SRI LANKA: AMBASSADOR URGES PRESIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000257 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS MCC FOR S GROFF, D NASSIRY, E BURKE AND F REID E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: AMBASSADOR URGES PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND A DEVOLUTION STRATEGY REF: COLOMBO 0176 Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a candid, hour-long meeting with President Rajapaksa on February 9, Ambassador pressed the President to show personal leadership in taking concrete steps to improve his government's human rights performance. Rajapaksa weighed in against a proposal by members of Congress to appoint a U.S. special envoy to Sri Lanka. The Ambassador urged Rajapaksa to develop a credible devolution proposal with broad political support, emphasizing that this would isolate and marginalize the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Rajapaksa opined that all political parties must be involved in the formulation of a devolution strategy and that the current domestic political turmoil must subside before progress can be expected. End summary. -------------- Lukewarm Response on Special Envoy Proposal -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by DCM, met with a relaxed President Rajapaksa, who was joined by Foreign Secretary Palitha Kohona, at Temple Trees on February 9. He SIPDIS opened by asking the President's views on appointing a U.S. special envoy to Sri Lanka, as proposed in a January 31 Congressional letter to President Bush. Rajapaksa laughed, replying "Who needs a special envoy on human rights? You are after us all the time about human rights." Rajapaksa said the appointment of a special envoy was "not a good idea" because it could spark popular opposition to the U.S. Rajapaksa claimed credit for "making the people understand that the U.S. is Sri Lanka's main supporter" and worried that a special envoy might turn public opinion against the U.S. The President added that the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry (COI) to investigate human rights violations and the arrival this week of a team of international observers to monitor the work of the COI (the Independent International Group of Independent Persons - IIGEP, which includes former Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration Gene Dewey) would make a special envoy redundant. -------------- -- President Must Show Leadership on Human Rights -------------- -- ¶3. (C) Using the Congressional letter as an opening to appeal directly and personally to Rajapaksa to improve his government's human rights performance, the Ambassador maintained that while Sri Lanka has done much on the "process" side, including the creation of the IIGEP and numerous commissions, the GSL has failed to create viable institutions and mechanisms to prosecute human rights violators. As a result, the Ambassador continued, in the absence of effective investigations and with virtually no human rights cases ever coming to trial, Sri Lankans live in a climate of fear. He stressed that the President must demonstrate personal leadership and undertake meaningful actions to improve the human rights environment in the country. He offered to provide U.S. technical assistance in forensics and other investigatory resources. -------------- -------------- "They Tried to Kill My Brother; What Are We Supposed to Do?" -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Rajapaksa, however, would not allow himself to be drawn into a serious discussion of human rights. Instead, he railed against the LTTE, saying "they tried to kill my brother (Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa, on December 1) and then they killed the Hindu priest who garlanded me in COLOMBO 00000257 002 OF 004 Vakarai. What are we supposed to do?" (Note: Four days after Rajapaksa's triumphal February 3 visit to Vakarai following the Sri Lankan military's successful campaign to dislodge the LTTE from its last stronghold on the east coast, the Hindu priest who greeted the President was taken from his home and killed by gunmen, who the government alleges were LTTE cadres.) Rajapaksa also blasted the LTTE for hiring criminals to carry out assassinations and abductions. He implausibly contended that abductions have recently stopped, an unsupportable claim which the Ambassador challenged as fiction. -------------- A "To Do" List for the President -------------- ¶5. (C) Reiterating his appeal to Rajapaksa to take immediate, concrete action to improve the human rights environment, the Ambassador handed him a list of recommendations that came out of a meeting he recently chaired with all of Sri Lanka's major human rights organizations. The President thanked him for the list, which he promised to study seriously. The recommendations (reftel) were: -- Implement or amend the 17th Amendment in order to activate the independent commissions. Due to their inactivity, there is little or no accountability by power holders. -- Allow the Constitutional Council to appoint suitable persons with good track records to the National Human Rights Commission. The persons who were appointed to the Presidential Commission of Inquiry to investigate into serious violations of human rights are good examples of suitable persons. -- Activate the MOU with the UNP to cooperate both on good governance and the peace process. -- Reactivate the peace process by honoring the Ceasefire Agreement, and getting the Norwegian facilitators and the SLMM back into action. -- Give humanitarian access to NGOs in conflict areas in the east and Jaffna. -- Stop anti-NGO propaganda by state media. -- Compensate civilian victims of violence equitably. The compensation packages extended to the victims of the bus bombings in the south should be extended to victims of air and mortar bombing and collateral damage in the northeast. -- Permit freedom of expression to the media and freedom of meeting to political and civic activists to peacefully canvass their causes without harassment. -- Implement a Media Freedom Act. -- Take seriously Ambassador Rock's report of complicity between GSL security forces and the Karuna Faction and address this concern within the military. Monitor the actions of the Karuna Faction and provide redress to families and communities who have had their children abducted. -- Investigate immediately human rights abuses, specifically abductions and extrajudicial killings, and take appropriate measures to prosecute and punish those responsibly. Ensure transparency so the public is aware of actions taken to punish human rights violators. COLOMBO 00000257 003 OF 004 -- Implement a fair Freedom of Information Act to reduce corruption. -------------- -------------- A Credible Devolution Strategy Would Marginalize the LTTE -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Turning to a political way forward in the stalled peace process, the Ambassador said he had recently met several cabinet members, including newly appointed Foreign Minister Rohitha Bogollogama, as well as other political leaders, to discuss possible mechanisms for the devolution of power. The Ambassador urged the President to formulate a devolution proposal that would address the rights and aspirations of Tamil-speaking people. He stressed that a credible devolution proposal with broad political support, including from the United National Party (UNP),Tamil moderates, and the overseas Tamil diaspora, represents the best opportunity to move the country toward peace and isolate the LTTE. With such a proposal in hand, he continued, the LTTE would be marginalized. ¶7. (C) The President said he believed a proposal based on the Indian panchayat system to decentralize decision making and resource allocation to the local level would be appropriate for Sri Lanka. Rajapaksa noted that he wanted all parties to have the opportunity to submit proposals. The Ambassador worried, however, that in the process of drawn-out party consultations, a strong devolution plan would almost certainly be watered down, particularly by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). Rajapaksa maintained that all parties would need to be consulted, but the JVP could be "managed." He acknowledged that the recent crossover of 18 UNP MPs to the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the reassignment of many cabinet portfolios had created an unsettled political climate which would delay for at least a few weeks serious inter-party consultations on devolution proposals. -------------- Disarm Now, Talk Later -------------- ¶8. (C) While agreeing with the Ambassador that there can be no military solution to the conflict, Rajapaksa nevertheless provided no indication that following the military's recent success in Vakarai his government plans to moderate military action against the LTTE. He insisted that the GSL has to "end the LTTE's firepower and disarm them. Then we will come to talks." The Ambassador countered that the effort to achieve a workable devolution strategy must be the government's first priority and should not be held up by its military agenda. Besides, he continued, a credible devolution proposal with broad political backing would isolate LTTE leader Prabhakaran and his extremist approach and violent methods. The Ambassador added that the radar-based maritime surveillance system that the U.S. is helping Sri Lanka build to monitor waters off the north and east coasts will be a significant deterrent to the LTTE's efforts to bring in arms. -------------- Political Agenda Comes First -------------- ¶9. (C) COMMENT: Clearly, the President's immediate priority is to consolidate his party's political strength in the wake of recent cross-overs and cabinet changes. During the meeting, Rajapaksa told the Ambassador he had earlier that day signed letters stripping SLFP dissidents Mangala Samaraweera, Minister of Ports and Aviation (and until recently Foreign Minister),and Anura Bandaranaike, Minister COLOMBO 00000257 004 OF 004 of National Heritage (and brother of former president Chandrika Kumaratunga) of their portfolios (septel). The President is almost certainly correct in his assessment that meaningful progress on a devolution strategy is unlikely until the domestic political situation settles out. Nevertheless, we will continue to press Rajapaksa and other senior leaders on the importance of achieving broad political support for a credible devolution proposal and the urgent need for the government to take concrete actions to improve its human rights performance. The President said he would welcome future opportunities such as this for frank and private exchanges with the Ambassador. BLAKE