SRI LANKA: CROSSOVERS ENDANGERING COOPERATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000070 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: CROSSOVERS ENDANGERING COOPERATION BETWEEN MAJOR PARTIES REF: A) COLOMBO 46 B) COLOMBO 57 Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b,d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Opposition leader Wickremesinghe told Ambassador on January 11 that a large-scale defection of members of Parliament from his UNP to the government ranks would force him to end cooperation with President Rajapaksa. He was concerned about the negative fallout for the peace process. He speculated that the President might be seeking to weaken the UNP and call a snap election. The Ambassador called President's senior political advisor (and brother) Basil to urge the GSL not to take any actions that would jeopardize the SLFP-UNP MOU. Basil assured the Ambassador that the government would not make such a move before a consultation between the President and Wickremesinghe could take place early next week. He said the government remained committed to seeking peace and would not do anything to call the MoU between the two major parties into question. End summary. ¶2. (C) Ambassador and Pol Chief met Opposition Leader and head of the United National Party (UNP) Ranil Wickremesinghe on January 11. Ambassador asked about rumors of a Cabinet reshuffle and whether President Rajapaksa would be successful in enticing a number of UNP members of parliament to cross over to the government side in exchange for ministerial posts (ref A). Wickremesinghe acknowledged that there were some in his party who wanted to bolt in order to enjoy ministerial privileges and perks. He noted that UNP constitutional expert G.L. Peiris and the reformer Milinda Moragoda a UNP heavyweight, were probably willing to switch parties in order to join the government. Wickremesinghe indicated he could live with this, provided that Peiris and Moragoda resigned from the UNP first. ¶3. (C) However, Wickremesinghe said that if Rajapaksa engineered a large-scale defection of his deputies, sufficient to provide the ruling SLFP with an absolute majority in Parliament, then the UNP would be compelled to reconsider its cooperation with the government under the MoU between them. While not spelled out in the MoU, Ranil said that there was an express understanding between him and the President that there would be no raiding of his MPs during the two-year period of the MoU. On December 17, he went on, he had taken a decision that his party would sustain the government for two years under the MoU ) but without taking ministerial posts. ¶4. (C) According to Wickremesinghe, UNP party chairman Rukaman Senanayake told the President just days before that he would effectively be breaking the MoU by luring away UNP members. His parliamentarians had also been approached by members of the Sinhalese chauvinist JVP, the former coalition partners of the government, who were unhappy because in their view the President was trying to replace their support with that of the UNP dissidents. Wickremesinghe speculated that Rajapaksa might be trying to weaken the UNP at this point because the UNP was in favor the merger of the northern and eastern provinces in order to spur the peace process along. He was concerned that there would be serious fallout for the peace process if this happened. He also thought that Rajapaksa might also be tempted to call a snap election. ¶5. (C) Wickremesinghe said that he had been trying to set an appointment with the President, but had not yet been able to negotiate a date. This was now likely to slip into the week of January 15. He would suggest to the President that they each make parallel statements in support of the peace process, then start bilateral talks between the two parties on the way forward. However, the President would have to decide to reinstate the merger of the north and east over the objections of the JVP and other nationalists. COLOMBO 00000070 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Ambassador agreed that the prospect of the MoU coming apart was deeply troubling. He noted that various government figures, such as Defense Secretary Gothabaya (ref B),had given him assurances that the government remained committed to the peace process. The President had been waiting for the devolution proposals of the All party Representative Committee (APRC) headed by Minister Tissa Vitharana. He offered to call the President's senior political advisor (and older brother) Basil Rajapaksa to seek clarification of what the government intended. Wickremesinghe urged him to do so. ¶7. (C) Ambassador spoke to Basil Rajapaksa on January 12, saying that he had heard reports about the possibility of crossovers and was gravely concerned about the impact on the peace process. Basil assured him that the President would not make any such move without consulting Wickremesinghe. However, scheduling conflicts had so far prevented such a meeting. Basil assured the Ambassador that the President was conscious of the importance of the SLFP-UNP MOU to the peace process and that the president would not do anything that would have an adverse impact on the MoU. However, it was not the case that the government was trying to persuade UNP dissidents to cross over, he told us. Rather, they had been dissatisfied with their own party leadership for a long time, and had been asking to join the government. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: This pot has been boiling for many weeks. There is no doubt that a substantial part of the UNP is unhappy with Wickremesinghe's autocratic leadership style, and with some of Ranil's strategic decisions. There are others who, nearing the end of their public lives, may in fact simply be yearning to end their careers as ministers. Basil Rajapaksa's assurances notwithstanding, the President has aroused expectations of change by announcing publicly that he would undertake a major cabinet reshuffle and expected a number of UNP crossovers. Ranil will have his work cut out to head off a defection by the dissidents in his party and get the President to back off on his plan to recruit them for his cabinet. BLAKE