Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07COLOMBO338
2007-03-01 02:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

SRI LANKA: FORMER PRESIDENT KUMARATUNGA EXCORIATES

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS ECON CE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000338 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS ECON CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: FORMER PRESIDENT KUMARATUNGA EXCORIATES
HER SUCCESSOR

REF: COLOMBO 337 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b, d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000338

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS ECON CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: FORMER PRESIDENT KUMARATUNGA EXCORIATES
HER SUCCESSOR

REF: COLOMBO 337 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b, d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Former President Chandrika Kumaratunga
expressed strong disapproval of President Rajapaksa's
approach to governance in a meeting with Ambassador on
February 26. She feared that the current government was
committed to trying to resolve the country's ethnic conflict
through purely military means, but said she did not think
this would succeed. The recent cabinet reshuffle had
produced further instability, she said, noting that there was
an undercurrent of unease in the ruling party about the
President's autocratic style and the influence of his
brothers. She thought the government's popularity would sag
as the consequences of inappropriate economic policies began
to take hold. She denied harboring any further political
ambitions, adding that the President had advised her to
reside abroad. End summary.

GOVERNMENT COMMITTED TO WAR?
--------------


2. (C) Former President Chandrika Kumaratunga told
Ambassador on February 26 that her successor Mahinda
Rajapaksa clearly intended to lead the country down the path
of war. He and his advisors had opted to try for a military
solution to the problem posed by the ethnic conflict, she
thought. However, she was convinced that they would not
succeed in this. She claimed that she had always supported
maximum power sharing as the way to bridge the ethnic divide.
However, Rajapaksa, "quite unnecessarily" in her view, had
sought an alliance with the radical Sinhalese nationalist
parties JVP and JHU, thus sharpening the conflict. She noted
that support for devolution by the Sinhalese majority had
undergone wide fluctuations, depending on the messages sent
by the country's leaders. At the moment, sentiment for
power-sharing was at a low ebb.

DEVOLUTION OF POWER THE ONLY ANSWER

--------------


3. (C) Kumaratunga noted that the current constitution
requires a two-thirds majority to make major institutional
changes. Sri Lanka's proportional representation electoral
system meant that only cooperation between the two major
parties could produce this constitutional majority. The
recent political maneuvering may have brought the President
short-term advantages, but a devolution proposal would still
need the support of the principal opposition UNP. She said
that the sacking of two SLFP ministers, including former
Foreign Minister Samaraweera, had only brought further
instability. Regional party meetings called to endorse the
president's move had not produced a single resolution
endorsing the firing of the ministers, she noted.


4. (C) Kumaratunga predicted that the government would run
into serious political problems within a few months because
"they are having trouble running the economy properly." She
believed that accelerating inflation and anemic job creation
would sap the government's present high popularity with the
Sinhalese majority.

NOT SEEKING A COMEBACK
--------------


5. (C) Kumaratunga commented that politics in Sri Lanka had
become such a "filthy and dangerous business" that "decent
people don't want to enter politics any more." She denied
that she had any further political ambitions and said
categorically that she was not seeking to make a comeback.
However, she was contemplating making a statement about the

COLOMBO 00000338 002 OF 002


condition of the country before redeparting for London (where
she lives near her grown children). She added that even if
she wanted to remain in Sri Lanka, the President had advised
her against it: "Honestly, madam, I think you ought to go
abroad."

DRIFTING TOWARD DICTATORSHIP?
--------------


6. (C) Kumaratunga noted that President Rajapaksa is
intolerant of criticism from any quarter. For example, she
said, he did not permit any discussion of Sri Lanka's
problems with abductions and disappearances in Cabinet
meetings. This was one of the reasons that Foreign Minister
Samaraweera had been sacked, she added. She did not think
the government was conducting serious investigations into
these incidents. She would not be surprised if the President
invoked his powers under the Constitution, never used until
now, to prorogue Parliament and rule by executive decree.
Even ministers were intimidated to the degree that they were
afraid to be seen meeting with her, she said, resorting
instead to sending her "secret messages." She feared the
country was drifting toward a dictatorship.


7. (C) COMMENT: Some of the bile Chandrika directed at her
successor undoubtedly stems from pique at being frozen out of
the SLFP power structure. Although some her criticism
appears overblown, it reflects an undercurrent of unease in
part of the ruling party at the President's autocratic style
and the influence wielded by his closest, unelected advisors
-- especially his two brothers Gothabaya and Basil. So far,
few members of the SLFP have dared to challenge the
President's authority. However, setbacks to the government,
especially any significant military misadventures, could
cause the latent discontent to break out into the open.
BLAKE