SRI LANKA: SCENESETTER FOR SCA PDAS MANN'S VISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000350 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS AND SCA PDAS MANN E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: SCENESETTER FOR SCA PDAS MANN'S VISIT TO COLOMBO Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b, d). ¶1. (C) Your visit to Colombo comes at a critical time. There is a substantial risk of a return to fighting in the east and north in the next few weeks. Prospects are uncertain that the ruling Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) will present a viable devolution proposal to the All-Party Representative Committee that could form the basis for a new round of negotiations. Embassy efforts have made a difference in the humanitarian situation in places like Jaffna, but we have not yet been able to effect an improvement in the government's human rights record. Your meetings with government officials are an invaluable opportunity for us to reinforce the messages agreed on by Co-Chair Ambassadors. You will also have the chance to reach out to the media and the general public in your press conference. DETERIORATING SITUATION ON SEVERAL FRONTS -------------- ¶2. (C) The situation has deteriorated in Sri Lanka since your last visit, and that of Assistant Secretary Boucher. Casualties of GSL soldiers, LTTE cadres, and innocent civilians caught in the crossfire have been rising with the uptick in hostilities. Many foreign tourists and investors, understandably alarmed, are staying away from Sri Lanka. Abductions and kidnappings by paramilitary organizations (such as the Karuna group, or TMVP, and the Eelam People's Democratic Party of Social Affairs Minister Devananda), criminal gangs, and by government security forces, are also on the rise. Sri Lankans, like the international community, are deeply concerned about the climate of fear that now prevails in the country. ¶3. (C) While we perceive no direct threat from the LTTE to Americans or westerners in general, there is a risk that someone could find himself in the wrong place at the wrong time. This nearly happened to Ambassador Blake on February 27, when a delegation he was traveling with to Batticaloa came under an LTTE mortar attack. CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT: WORTH THE PAPER IT'S PRINTED ON -------------- ¶4. (C) The 2002 Cease-fire Agreement between the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has been unraveling by degrees. Both sides bear responsibility for numerous, and increasingly serious, CFA violations. However, it is the new aggressiveness of the government forces, who have been capturing territory in the East from the LTTE, that has increased the likelihood of one side or the other withdrawing from the CFA. It would only take a letter to the Norwegian Foreign Minister, giving two weeks' notice, to do so. Thus far the government remains committed to the CFA. GOVERNMENT PLANS TO TAKE WAR TO NORTH -------------- ¶5. (C) Officially, the President and senior Ministers continue to tell us that they support a negotiated solution to the conflict, while insisting rightly on Sri Lanka's right to defend itself. But there are numerous indications that the military intends to pursue the military campaign into the Tiger's northern stronghold, once they finish remaining operations in the east. Polls show continued strong support in the President's political base in the south for pursuing the military option. If such an expanded military push does take place, the most likely time frame would be in the northeastern dry season of April to August, when weather COLOMBO 00000350 002 OF 004 conditions would be more favorable to the government forces. ¶6. (C) The Embassy continues to say publicly and privately, however, that there can be no military solution to the conflict. Most of our sources, including the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, believe that the government may be underestimating the Tigers' residual capability. Even if government forces were able to occupy the entire territory of the country, including the northern LTTE stronghold of the Vanni, the LTTE could probably carry on indefinitely as an underground guerrilla force and terrorist organization and inflict considerable damage in all parts of the country. ¶7. (C) While it is no doubt true that in some sense the CFA now exists only on paper, it still serves a useful purpose in limiting the level, extent and nature of the escalating violence. Negotiating a new one following the Government's military victories in the East would not be practical. There is growing domestic political pressure on the government to withdraw from the agreement. We need to urge the GSL not to do so. POLITICAL MANEUVERING ENDANGERS "SOUTHERN CONSENSUS" -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Large sectors of the Sri Lankan population, as well as the international community, had invested a great deal of hope in the prospect of a "Southern consensus" on a peace proposal based on the devolution of power to Sri Lanka's regions. However, the President decided not to implement the MoU between his SLFP and the opposition United National Party, preferring to accept 18 "crossovers" from the UNP into the already-bloated cabinet to assure himself a new parliamentary majority. The UNP denounced the move and withdrew from the MoU, but UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe has assured us that his party will continue to support a reasonable devolution proposal as the foundation of a renewed peace process. ¶9. (C) We and the other Co-Chairs, plus India, are pressing the Government to come up as soon as possible with a power-sharing proposal that meets the aspirations of the Tamil people, and those of other communities, that could form the basis for renewed talks with the LTTE. We believe, at a minimum, that the proposals should exceed in scope those that the SLFP put forward under President Kumaratunga in 2000. However, while the President has often spoken of "maximum devolution," it remains unclear whether he is willing to accept a true power-sharing arrangement. His pre-election platform, Mahinda Chintana ("Mahinda's Thoughts"),is explicit in its endorsement of a unitary state and its rejection of federalism. ¶10. (C) The President told Ambassador Blake that he supports the development of a credible devolution proposal that would meet the aspirations of moderate Tamils. Key figures in his Cabinet such as the Foreign Minister and influential UNP crossovers such as Trade Minister Peiris and Tourism Minister Moragoda continue to assure us they believe the President remains committed to this course. ¶11. (C) Others are not so sure. The ad-hoc committee of the ruling Sri Lankan Freedom Party tasked with developing ideas for the All-Party Representative Committee (APRC) is reportedly working ideas that would significantly dilute the Vitharana report. Anything that represents less than what former President Chandrika Kumaratunga proposed in 2000 (which was rejected at that time by the parliament) is unlikely to be viable as the basis for a negotiated settlement. This would be a serious setback for the peace process. It will be important for you to urge all your interlocutors to have the SLFP and UNP work together within COLOMBO 00000350 003 OF 004 the APRC to ensure that the consensus document that emerges from the APRC exceeds the 2000 Kumaratunga proposal. HUMAN RIGHTS: FIGHTING THE "CULTURE OF IMPUNITY" -------------- ¶12. (C) The GSL barely bothers to deny any more that the security forces are involved in extrajudicial "disappearances" ) and worse. While there are ministers, such as Human Rights Minister Samarasinghe, who clearly want to do the right thing and are disturbed by these reports, they are not the ones who wield clout on security policy. Defense Secretary Rajapaksa and the security establishment appear convinced that they will need to roll up networks of LTTE agents and sympathizers in the government-controlled south to win the fight against the Tigers, and that this justifies the use of extralegal methods. They have not yet been swayed by the argument ) which we have made repeatedly ) that a democratically elected government must hold itself to a higher standard than that employed by a terrorist organization. We have also noted that these tactics can backfire, creating more sympathy for the Tigers and driving even moderate Tamils into their arms. COMMISSION OF INQUIRY AND INTERNATIONAL PANEL -------------- ¶13. (C) An ad-hoc group of countries (U.S., UK, Canada, Australia, Netherlands, India and the EU),following a green light be UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour, has appointed members to an International Independent Group of Eminent Persons, or IIGEP, to assist the national Commission of Inquiry (CoI) on Human Rights established by President Rajapaksa. This is perhaps the best chance for the international community to help bring some accountability into GSL human rights practices and help clear up some of the most reprehensible cases of violations by both the GSL and the LTTE. ¶14. (C) Unfortunately, there are signs that the Attorney General's office is attempting to hamstring both the CoI and the IIGEP. American representative Gene Dewey has joined his international colleagues in trying to push back to establish a clear and robust mandate for the Commission and the international panel to carry out their work. The Ambassador has said publicly and privately that while we welcome the important work of the COI, the GSL must also take concrete action to stop the disappearances, abductions and killings, and prosecute those responsible. If the GSL continues to stiff-arm the international community, the UN already has begun a dialogue with the GSL to deploy international human rights monitors. We should also be prepared to support a strong statement in the Human Rights Commission in Geneva. ECONOMIC OUTLOOK -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Sri Lanka's gross domestic product grew by an estimated 7 percent in 2006 to about $27.4 billion, or about $1,375 per capita. The telecommunications, ports, construction, and agriculture sectors are all healthy. This rapid growth rate was accompanied by double digit inflation and the depreciation of the Sri Lankan Rupee, however, as the government borrowed heavily to finance deficit spending on military and social programs. So far, the erosion of consumer purchasing power has not become a political issue. ¶16. (SBU) Both the government and major businesses in Colombo are counting on Sri Lanka's "resilience" to insulate the economy from events involving the conflict. COLOMBO 00000350 004 OF 004 Historically, this has been true, but if the LTTE were to successfully attack a major economic target, as they did with the airport in 2001, they could drag the economy down significantly. ¶17. (C) With this in mind, Post has been encouraging business leaders to more actively press the government to pursue a peaceful solution to the conflict. Businesspeople agree with us that a resolution must be political, not military, but they have been timid about saying so publicly. They fear repercussions ) either from the government viewing such statements as criticism or from ultranationalists charging them with being unpatriotic. In your discussions with the government, you could emphasize that peaceful resolution of the conflict could unlock significant economic growth potential in the north and the east, which would contribute greatly to the Mahinda Chintana goal of reducing poverty and speeding development. PUSHING CO-CHAIR AGENDA: BACK TO BASICS -------------- ¶18. (C) We are seeking appointments for you with the President, Foreign Secretary Palitha Kohona (also chair of the GSL Peace Secretariat, SCOPP),Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa, and Treasury Secretary P.B. Jayasundera. Foreign Minister Bogollagama will be in the UK March 7-9, but will likely host a dinner for you on March 10. We should use your meetings to reinforce the points agreed with the Co-Chair Ambassadors in Colombo: o Sri Lanka has an important opportunity now to achieve peace. o Hope the SLFP and the APRC will develop as rapidly as possible a credible power-sharing proposal that will be acceptable to moderate Tamils and India and will exceed in scope the SLFP proposals put forward by President Kumaratunga in 2000. o We welcome the beginning of the work by the Commission of Inquiry and a group of eminent persons. To be effective, both bodies must be permitted to undertake their work in an independent and impartial manner. o The Government of Sri Lanka must take concrete actions now to address growing human rights abuses in Sri Lanka. In particular, killings, abductions and kidnappings must stop. o The government must also stop the illegal activities of the Karuna group and take rapid measures to re-establish Government control of law and order in the East. ¶19. (SBU) For your press conference in March 9, we should take the line: o The U.S. and the other Co-Chairs believe the conflict can only be solved through a negotiated settlement that takes into account the legitimate interests and aspirations of all communities, whether Sinhalese, Tamil, or Muslim. o We believe Sri Lanka now has an important opportunity to develop a power-sharing proposal that could form the basis for renewed talks with the LTTE. We hope the SLFP and the UNP will work together within the APRC to fashion a proposal that will meet the needs of the Tamil and other communities. o We should again call on the LTTE to renounce terrorism, give up violence, and join in negotiating a peaceful solution to Sri Lanka's conflict that will satisfy the aspirations of all the country's people. BLAKE