SRI LANKA: MILITARY VICTORIES IN THE EAST PAVE WAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 COLOMBO 000265 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS, MCC FOR S GROFF, D NASSIRY, E BURKE AND F REID E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM ECON MOPS CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: MILITARY VICTORIES IN THE EAST PAVE WAY FOR DE-COUPLING OF NORTHERN AND EASTERN PROVINCES REF: A. COLOMBO 140 ¶B. COLOMBO 68 ¶C. COLOMBO 221 Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The military victories of the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) security forces against the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Vakarai, Sampur and elsewhere in the eastern province mark a significant change in the balance of power. The consensus, with which we agree, is that the capture of Vakarai signifies that the armed forces will assume complete control over the Eastern Province within several months. The military victories in the east have emboldened the Government of Sri Lanka to pursue a political strategy of decoupling the east from the north by voiding the merger of the northern and eastern provinces. To ensure that the LTTE does not try to regain either political or military control, many observers believe the Government's strategy will now be to step up its collusion with the Karuna paramilitary in the east with the eventual goal of establishing Karuna as a new proxy Tamil political leader in the east, just as it is trying to build up EPDP leader Douglas Devananda in the north. Already the Karuna faction has quietly established political offices in several parts of the east and Colombo. However, Karuna has simultaneously stepped up child recruitment, extortion, abductions and many other illegal activities that undercut Karuna's potential political support in the east and make international support impossible. Many Tamils allege that the Government also intends to continue concentrating more Sinhalese in the eastern region and not allowing Tamil IDPs and refugees who were displaced during fighting in 2006 to return to their villages. The Government denies these charges. Vakarai is both a military and propaganda defeat of major proportions for the LTTE. The LTTE will almost certainly try to strike back in the south to show it is still a force to be reckoned with. Paragraphs 19-21 suggest implications for the peace process and messages the Co-Chairs should continue to convey. End summary. Marked Military Advantage -------------- ¶2. (C) The military victories of the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) security forces against the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Vakarai, Sampur and elsewhere in the eastern province mark a significant change in the status quo. The government forces have re-balanced the east to the disadvantage of the LTTE. We, and many observers, including Kumar Rupasinghe of the Colombo think tank Foundation for Co-Existence, that the capture of Vakarai signifies that the armed forces will assume complete control over the Eastern Province within several months. Decoupling the North and East -------------- ¶3. (C) In conjunction with its recent military success, the Government has followed a new political strategy to decouple the east from the north. The 1987 Indo-Lankan accord first merged the North and East Provinces in order to establish a Tamil-majority area that eventually could be ruled by Tamils under a federal system to be negotiated later. The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka ruled on October 30, 2006 against the merger of the two provinces. However, several recent devolution proposals including the Majority Expert Panel report recommended that the Eastern Province be re-merged with the Northern Province for a period of ten years. ¶4. (C) The panel's recommendation has excited some controversy. Many Sinhalese and Muslims objected to the merger from the start. Sinhalese experts such as retired COLOMBO 00000265 002 OF 005 Ambassador Nanda Godage, one of Sri Lanka's most senior retired diplomats, assert that the Indo-Lanka Accord was forced on Sri Lanka by India and that then-President Jayawardene agreed to the merger only under the condition that a referendum be held within a year to allow the people of the east to decide whether the merger should continue. ¶5. (C) Muslims in the east also objected to the merger. They contend that by merging the two provinces, the Government of Sri Lanka and India in effect diluted the strong majorities the Muslims enjoyed in several parts of the East. The Muslims therefore support GSL efforts to de-merge the two provinces. ¶6. (C) The extent to which the east constitutes a Tamil homeland also remains the subject of hot dispute. The Indo-Lanka Accord referred to the North and East as "areas of historical habitation of Sri Lankan Tamil people." However, many Sinhalese assert that the Sinhalese Kings ruled the East in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries and that it was only in the 19th century that Tamils from South India moved to Trincomalee, Batticaloa and the Vanni. Sinhalese also note that there is extensive archaeological, and anthropological evidence to prove the East was never a traditional Tamil-speaking area. ¶7. (C) In fact, both the historical and the archeological records on this are mixed. Sri Lankan Tamil scholars respond that Tamil habitation in Trincomalee has been documented since the first Century A.D. Later, settlers also arrived from the Indian state of Kerala, accounting for a matriarchal property inheritance system still practiced in some areas. In Batticaloa, the presence of Tamil words in the language of the Veddah (pre-Sinhalese aboriginals) testifies to the antiquity of Tamil settlement there. Finally, one of the Kandyan dynasties the Sinhalese chauvinists refer to, the Nakkayars, was an ethnic Tamil one, whose wives they imported from India to maintain the Tamil identity of the dynasty. Sinhalization of the East -------------- ¶8. (C) Both Tamils and Muslims allege there has been a systematic effort dating back many years to settle Sinhalese in the east and thereby dilute the majorities the Tamils and Muslims enjoy in many parts of the east. There is no recent census to conclusively prove such allegations. In the current demographic balance of the East, Sri Lanka's major ethnic communities -- the Sinhalese, the Tamils, and the Tamil-speaking Muslims - are in approximate equilibrium. But Kumar Rupasinghe, the respected head of the Foundation for Co-Existence, told us "Trincomalee is recognized as a strategic and political asset of the Sri Lankan state," therefore "efforts will be made to ensure that Trincomalee is defended by an enhanced military presence and a strong Sinhalese population in the town. The manipulation of populations will likely endanger ethnic co-existence between the communities." ¶9. (C) M.R. Narayanswami, Indo-Asian news service journalist and author of the definitive biography of Prabhakaran, expressed concern to poloff over this alleged Sinhalization and said that "there will be no peace in Sri Lanka" no matter how much territory the security forces capture in the east or north. "The international community, including the US, is taking a partisan pro-GSL stand. The LTTE may be a terrorist group, but that is what they were long before the international community (apart from India) began using this term. Either the LTTE represents the Tamils or it does not. If the latter is true, then why should Tamils suffer for the faults of the LTTE? On top of this, the international COLOMBO 00000265 003 OF 005 community tells us that Tamils should be happy with a unitary system. A country which cannot accept the majority group's recommendations on moderate federalism cannot have peace." The Supreme Court decision of October 30 to that effect cannot be seen in isolation; it was part and parcel of the government strategy. If President Rajapaksa had wanted, under the now-defunct MoU with the UNP, to reconstitute the merged northeast province on a legally defensible basis, it was abundantly clear that the votes were available. Including the deputies of the Tamil National Alliance, there could have been a "constitutional" two-thirds majority for the re-merger. However, this was not the government's game plan, Narayanswami points out. ¶10. (C) The military activity has brought with it the shift of more than 200,000 civilians in the east, according to UNHCR figures. Tamil politicians allege that many displaced Tamils will not be allowed to resettle in their original villages, particularly those south of the strategically important port of Trincomalee. Ambassador has raised these concerns with the Defense Secretary and senior military leaders, all of whom reject these charges and rejoin that they will resettle Tamils in Vakarai and near Sampur (ref A). But Tamil politicians continue to express strong doubts. Revitalizing Commerce Essential But Maintain Ethnic Balance -------------- -------------- ¶11. (C) Tamil politicians also allege that the Government intends to establish high security zones, a Special Economic Zone and locate a new coal-fired power plant in Sampur that will displace Tamil villages. The Indian Government, which is very sensitive to any possibility of displacing Tamils, has asked to see alternative sites for the power plants to avoid any Tamil displacement. The exact location of the proposed SEZ remains unclear but there is no question it would play a positive role in helping to rebuild the economy of the area. Foreign investors in two of Trincomalee's major manufacturing operations, a flour mill and an oil distribution terminal, told Econoff that commerce would come back if the government could ensure a more secure living environment, provide better education and training resources for local students and workers, and improve Trincomalee's aging infrastructure. ¶12. (C) The General Manager of Prima Ceylon and the Finance VP for Lanka Indian Oil Company (LIOC) both are having trouble hiring qualified workers because candidates fear the security situation will again deteriorate. A lack of local university and vocational training programs exacerbates the shortage of accountants, engineers, chemists, and even equipment operators. The Prima GM noted that a German NGO-run skills training center was doing excellent work and said that his and other companies would surely support development of similar centers. ¶13. (C) Improved infrastructure would reduce Trincomalee manufacturers' highest operating costs: transportation and power. Currently Prima's flour and LIOC's oil take eight hours or more to ship by truck from Trincomalee to Colombo (270 kilometers). The journey is slowed by poor road conditions and numerous security checkpoints. Improved roads would reduce the 25 percent downtime that Prima's trucks experience due to accidents, maintenance, and time waiting at checkpoints. (Note: Sri Lanka's Millennium Challenge Account compact proposal includes upgrading this road as a priority.) Prima and LIOC also would like to see a more reliable power supply, as they currently use generators to supplement power from the grid. ¶14. (C) Trincomalee chamber of commerce members likewise say that business in Trincomalee would flourish again if the COLOMBO 00000265 004 OF 005 government would permit more normal commercial activity. Restrictions on fishing, reduced inward flow of inputs like seeds and fertilizer, and even parking restrictions are all dampening trade. As a result, residents have little income and are unable to buy much from local shopkeepers, who in turn are reluctant to stock their shelves. These business owners would like to see government security checkpoints run more efficiently so that goods would not sit for long periods waiting to be checked; police officers riding on buses to facilitate transit through checkpoints; and provision of cold storage facilities so that fish and produce could be kept fresh longer. The Karuna Factor: The Security Forces' Frankenstein? -------------- ¶15. (C) Another part of the Government's strategy to consolidate control in the East is to build up the political stature of former LTTE eastern commander, Vinayakamoorthy Muraleetharan, widely known as "Karuna." The Government successfully exploited a widening rift between LTTE supremo Prabhakaran and Karuna and succeeded in wooing Karuna over to its side. Karuna is now vehemently against the LTTE objective of a separate state and ostensibly favors power-sharing with a separate status for the East. ¶16. (C) The government, in allying itself with Karuna, has acquired a valuable counterinsurgency tactical tool, in that Tamil-speaking Karuna cadres familiar with LTTE operations can easily penetrate LTTE-controlled areas in ways the Sinhalese-dominated security forces cannot. However, Karuna continues to employ some of the tactics out of the LTTE manual, and some others as well that will not stand up to international scrutiny, including kidnappings for ransom, forced recruitment of child soldiers, assassinations, and intimidation of the media. ¶17. (C) Many local observers believe the Government's ultimate objective is to build up Karuna as a new proxy Tamil political leader in the east, just as it is trying to build up the EPDP's Douglas Devananda in the north. Already the Karuna faction has quietly established political offices in several parts of the east and Colombo. However, Karuna has simultaneously stepped up child recruitment, extortion, abductions and and many other illegal activities that undercut Karuna's potential political support in the east and make international support impossible. RIP CFA? -------------- ¶18. (C) The loss of the East means that the Cease-fire Agreement of 2002 is effectively dead. The CFA states that "in areas where localities have not clearly been established, the status quo as regards the areas controlled by the GSL and LTTE on December 24, 2001 shall continue to apply pending demarcation." However, as Norwegian Ambassador informed the Ambassador, the SLMM was never able to demarcate the east because it was so controversial. The LTTE nonetheless controlled substantial areas of the East at that time, almost all of which it has now lost as a result of recent fighting. The LTTE therefore will be likely to assert that a return to the CFA, and by implication, a withdrawal by Government forces of all the territory they won in the course of 2006, will be a precondition for the LTTE's return to talks. President Rajapakse effectively ruled out such a return when he told a BBC interviewer on February 9 that Sri Lanka made a mistake by agreeing to a peace pact in 2002 that demarcated LTTE controlled areas. Implications for Peace Process COLOMBO 00000265 005 OF 005 -------------- ¶19. (C) The Government's military victories in the East and its political strategy to de-couple the northern and eastern provinces have significant implications for the peace process and present several strategic questions for the Co-Chairs. In the short term almost all observers believe the LTTE will try to attack military targets in the south to demonstrate it retains the capability to strike the GSL anywhere at any time and to counter perceptions that it is a spent military force. ¶20. (C) Longer term, the developments in the east mean that it will be very difficult for Norway to re-convene the peace talks on the basis of the 2002 Cease-fire Agreement. In his February 1-2 meeting with Norwegian Ambassador Brattskar (ref c),LTTE Chief Negotiator Tamilselvan stated the parties would need to go back to the CFA in order to re-start talks. Brattskar said Tamilselvan left what Brattskar termed as "strategic uncertainty" about whether the LTTE would insist that the GSL withdraw from the areas it has occupied in the east in 2006. All Co-Chair Ambassadors believe it would be politically impossible for the GSL to give up the land it has fought so hard to gain in the east. Allowing the LTTE to insist on this condition will prevent the talks from even starting. ¶21. (C) There are several other areas, however, where it will be important for the Co-Chairs to continue to lay down clear markers for the Government: -- Discourage military offensive in the north: a decision to mount a military offensive in the north would likely invite an even harsher LTTE retaliation in the south and possibly elsewhere and make a return to talks that much more difficult. It will therefore be important for the Co-Chairs to continue to discourage a GSL military offensive. -- Allow Tamil resettlement in east: the Co-Chairs need to continue to encourage the GSL to allow Tamil internally displaced persons and refugees from India to be resettled in their villages in the east so the ethnic balance is not disturbed. -- Discourage economic revitalization efforts that could displace Tamil populations: while GSL efforts to promote new investment in Trincomalee and other parts of the east will be welcome and should help bring much needed employment and income to the area, the Co-Chairs should continue to urge the GSL not to establish special economic zones or new investments in a manner that would disturb the ethnic balance of the region. We also need to be alert to the possibility that the government will seek funding from the donor community for large infrastructure development projects undertaken without adequate community consultation. -- Karuna: the international community should insist that the Karuna faction abandon its kidnappings for ransom, forced recruitment of child soldiers, assassinations, and intimidation of the media on a sustained and verifiable basis before acceding to probable GSL efforts to legitimize Karuna as a Tamil alternative to the LTTE in the East. BLAKE