SRI LANKA: DEFENSE SECRETARY OUTLINES MILITARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000630 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS MCC FOR S GROFF, D NASSIRY, E BURKE AND F REID E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: DEFENSE SECRETARY OUTLINES MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE NORTH; ASSERTS SRI LANKA IS SERIOUS ABOUT POLITICAL SOLUTION; FALSE ALARM OF SECOND AIR ATTACK ON COLOMBO Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b,d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador called on Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa on April 26 to inquire about the military's future ambitions in the North. Ambassador reasserted the U.S. position that only a political solution will resolve Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict. In a candid discussion, Gothabaya detailed the military's response and weaknesses during the April 24 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) air attack on the Palaly military complex in Jaffna, outlined the military's objectives and tactics in the North, and urged Ambassador to convince the international community that the GSL was sincere in its desire for a political solution. Gothabaya petitioned for U.S. support in developing Sri Lanka's surveillance abilities, but asserted that the military has no plans for a conventional invasion of LTTE-controlled territory. Also on April 26 at approximately 11:00 p.m., the Sri Lanka electric utility cut power to Colombo and the Army began firing anti-aircraft artillery after a reported sighting of two LTTE light aircraft over Puttalam, north of Colombo. It was quickly determined to be a false alarm, and business returned to normal approximately one hour after the disturbance began. End Summary. A/S BOUCHER'S TRIP TO JAFFNA -------------- ¶2. (C) On April 26, Ambassador, Defense Attache, Director of the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) and PolOff called on Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa to discuss continued U.S. support for Sri Lanka's fight against terrorism. We also pressed Gothabaya to focus on a political solution to the conflict. Ambassador confirmed A/S Boucher's planned visit to Sri Lanka on May 8-10, and asked if security conditions would permit his travel to Jaffna. Gothabaya stated that security conditions did not currently pose a threat to A/S Boucher's Jaffna plans, but urged Ambassador not to inform the LTTE, cautioning that LTTE leader Prabhakaran might try to kill A/S Boucher to "show his power." Ambassador said he did not share that assessment, but was confident that the LTTE had no desire to attack the United States. However, Ambassador reassured Gothabaya that contact would be made indirectly, perhaps through the ICRC; notice would be provided shortly before actually leaving for Jaffna to eliminate the LTTE's ability to prepare; and the USG would not reveal any operational details to the LTTE. Gothabaya then gave his concurrence, adding that in any case the LTTE would not undertake any air attacks in the daytime. LTTE'S JAFFNA AIR RAID WAS "PURELY FOR PRESTIGE" -------------- --- ¶3. (C) Turning to the LTTE's April 24 air raid on the Palaly Military Complex in Jaffna, Ambassador asked if the military's response worked as Gothabaya had hoped. Gothabaya explained the operational details of the LTTE's attack and the military's response to it, candidly admitting that the military did not anticipate the LTTE would attack Jaffna, given GSL troop levels and military preparedness. Gothabaya asserted that the attack was a Prabhakaran "play for international prestige" to rally the Tamil Diaspora. Gothabaya made a renewed plea for help with air defense systems, stating that the GSL must "crush" the LTTE's nascent air force before it becomes a formidable fighting force the way the "Sea Tigers" have. Ambassador reassured Gothabaya of the U.S. commitment to help the GSL defend itself against LTTE aggression. Defense Attache detailed the USG's planned operational assistance, including the provision of radar COLOMBO 00000630 002 OF 003 systems under the National Defense Authorization Act. ¶4. (SBU) As if to underline the need for U.S. help, at approximately 11:00 p.m. on April 26, the Sri Lanka electric utility cut power to Colombo and the military began firing anti-aircraft guns from the Katunayake Air Force Base, located adjacent to Bandaranaike International Airport. This was triggered by a report of two LTTE light aircraft over Puttalam, north of Colombo. It was later determined to be a false alarm, with power and normal airport operations resuming approximately one hour later. PUSHING TOWARDS THE VANNI -------------- ¶5. (C) Ambassador urged Rajapaksa to not make a major offensive push into the North because such a push would unleash an escalation of the conflict that would jeopardize peace prospects. Gothabaya detailed a strategy to induce "fear" in the LTTE leadership by using deep penetration units and aerial bombardment to destroy LTTE training camps and cut off avenues of retreat. He expressed his belief that there would never be peace as long as Prabhakaran was leading the LTTE. He vowed not to repeat tactical mistakes of past commanders that allowed the LTTE to retake territory the military had captured, stating that the GSL must "put continuous pressure on the LTTE, or all the sacrifice will be in vain." Gothabaya discussed a meeting he recently had with a retired Israeli intelligence officer who detailed the Israeli strategy of using dozens of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to monitor insurgent activities around the clock. He asserted his desire to do the same in the Vanni, stating that without better intelligence and surveillance abilities, the conflict would drag on, causing more pain to civilians. Gothabaya petitioned for U.S. support in developing Sri Lanka's surveillance abilities, but asserted that the military has no plans for a conventional invasion of LTTE-controlled territory, because that would require twice as many soldiers as currently enlisted in the Sri Lankan armed forces. A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY -------------- ¶6. (C) Ambassador assured Gothabaya that the U.S. supports the GSL's efforts to defend itself against terrorism. However, Ambassador reiterated that President Rajapaksa has a unique opportunity to bring lasting peace to Sri Lanka, with the strong support of the Sinhalese majority, a supportive prime minister, and a strong military. Ambassador urged the government to present a workable power-sharing proposal as the basis for a solution to the conflict to the All Party Representative Committee (APRC). Ambassador reiterated the USG's position that a military invasion of LTTE-controlled territory in the North would not eliminate the LTTE, but would endanger the peace process, urging Gothabaya to counsel his brother in favor of peace. ¶7. (C) Gothabaya asserted that he has advised the President to quickly submit his devolution proposal to the APRC, regardless of whether it has been fine-tuned, so that political discussions can begin. Gothabaya cautioned, however, that Sri Lanka could not accept a cessation of fighting simply for the sake of peace if it resulted in something other than the "unitary state" as the basis for government. He criticized Norway's efforts to end hostilities regardless of the political outcome, and urged Ambassador to convince the international community that Sri COLOMBO 00000630 003 OF 003 Lanka is serious about a political solution. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: Gothabaya outlined a detailed military-political solution to the conflict -- that leans heavily to the military side. His support for a political solution was the clearest he has ever given us. While Gothabaya seems genuinely to hope for a peaceful Sri Lanka at some point in the future, he will continue to try to weaken the LTTE as much as possible before talks begin. BLAKE