SCENESETTER FOR JUNE 25-26 CO-CHAIR MEETING IN OSLO

C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 000890 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR A/S BOUCHER AND SCA/INS, USPACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2017 TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV CE SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR JUNE 25-26 CO-CHAIR MEETING IN OSLO Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr. for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. Summary: The June 26 Co-Chair meeting in Oslo marks a good opportunity to think through our strategy to get the parties back to the negotiating table and into a more sustained process that could produce a breakthrough. In a June 15 meeting with Norwegian Minister Solheim in Geneva, President Rajapaksa said Sri Lanka is ready to stop fighting if the LTTE agrees to stop all attacks against civilian and military targets. He also expressed support for a political solution. The All Parties Representative Committee process aims to produce a devolution proposal by the end of July but faces two principal obstacles. President Rajapaksa has hesitated to embrace a devolution proposal that would appeal to the majority of Tamils out of concern that the LTTE will refuse to engage on the proposal, which will leave Rajapaksa exposed to significant criticism from the JVP and others from his southern base that he made concessions without getting anything in return. UNP opposition leader Wickremesinghe, for his part, is loathe to give the President a political victory at a time when he entertains hopes of bringing down the government later in the year. In addition to exploring a mix of incentives and sticks to encourage the LTTE to negotiate in good faith, the Co-Chairs should consider measures that will help ensure southern support, since most previous peace attempts have failed due to the reluctance of southern leaders to take the necessary political risks for peace. The Co-Chairs should also explore the possibility of encouraging a more sustained engagement between the parties as well as a more aggressive mediation to enhance the prospects for reaching a deal and answer Rajapksa's concern that the LTTE will only come to the table to give itself time to re-arm for fresh hostilities. End Summary. Solheim-Rajapaksa Meeting in Geneva -------------- ¶2. (C) Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar invited Co-Chair Ambassadors for a read-out of Norwegian Minister Solheim's meeting with President Rajapaksa in Geneva on June 15th. Noting that more than a year had passed since their last meeting Brattskar said Norway and Sri Lanka were happy with the outcome. The President opened by saying he wanted to know from Norway whether the LTTE was ready for talks. Solheim responded that the Norwegians had not been able to travel to Killinochchi recently because of GSL restrictions, but they had received no signals from the LTTE that they were ready for talks. Norwegian Special Envoy Hanssen-Bauer interjected that the LTTE were likely waiting for the document that would be produced by the All Party Representative Committee (APRC). ¶3. (C) Rajapaksa told Solheim the Sri Lankan government is ready to stop fighting when the LTTE agrees to do so, but that the LTTE agreement must also include a pledge not to attack security forces. Rajapaksa repeated his often expressed concern that the LTTE would not negotiate in good faith and would use the opportunity afforded by peace talks to rearm and prepare for fresh military attacks. EPDP Leader Devananda interjected that once Prabakharan is gone the LTTE will collapse. ¶4. (C) President Rajapaksa expressed concern to Solheim with what he perceived as a lack of Norwegian activity over the last several months. Solheim responded that Norway could not work in a political vacuum (an apparent reference to the lengthy delays in the APRC process). The President repeated that there could not be a military solution to Sri Lanka's problems. He estimated that LTTE forces would be cleared out of the east very soon. As he did with Special Japanese Envoy Akashi, Rajapaksa expressed support for district-based devolution while making clear he is willing to consider an amalgamation of districts in the north to approximate the provincial-level devolution moderate Tamils are seeking. ¶5. (C) Solheim returned to Norway's recent unsuccessful attempts to get GSL clearance for Norwegian diplomats to travel to Killinochchi for the purpose of meeting with the LTTE. Brattskar noted that the President did not give a clear answer about whether the GSL would lift its recent restrictions, but his body language did not suggest Sri Lanka is leaning in a positive direction. Human Rights Minister Samarasinghe suggested Norway get Co-Chair and India support for its request to visit Killinochchi. In closing, Brattskar indicated that Hanssen-Bauer would be traveling to India to meet Foreign Secretary Mennon on Friday, June 22nd. Brattskar indicated the Norwegians would brief the other Co-chairs in Oslo on the outcome of these discussions. Security Situation -------------- ¶6. (C) The United States has been asked to brief on the security and political situation at the Oslo meeting. With regard to the security situation, there has been a shift in recent weeks in GSL thinking to recognize that Sri Lanka cannot defeat the LTTE with the GSL's current forces and therefore must embrace a political solution. Several factors have influenced this shift. First, the military has suffered higher-than-expected casualties in recent engagements with the LTTE near Omanthai, Vavuniya and Mannar, along the southern edge of the region controlled by the LTTE. Second, Defense Secretary Rajapaksa has admitted to us that Sri Lanka would need double the number of current troops to vanquish the LTTE in the north. Such an increase will be impossible for the government to finance since there is already deep opposition from all opposition parties and some in the ruling SLFP coalition to the high level of military spending and the fifteen plus percent inflation this spending has caused. Third, the LTTE air attacks, while militarily insignificant, had a profound psychological impact because they punctured the myth prevailing in the south that the Sri Lankan military was making consistent, inexorable progress in defeating the LTTE. The fact that the LTTE was able to launch multiple nighttime raids, drop their ordinance at or near their intended targets, and return to their bases in the Vanni untouched came as a shock to many in the Sinhalese community. ¶7. (C) The military strategy therefore will be to weaken the LTTE as much as possible. The GSL will do so through the use of "deep penetration units" of special forces to undertake attacks against specific targets in the Vanni as well as continued use of air power to attack LTTE naval and land based assets. Interestingly, a recent report by technical level diplomats who visited the Vanni last month found that the government has been remarkably successful in avoiding civilian casualties in these air raids. The group was told of only three civilian casualties in all of the recent air raids. The Swiss Ambassador and the US Ambassador (as the Co-chair representative on the Coordinating Committee for Humanitarian Affairs) will present the full donor group report on the trip to the Vanni on June 28th to Defense Secretary Rajapaksa and Minister Samarasinghe. SIPDIS ¶8. (C) A well informed minister who has direct access to military decision makers told Ambassador this week that the military is giving serious consideration to the idea of a military push north up the western coast from Mannar to seek to capture LTTE naval bases in that region and stop LTTE arms resupply efforts in that area. This is the reason why the military is said to be seeking funds to recruit 50,000 new troops. The Ambassador cautioned the Minister against such an approach. He noted that the government appeared to have enjoyed significant success in interdicting LTTE arms trawlers and therefore the rationale for such an operation would need to be carefully explained and thought through. The Ambassador suggested that if LTTE trawlers were in fact getting through in this region, the GSL should first approach the government of India to inquire about enhanced joint patrols to stop such arms shipments. A GSL push north would renew international concerns that the GSL was pursuing a military solution. There would also likely be significant humanitarian repercussions. The LTTE was expecting a push in this region, so the government could expect heavy fighting in an area that included the Madhu church, and many civilians as well as IDPs in that area. The government could expect to encounter heavy international criticism for engagements in populated areas. The Minister agreed with the Ambassador's analysis and undertook to share it with senior military figures. Political Situation -------------- ¶9. (C) There is nearly a universal consensus that the All Parties Representative Committee process to develop a power sharing proposal offers the most promising hope for developing a proposal that could form the basis for negotiations with the LTTE. The APRC faces two significant obstacles. First, President Rajapaksa himself has offered at best lukewarm support for the process thus far. The President watered down the proposals submitted to the APRC by his own SLFP party. He has doggedly defended district level devolution because that is the option favored by the majority in his southern Sinhalese base. In the face of withering international and opposition criticism, the President has agreed to consider a hybrid system in which the south would elect to choose district based devolution while the north could choose to amalgamate districts to what would be the equivalent of provinces. But that option has not yet been vetted in the APRC, nor has it been subject to public debate. ¶10. (C) Party insiders who are close to the President tell us that his chief hesitation in embracing a devolution proposal that would appeal to the majority of Tamils is that the President is concerned the LTTE will refuse to engage on the proposal which will leave him exposed to significant criticism from the JVP and his southern base for making concessions without getting anything in return. The President is mindful that Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe is eyeing the possibility of trying to bring down the government during the course of debates on the 2008 budget in November. ¶11. (C) The second major challenge the APRC faces is the opposition UNP party's ambivalence about the process. Opposition leader Wickremesinghe told the diplomatic community that the UNP is pressing the Government to submit its own proposal to the APRC. Ambassador expressed concern that the UNP was in effect trying to change the terms of reference of the APRC by insisting the Government submit a proposal. In a dinner later in the week with Ambassador and DCM, Wickremesinghe backed off his insistence on a government proposal saying he would abide by the advice of the Co-Chairs and India. The larger question remains whether the UNP will engage in good faith to work within the APRC to produce a devolution proposal that is acceptable to Tamils. Wickremesinghe clearly is loathe to give the President a political victory at a time when he entertains hopes of bringing down the government later in the year. ¶12. (C) Septel reports that such hopes appear unrealistic, despite the recent defection of former Ministers Mangala Samaweera and Sripathi Sooriyarachchi. The government coalition appears to be reasonably strong. Most politicians doubt that the UNP will be able to bring down the government, mostly because the JVP, which has 39 of the 225 seats in Parliament is likely to support the government against any challenge of the UNP (because the JVP stands to lose up to half of its seats should fresh elections be called). The Co-chairs' message to all parties must be that they must put aside their narrow partisan differences in the interest of finding a durable solution to the conflict that has plagued Sri Lanka for more than 25 years. Human Rights Situation -------------- ¶13. (C) The EU will take the lead on this and the next topic. The government has made scant progress on human rights. The slow progress of the Commission of Inquiry and the continued role played by the Attorney General in the COI forced the Commission to issue two critical public statements recently. The GSL also has been slow to stand up a witness protection unit, without which few if any witnesses are likely to provide testimony to the COI. Abductions continue to be a problem, with a new trend emerging of Muslim businessmen being targeted for the purposes of extortion. The Commission, led by Justice Tilekaratne, that the President appointed to look into abductions, has made little progress thus far. On the positive side GSL interlocutors report that the President had a positive meeting with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights last week, welcomed her proposals to come to Sri Lanka later this summer at a date to be determined and to develop the UNHCHR's capacity in Sri Lanka. Another positive development has been the independence shown by the Sri Lankan judiciary, including its decision to stop the GSL from evicting Tamils from lodges in Colombo. Humanitarian Situation -------------- ¶14. (C) The government has made substantial progress in resettling many of the IDPs from Batticaloa and Trincomalee in recent weeks. The GSL has received generally good marks from the UNHCR for the manner in which it has conducted the resettlement process recently. Significant questions remain, however. First is the extent to which the government will continue to assist IDPs that have been resettled in the east until their livelihoods are restored. The UN is preparing to help the government to develop a plan to restore livelihoods and support the IDPs in the interim. The second major concern remains the extent to which the government will permit resettlement in the extensive new high security zone that the government has established in Sampur and Muttur. The Defense Secretary assured the Ambassador that Tamil and other IDPs would be resettled in their original villages except in a narrow band that borders the entrance to the Trincomalee harbor. TNA and many NGO representatives from that area are deeply skeptical, however, and charge that the government plans to resettle Sinhalese into some Tamil areas. This controversy will require close monitoring by the international community in the coming months. Enhancing Prospects for a Successful Outcome -------------- ¶15. (C) Everyone agrees that the APRC process represents the best hope for developing a devolution proposal that meets Tamil aspirations and could form the basis for negotiations. There is also consensus that unless President Rajapaksa personally embraces an ambitious outcome to the process and then sells it to the people of Sri Lanka, the process is likely to falter. We should not underestimate the risks Rajapaksa faces. Nearly all previous peace process attempts have faltered because past Sinhalese leaders proved unwilling to take the necessary risks for peace. The challenge for the international community therefore is to explore what incentives we may be able to provide to make these risks more palatable. ¶16. (C) The President first needs reassurance that the international community will do everything possible to ensure that the LTTE comes to the table and negotiates in good faith. A mix of carrots and sticks should be considered to ensure that outcome. One of the failures of the 2002-2003 process was that the LTTE was never able to show its supporters any tangible economic benefits as a result of its engagement in talks. A future round, therefore, will need to have clear upfront promises of what development assistance and incentives for business investment will be forthcoming so the LTTE has an incentive to engage. At the same time, there will need to be a clear understanding that there will be repercussions for the LTTE if they fail to seize the negotiating opportunity. Since the Tamil Diaspara bankrolls the LTTE, the Co-Chairs should give serious thought to a coordinated approach to the Tamil Diaspara in the United States, Canada, Australia and the EU to listen to their concerns, seek their support for a process that leads to a successful outcome. We should also discuss how we might further strengthen Sri Lanka's capability to interdict LTTE arms shipments as an additional incentive for the LTTE to engage seriously. ¶17. (C) To counter southern skepticism that the LTTE will string out negotiations to give itself time to rearm, the Co-Chairs should give thought to how the negotiating process itself can be invigorated and expedited. One model is to encourage the parties to engage continuously -- at least at the technical level -- such as was done in the Northern Ireland process. The Co-Chairs also should consider whether Norway, or possibly some other mediator, should go beyond the current Norwegian facilitation role and take on a more direct mediation that could accelerate the overall process. ¶18. (C) Lastly, the Co-Chairs must consider what economic carrots can be offered to the south. In the past, donors have naturally focused on ways to enhance growth and development in the north and east. But the south is a crucial stakeholder in the process and therefore must derive some of the development, trade and other assistance that would underpin a successful negotiating process. Since the Co-Chairs do not intend to issue a statement at Oslo, there should be ample time for a discussion on all these important issues. BLAKE