Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07COLOMBO214
2007-02-05 13:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

SRI LANKA: DEFENSE SECRETARY RECKONS TIGER GROUND

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000214 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS, MCC FOR S GROFF, D NASSIRY, E BURKE
AND F REID

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: DEFENSE SECRETARY RECKONS TIGER GROUND
FORCES WEAKENED, BUT SEA TIGERS STILL FIERCE

REF: A. COLOMBO 189

B. COLOMBO 158

Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000214 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS, MCC FOR S GROFF, D NASSIRY, E BURKE AND F REID E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: DEFENSE SECRETARY RECKONS TIGER GROUND FORCES WEAKENED, BUT SEA TIGERS STILL FIERCE REF: A. COLOMBO 189 ¶B. COLOMBO 158 Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa offered his interpretation of the government security forces' January victory in Vakarai to Ambassador and DATT on February 5 and explained the government's current military strategy. Gothabaya noted that the security forces encountered predominantly younger, less committed Tiger cadres in Vakarai. The GSL's redevelopment efforts in the east, he theorized, would head off any re-infiltration by the Tigers and allow the security forces to "devote their full forces" elsewhere. In particular, the military would seek to neutralize the LTTE's navy, the "Sea Tigers." Gothabaya was silent on whether the Army would attempt a major offensive in the North. End summary. Cadres Forego Cyanide -------------- ¶2. (C) Ambassador, DATT and PolMilOff met Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) Defense Secretary (and brother to the President) Gothabaya Rajapaksa on February 5. Rajapaksa offered his interpretation of the government security forces' January victory in Vakarai and explained the GSL's current military strategy. Ambassador commended the Secretary for conducting a successful battle with such low civilian causalities, after the initial shelling incident. Gotabaya claimed that no civilians had been killed and only 40 soldiers had been killed in action in the two and a half month fight for Vakarai. He emphasized that the military had been able to minimize civilian and troop causalities by surrounding Vakarai with small Special Forces teams rather than large battalions and moving without a "logistical tail" open to Tiger (LTTE) ambush. ¶3. (C) According to the Defense Secretary, the security forces encountered predominantly younger Tiger cadres in Vakarai, at least 40 percent under the age of 18, and noticeably less well-trained. These cadres also appeared to be less committed to fighting for the LTTE, he said, indicating why they were willing to flee in the end. Many more of these cadres underwent forced recruitment than in previous years, claimed Gothabaya: "We can see that the lower-ranked c
adres have not come out willingly. They have little motivation to fight. They aren't committed, and in fact try to escape. We have intelligence that elsewhere in Batticaloa district LTTE cadres are waiting for a battle in which they can surrender." The security forces captured a number of Tiger cadres in Vakarai. On the other hand, very few made use of the cyanide capsule all wear around their necks for that eventuality, according to the Secretary. Resettlement and Development -------------- ¶4. (C) As the conflict has dragged on, noted the Defense Secretary, "families have not been willing to contribute SIPDIS their children. Their motivating factor was an independent state. They thought they didn't get enough from Sinhalese governments. Now we are making an effort to provide basic requirements -- electricity, education, roads, houses -- and the people see the difference." Ambassador revised reports that the GSL planned to resettle retired Sinhalese military officers in Tamil areas. Gothabaya denied this and other speculation by the pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance (TNA) and others that the GSL is pursuing a "Sinhalization" program in the east, adding that the Sinhalese population in Trincomalee district has decreased from 31 percent to 21 percent since ¶1981. Presidential Advisor (and brother) Basil Rajapaska was COLOMBO 00000214 002 OF 002 overseeing the Resettlement Ministry's early work to resettle Tamil civilians in Vakarai, Gothabaya said, where the GSL hoped to provide electricity within ten days. ¶5. (C) Gothabaya said the GSL would use "minimum police force" to maintain GSL control of Vakarai and other "liberated" areas in the east, such as Sampur, "so we can concentrate our full forces on other things." He affirmed that the GSL would implement development projects soon to minimize the threat of re-infiltration by the LTTE. "There must be a reaction from normal civilians to reject the LTTE," he said, adding that the International Labor Organization (ILO) is considering a livelihoods project in Vakarai, while the French government may be willing to rebuild the A15 highway. Sea Tigers Strong -------------- ¶6. (C) While the LTTE's ground forces are clearly weaker following the security forces' victories in the east, Gothabaya said, the LTTE's navy, the "Sea Tigers," remain strong. The Sea Tiger attack on a GSL food convoy at Point Pedro, Jaffna in January emboldened the LTTE by their sinking of two dvora "fast boats" and made the Sri Lankan Navy timid, he thought. "The Navy is no longer as aggressive. It wants to protect its assets, so the Sea Tigers have more leeway. We must neutralize the Sea Tigers. We must give the Navy some help by finding and destroying more Sea Tiger bases and assets." In the Defense Secretary's view, the January 27 Sea Tiger attack attempt on Colombo's port targeted a naval ship donated by India, rather than commercial vessels. Nevertheless, the LTTE would continue to seek soft targets in Colombo and the south as "part of their demoralization plan." Overall Strategy -------------- ¶7. (C) Comment: Gothabaya assured us that the President remains committed to the peace process "without delay, and without respect to the military." We understand that the security forces will try to consolidate the GSL's hold on the east, and that the military will also pursue Sea Tiger and artillery targets in the east and in the Tiger's northern Vanni stronghold. Gothabaya was silent on whether the Army would attempt a full-scale invasion of the north, as earlier GSL statements had suggested. The Defense Secretary appears to have realized, however, that winning Tamil hearts and minds will be crucial to the GSL's consolidation of its new hold on the east. BLAKE

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