cable title:  

EIGHT MONTHS IN - A LOOK AT KOUYATE,S

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM ASEC GV 
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VZCZCXRO5622
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHRY #1268/01 3301529
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261529Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY CONAKRY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1907
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CONAKRY 001268 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM ASEC GV
SUBJECT: EIGHT MONTHS IN - A LOOK AT KOUYATE,S
ADMINISTRATION

REF: A. SECSTATE 1245


B. SECSTATE 01139

C. SECSTATE 1229

Classified By: AMBASSADOR PHILLIP CARTER FOR REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CONAKRY 001268 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM ASEC GV SUBJECT: EIGHT MONTHS IN - A LOOK AT KOUYATE,S ADMINISTRATION REF: A. SECSTATE 1245 ¶B. SECSTATE 01139 ¶C. SECSTATE 1229 Classified By: AMBASSADOR PHILLIP CARTER FOR REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Eight months into his administration, Prime Minister Lansana Kouyate remains popular, but a number of civil society leaders are frustrated with his slow pace of reform. He continues to walk a delicate balancing act between the demands of his political mandate and his need to maintain a cordial working relationship with President Lansana Conte. Kouyate's perceived slow progress does not necessarily reflect a lack of political will. Rather, his calculated maneuvers suggest an acute political acumen coupled with a solid political strategy designed to move things forward within a severely confined political space. At the same time, while Guineans are renowned for their patience, it is not clear how long they are willing to wait for change - or what pace of reform is considered acceptable evidence of progress forward. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) The entire text of this cable serves as commentary and Embassy analysis of Guinea,s current political situation and Prime Minister Lansana Kouyate,s administration, which is based on information and perceptions gathered from extensive contacts within both the government and civil society. -------------- GLASS HALF FULL OR HALF EMPTY? -------------- ¶3. (C) Eight months into his tenure, Prime Minister Lansana Kouyate has moved slowly on the objectives set before him as outlined in the January 27 Accords, which has left a number of his supporters disappointed and frustrated. Rather than capitalizing on the wave of unprecedented popular support generated by the January/February strikes, Kouyate has appeared tentative, unwilling to confront President Lansana Conte, and slow to overcome blockages posed by Conte,s substantial bureaucratic machine. While Kouyate appointed new ministers, governors and prefects, he has not penetrated the ranks of bureaucrats who block his government,s reform efforts and embody the rampant corruption that has undermined Guinea,s economic progress for decades. Some critics say that Kouyate has not delivered on what they see as the key objectives for his administration: transparent legislative elections, a commission of inquiry into the alleged h
uman rights abuses committed by security forces during the strikes, administrative restructuring, reduction of corruption, and economic reform. ¶4. (C) Preparations for legislative elections are currently stalled with no set election date on the horizon, although Kouyate told the Ambassador that he expects to overcome the current blockage before the end of November (reftel A). Kouyate did establish a human rights commission in September, but it lacks budgetary support. As to administrative restructuring, a number of Kouyate's supporters see his appointment of ministers, governors and prefects as only half the battle - they are still waiting for replacements of senior executive officials, sous prefects, and others. On the corruption front, a number of contacts say Kouyate may be himself corrupt. ¶5. (C) However, it is important to note that Kouyate is moving forward, albeit slower than some would like, on many of these issues as well as other more basic improvements. People seem to agree that the overall supply of electricity and water has generally improved, at least in the capital area. Solar-powered street lamps, which had been in storage for many months, were finally taken out and installed at some of Conakry's major intersections. During his October 11 speech before the National Assembly, Kouyate detailed a number of specific accomplishments, many of which targeted basic quality of life issues (reftel B). On the economic front, inflation is down and prices seem to have stabilized. Kouyate's economic reform program has instilled confidence on the part of the IMF representative who has indicated publicly that the IMF may soon restore Guinea's funded program - although he also confided privately that he has some lingering budgetary concerns. -------------- GOVERNANCE SYSTEM HAS NOT CHANGED -------------- ¶6. (C) At the same time, Guinea's underlying bureaucratic CONAKRY 00001268 002 OF 003 system remains essentially unchanged. Many contacts believe that the January/February strikes signaled a fundamental shift in the political mentality of Guineans in that people realized they could effect change and did not have to simply accept the inadequacies of their government and political leaders. That mentality shift may have occurred at the level of individual citizens and with Kouyate and his small cadre of appointees, but it does not appear to have manifested itself elsewhere. Governance as a whole continues much as it has in the past - ranks of old system, long-time government bureaucrats continue to block reform efforts. -------------- WALKING A POLITICAL TIGHTROPE -------------- ¶7. (C) In many ways, President Lansana Conte still pulls some strings although the extent of his current power base is unclear. Conte has sat on a number of key decrees and pieces of legislation, which include documents establishing the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) and appointments to key government offices. Under Guinean law, the President has ten days to veto or sign newly passed legislation - after ten days, it automatically becomes law even without the president's signature. Despite this provision, Kouyate and his administration have been unwilling to implement legislation without Conte's signature, which raises questions about Kouyate's ultimate authority. Conte recently signed the law establishing the CENI, but the fact that everything had been at a standstill pending his authorization suggests that he still wields considerable power. Kouyate is ultimately constrained by Conte's inaction. ¶8. (C) To some of his supporters, Kouyate,s failure to confront Conte suggests that he is more concerned about keeping his job than doing it. However, another possibility is that he is trying to keep the country from falling apart. By playing the traditional appeasement game with Conte, Kouyate has been able to avoid a direct inter-personal conflict. Kouyate may be trying to avoid a situation that could force Conte to play his cards, which could then undermine Kouyate,s own position and possibly generate further civil unrest. At the same time, Kouyate's tactics, which include frequent substantive contact with the president, could be a calculated move to build Conte's trust and make Conte increasingly reliant on Kouyate as head of government. Kouyate's interactions vis-a-vis the president more likely demonstrate an acute political acumen that critics do not fully appreciate. Furthermore, Kouyate's targeted efforts to cultivate relationships with other country's leaders suggests a well-defined political strategy. -------------- ULTERIOR MOTIVES? -------------- ¶9. (C) Some critics question Kouyate's ultimate goals. There have been a number of unconfirmed reports indicating that Kouyate provided funding to certain youth organizations in order to generate political support, that he bribed union and civil society officials, and that he offered high-value contracts for renovations to his office and his residence to his nephew. In addition, press reports and contacts suggest that Kouyate may be either supporting an opposition political party or creating one of his own, raising questions about his personal political ambitions. Furthermore, his administration's slow progress on legislative elections has people questioning whether Kouyate is intentionally delaying the process so as to build up a stronger, personal support base that could bolster his own bid for the presidency in ¶2010. These rumors and others, coupled with the government's poor to mediocre public relations effort, engender distrust and threaten civil society's general confidence in Kouyate. ¶10. (C) At the same time, Kouyate's possible aspirations for the presidency do not necessarily preclude from him being effective in his current job and in fact, could provide an additional incentive. Successfully administering credible legislative elections and delivering on other key objectives could earn Kouyate respect and possibly generate popular support that could win him a presidential election. However, he needs to be careful about appearing too partisan, at least until he can hold credible legislative elections, and keep himself above corruption. -------------- WHAT PACE FOR REFORM? -------------- CONAKRY 00001268 003 OF 003 ¶11. (C) It is unclear how long Guineans will patiently await the fundamental political change they demanded eight months ago. At the same time, there is no clear, unified vision of what change means - one of the reasons the different societal groups have been dividing within themselves. People are looking for the entire system to change, a system that may be fundamentally flawed, and they seem to be looking to Kouyate to do it. However, while people seem to recognize that the real problem is Conte, no-one seems to be willing to confront him. This makes for a volatile situation in that people have invested their hope in Kouyate while ignoring the fact that the existing political system makes it extremely difficult for Kouyate to effectively implement the change people are demanding or at least to do it within an acceptable timeframe. In the meantime, Kouyate is moving forward on key issues, within the constrained political space he has to operate in, while simultaneously trying to fix some of the more basic quality of life issues. This may continue to appease the population. ¶12. (C) Short of a military coup, the death of Conte, or another such dramatic event forcing immediate political change, Kouyate and Conte along with Guinea's constitutional government structure, are what Guinea has to work with. Embassy is considering the above-mentioned issues along with challenges for the delayed legislative elections (reftel C) as we review USG strategy towards Guinea. Embassy is determining how best to work within this complicated political environment so that we can help ensure continued peace and stability in Guinea, along with progress towards a stronger democracy and increased economic prosperity. Kouyate is a key player in the movement for change and we need to think about ways we can help him accomplish what he has been asked to do. CARTER

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