Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07COLOMBO734
2007-05-21 10:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

SRI LANKA: ARMY COMMANDER REQUESTS REVIEW OF A

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6086
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RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0123
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RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 7690
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
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RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000734 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS
MCC FOR S GROFF, D TETER, D NASSIRY AND E BURKE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: ARMY COMMANDER REQUESTS REVIEW OF A
HUMAN RIGHTS VETTING CASE

REF: A) COLOMBO 596 B) COLOMBO 728

Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000734 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS MCC FOR S GROFF, D TETER, D NASSIRY AND E BURKE E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: ARMY COMMANDER REQUESTS REVIEW OF A HUMAN RIGHTS VETTING CASE REF: A) COLOMBO 596 B) COLOMBO 728 Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b,d). ¶1. (C) Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka asked Ambassador on May 18 to reconsider the case of a Sri Lanka Army intelligence officer rejected for U.S.-funded counterterrorism training under Leahy Amendment provisions. Ambassador explained the application of the Leahy Amendment, and said the Embassy did not have the authority to reopen the decision. The Ambassador noted that this pointed out the need for Sri Lanka to improve its observance of human rights and rein in the paramilitaries that operate in Jaffna and elsewhere. Fonseka claimed that the normal prosecutorial methods had failed to control LTTE terrorism in Jaffna. Ambassador responded that the U.S. is exploring the possibility of U.S. assistance to enhance the capabilities of Sri Lanka's military justice system. End summary. ¶2. (C) General Fonseka visited Ambassador Blake on May 18 to discuss the case of Major Wasantha Dharmasiri Wansapurage, a Sri Lankan Army intelligence officer (ref a). Dharmasiri had been rejected as a participant in a U.S.-funded counterterrorism course after Leahy vetting had disclosed a credible allegation against him of involvement in gross human rights violations. Fonseka said that an internal investigation of Dharmasiri had turned up no evidence of his culpability. There were no charges pending against him in any Sri Lankan court, Fonseka added. Fonseka asked Ambassador Blake to review the decision. ¶3. (C) Ambassador clarified that the final decision on eligibility rested with the Department of Defense. Ambassador explained the purpose of the Leahy Amendment, and noted that the relevant language refers to units, not individuals. There is ample evidence, Ambassador said, that the military intelligence unit Dharmasiri heads in Jaffna is complicit in human rights violations, many of them committed by various paramilitary organizations (ref b). The vetting procedure had determined that Dharmasiri's leadership of the unit was sufficient to disqualify him from receiving U.S.-funded training under applicable U.S. law, Ambassador said. ¶4. (C) In fact, Embassy vetting (ref a) had turned up a
specific allegation of Dharmasiri's personal involvement in a case of severe torture. However, we could not discuss this with Fonseka without putting our sources in grave danger. We also did not want to set a precedent of discussing the results of individual vetting cases with the Sri Lankan military after the decisions are final. ¶5. (C) Ambassador pointed out that this case underlined the importance of having an effective justice system to deal with those suspected of involvement with the LTTE. It was essential to follow due process, rather than allow paramilitaries to act against individuals suspected of working with the LTTE. Arrests should be accountable. If evidence exists of crimes, then those responsible should be charged, prosecuted, and if convicted, appropriately punished. Ambassador noted that Assistant Secretary Boucher, during his May 8-10 visit to Sri Lanka, had welcomed the progress the government has made, for example, by redisseminating the procedures to follow when making arrests, and by publicizing this information. We looked for further progress on implementing these intentions, Ambassador said. ¶6. (C) Ambassador emphasized that often the problem originated with other groups, such as paramilitaries, that operate completely outside the legal system and with no accountability. Although it might appear desirable for COLOMBO 00000734 002 OF 002 tactical reasons to allow these groups to continue their activities, this was a mistake, he said. He reiterated the need to rein in paramilitaries, such as the Eelam People's Democratic Party, which commit many of the most serious human rights violations in Jaffna. ¶7. (C) Fonseka argued that Sri Lanka had already tried to fight LTTE terrorism through normal prosecutorial means, but that these had proved inadequate. He said that Tamil judges in the North were subject to pressure from the LTTE. They would often release suspects on bail, who would then disappear, often to rejoin the LTTE. These people continued to pose a threat. Further, witnesses were afraid to come forward against LTTE suspects, so it was hard to gather evidence against them. Prosecutors were also intimidated. ¶8. (C) Ambassador responded that the U.S. is exploring the possibility of providing help to strengthen the Sri Lankan military justice system. He said the Embassy would try to identify appropriate training programs to enhance the capability of Sri Lankan prosecutors to deal with terrorism suspects. Fonseka took note of the offer but did not respond directly. ¶9. (C) COMMENT: We have a number of indications that senior Sri Lankan officials such as Army Commander Fonseka are now coming to grips with the consequences of Sri Lanka's increasingly poor reputation on human rights. Embassy will continue to seek opportunities to reinforce our message. For our criticism to be constructive, we have to offer alternatives. We already are working on a proposed Military Law Exchange in August, which will include an assessment of how Sri Lanka can improve its military justice system. Training on appropriate counterinsurgency techniques that comply with international human rights standards should also be an important component of our military assistance mix. We will continue to exercise vigilance to assure that candidates proposed for U.S.-funded training are qualified under the Leahy Amendment. This sends a message that we are serious about our human rights concerns, and will provide a positive incentive for the Sri Lankan government to prosecute the human rights violators both inside and outside its security forces. That said, military tribunals do not ordinarily try terrorism suspects, so the inadequacies of the criminal justice system that Fonseka pointed out will require other, more complex solutions. BLAKE

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