SRI LANKA: PRESIDENT SEEKS TO NEUTRALIZE SINHALESE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000748

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS
MCC FOR D NASSIRY AND E BURKE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: PRESIDENT SEEKS TO NEUTRALIZE SINHALESE
NATIONALIST PARTY AS AN OPPOSITION FORCE

Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Since the extremist Sinhalese party Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) withdrew official support for the
President in April 2006, President Rajapaksa has been working
to establish a measure of indirect control over the party and
sap its ability to challenge his policies. The President has
employed JVP insider and Member of Parliament Wimal
Weerawansa to weaken and manipulate the party's leadership
structure. The President and Weerawansa have successfully
damaged the political careers of several prominent JVP
figures. According to Embassy contacts, the president's
eventual goal is to establish Weerawansa as the leader of the
JVP, a move that he hopes would eliminate the JVP as a viable
opposition force. The President's efforts to create a tamer
opposition by installing an ally as JVP leader has only
limited prospects for success, however. It is unlikely that
the JVP, even under a "friendly" leader, would refrain from
criticizing the President on certain issues, particularly the
peace process and corruption. End Summary.

Creating a "Friendlier" Opposition
--------------


2. (C) Since the JVP withdrew support for the President in
April 2006, President Rajapaksa has been working to establish
indirect control of the party and weaken its ability to
challenge his policies. However, he has had to employ other
tactics than those he used to woo the United National Party
(UNP) "crossovers" -- offers of power and perks. JVP members
have proven more difficult to co-opt. Instead, the President
has been working to weaken and manipulate the party's
leadership structure.


3. (C) The President has several reasons for wanting to
neutralize the JVP. Because of its control over certain
unions, the JVP has a unique ability to mobilize street
action. For example, they have threatened to hold a general
strike in June to protest the rising cost of living and the
Government's failure to respond to a recent report on
corruption in public enterprises. The JVP also competes with
the President's party for the Sinhalese nationalist vote
base. The President will want to keep the JVPs criticism
muted, or he will risk losing more of these voters to the
JVP. Most important, the President knows well that he
received very few votes from minority Tamils and Muslims in
his November 2005 election and depended almost exclusively on
Sinhalese Buddhist votes for his slender majority over UNP
leader Ranil Wickremesinghe. He must try to prevent the JVP
from distancing itself too much from him, since he will need
its voters' support again if he hopes to be re-elected.

An Ally on the Inside
--------------


4. (C) The President has employed the help of JVP insider
and parliamentary floor leader Wimal Weerawansa to weaken the
JVP. The President has used Weerawansa as a source for
information on JVP internal matters, as well as damaging
personal data on several key JVP leaders. According to
Embassy contacts, the president's eventual goal is to
establish Weerawansa as the leader of the JVP, a move that he
hopes would eliminate the JVP as a true opposition force.

Undermining JVP Leaders
--------------


5. (C) The President and Weerawansa have inflicted damage
on the political careers of several prominent JVP figures.
The first was JVP trade unionist and MP Siripala Amarasinghe.
The President, through his brother and advisor Basil
Rajapaksa, used information from Weerawansa to highlight

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Amarasinghe's misappropriation of JVP trade union funds.
Amarasinghe resigned from Parliament, giving one more seat to
the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party, and is now employed at
the Presidential Secretariat. The next target was JVP MP
Nandana Gunathilaka, seen by many as the eventual successor
to the party leadership. The President, after cultivating a
dispute between Gunathilaka and Weerawansa, offered
Gunathilaka overseas tours and other perks until he
eventually dropped his active involvement in the JVP. JVP
stalwart Kumar Gunaratnum left Sri Lanka with his family when
he learned that the police force's Criminal Investigation
Division was investigating him for corruption based on
information supplied by Weerawansa. JVP MP Anura Dissanayake
told us that the President and Weerawansa are now putting
pressure on JVP leader Somawansa Amarasinghe to step down by
gradually excluding him from party matters. The President
and Weerawansa also are fostering criticism of Amarasinghe
for leaving the country in the aftermath of the JVP's armed
insurrection in the late eighties, claiming he abandoned the
party during difficult times.

The "Secret Plan"
--------------


6. (C) The President recently told a group of journalists
that JVP MP Anura Dissanayake and sacked former SLFP
ministers Mangala Samaraweera and Sripathi Sooriyarachchi are
toying with the idea of an alliance with UNP leader
Wickremesinghe. According to our contacts, the President is
fanning these rumors in an effort to damage Dissanayake's
relations with the rest of the JVP leadership. Dissanayake
earlier earned the President's animosity by revealing
fraudulent legal and financial transactions conducted by the
President's elder brother Chamal while he was Minister of
Agriculture. There is ample evidence of a growing rift
between Dissanayake and the rest of the JVP, and the
President's growing influence over the party. For example,
Dissanayake decided not to join the JVP's demonstrations at
the British High Commission in mid-May. The protests, over
the UK's decision to freeze debt relief and a UK
parliamentary debate on Sri Lanka, took place at the
President's request, according to Embassy contacts. (In
fact, protests are normally kept at a distance from the
British High Commission because of its location directly
across the street from the President's office and residence.)


7. (C) COMMENT: The President's efforts to create a tamer
opposition by installing an ally as JVP leader may succeed,
but to a limited extent. It is unlikely that the JVP, even
under a "friendly" leader, would refrain from criticizing the
President on certain issues. For example, fundamental
opposition to the peace process is part of the JVP credo that
it cannot afford to abandon. The JVP has also been a leader
in Parliament in seeking to investigate government
corruption. Moreover, Rajapaksa's backing of Wimal
Weerawansa and not-so-secret efforts to undermine prominent
JVP members has the potential to backfire, creating
resentment against Weerawansa and greater opposition to the
President within the JVP.
BLAKE