LEADING PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR DISCUSSES GSL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000539 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR SCA/INS, USPACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2017 TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV CE SUBJECT: LEADING PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR DISCUSSES GSL THINKING ON DEVOLUTION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND RESETTLEMENT REF: COLOMBO 463 Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr. for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: President Rajapaksa's senior political advisor and brother Basil Rajapaksa told the Ambassador on April 4 that once the All Parties Representative Committee (APRC) reaches agreement on a consensus devolution proposal, the GSL would need the approval of the Supreme Court and two thirds of Parliament before it then submits the package to a nation-wide referendum. On the question of abductions, Rajapaksa thought the USG idea of establishing a process to notify the relatives of those who might be in detention and thereby establish a process of accountability was a good one, and he pledged that he would seek to put it into action. He also revealed that the government has arrested more than two hundred military and police officials for human rights and other crimes. Rajapaksa laughed off allegations that he and others had paid six hundred million Rupees (6 million dollars) to the LTTE to encourage them to help swing the 2005 presidential election in Mahinda Rajapaksa's favor. Comment: GSL plans to gain a national consensus in favor of power-sharing proposals are justified, but suggest that a proposal would not be ready to be tabled for negotiations before the fall at the earliest. This in turn raises the risk that hard-liners within the GSL will push for a continued, concerted military campaign against the LTTE that could produce significant new humanitarian consequences and risk a wider conflict. Co-Chair Ambassadors are now drafting a common set of points we will submit to capitals to seek to avert this wider conflict and preserve the space for peace-making. End Summary. Devolution Process to Assure Majority Support -------------- ¶2. (C) Ambassador expressed concern that the SLFP had delayed submitting its comments on the devolution proposal to the Chairman of the All Parties Representative Committee, Tissa Vitharana. He noted some observers had interpreted the delay as a weakening of support within the SLFP for the devolution process. The Ambassador asked Rajapaksa whether such concerns were valid. Rajapaksa acknowledged that there had been a delay in submitting the SLFP comments, but noted that this was a very sensitive issue that requires support not only of the Sinhala majority but of the Tamils and Muslims as well. He stressed that previous efforts to achieve power sharing, such as the Indo Lanka Accord of 1987, had foundered due to lack of popular support. He also noted the importance of developing a solution that would actually be implemented. The Ambassador agreed on the importance of finding a solution that gains the support of all of Sri Lanka's communities, but also asserted that as long as debate continued on the proposals, fighting was likely to escalate between the two sides with a significant impact likely for civilian casualties and significantly larger numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs). ¶3. (C) At the Ambassador's request, Rajapaksa outlined GSL plans to market the APRC document once a consensus position has been reached. He indicated an extensive process would be required to achieve a popular consensus to implement the wide ranging constitutional changes envisioned. He said the Attorney General would first have to draft the necessary legal amendments to the constitution. These would then have to be approved by the Cabinet, then the Supreme Court and then by two-thirds of Parliament. Assuming parliamentary approval, the government would then organize a country-wide referendum on the proposal. COLOMBO 00000539 002 OF 003 Human Rights -------------- ¶4. (C) Ambassador briefed Rajapaksa on the list of abductions he had presented to Presidential Advisor Weeratunga on March 20 (reftel). The Ambassador underscored that it is essential for the government to take ownership of the abduction issue and establish a process to at least identify those on the list (and others) who are in custody. That by itself would do a lot to dispel widespread rumors that the majority of those abducted had been tortured and killed. Providing information on the whereabouts of the detained to their relatives and allowing independent access by the ICRC or others would mark significant progress by the government and help demonstrate its commitment to human rights. Rajapaksa was aware of the list and said the government was working to identify the whereabouts of those on it. He thought the USG idea of establishing a process to notify the relatives of those who might be in detention and thereby establish a process of accountability was a good one, and he pledged that he himself would seek to put it into action. On the larger question of accountability, Rajapaksa revealed that the government has arrested more than two hundred military and police officials for human rights and other crimes. Many were found to have been working with the LTTE and the underworld. The Ambassador characterized this as important information and encouraged Rajapaksa to make it public and to prosecute and punish these security officials. Helping Vakarai IDPS -------------- ¶5. (C) Noting that he had heard from Defense Secretary Rajapaksa about the concerns the Ambassador had raised about forced resettlement of IDPs back to their villages in and around Vakarai, Rajapaksa outlined the considerable efforts the government is taking to help these IDPs rebuild their lives. He explained that the government had registered by computer 13,889 IDPs who had been resettled in thirteen villages in and around Vakarai. He assured the Ambassador that food and supplies would be provided to all of these IDPs for two months, and longer, if needed. The government had repaired basic infrastructure, including roads and electricity for which they had requested partial reimbursement from the Asian Development Bank. The National Housing Authority had undertaken a comprehensive survey of the damage that had been done to existing housing and calculated that the GSL would need 87 million Rupees (almost a million dollars) to repair the damage, a sum the government was prepared to pay. He complained that on a recent inspection tour he had found that the area south of Sampur (e.g., south of Trincomalee) had no roads, schools or other investment for which many approvals had been given to NGO projects. He said an audit would be needed to find out what had been done with the funds. The Ambassador welcomed the steps the government had taken, but reinforced the importance of the government working with the UNHCR at all stages of the process to ensure no forced resettlement or separation of families. He also said the government should be prepared to take primary responsibility for all the costs associated with resettling the IDPs and that the U.S. and other donors would be prepared to consider funding whatever gaps the GSL could identify. No Secret Deal with LTTE -------------- ¶6. (C) The Ambassador asked about widespread rumors in Colombo that Basil Rajapaksa had concluded a secret deal with COLOMBO 00000539 003 OF 003 the LTTE whereby Basil allegedly had paid six hundred million Rupees (6 million dollars) to the LTTE to encourage them to help swing the 2005 presidential election in Mahinda Rajapaksa's favor. Basil laughed off the reports saying there had been no secret deal. He explained that the Rajapaksa presidential campaign did not have that kind of money to throw around; and that a sum of six million dollars was insignificant for a group such as the LTTE that mobilized hundreds of millions of dollars a month. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Given the failure of all previous efforts to gain a national consensus in favor of power-sharing proposals, the GSL is justified in planning to seek a national consensus through the Supreme Court, Parliament and a nation-wide referendum. However, given the delays that already have taken place in submitting the SLFP proposals and the likelihood that the APRC process will take at least two months, it is likely that the process leading up to a referendum will take a minimum of several additional months and possibly much more. This in turn raises the risk that hard-liners within the GSL will push for a continued, concerted military campaign against the LTTE that will produce significant new humanitarian consequences and risk a wider conflict. Co-Chair Ambassadors are now drafting a common set of points we will submit to capitals to seek to avert this wider conflict and preserve the space for peace-making. BLAKE