SRI LANKA: NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR SAYS TIGERS WILL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000189 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS, MCC FOR S GROFF, D NASSIRY, E BURKE AND F REID E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2017 TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR SAYS TIGERS WILL REJECT GOVERNMENT BID TO TRADE EAST FOR NORTH REF: COLOMBO 158 Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador met Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar on January 31 to discuss the January 28-29 Sri Lanka Development Forum and the ramifications of the Government of Sri Lanka's (GSL) military victories in Vakarai and elsewhere in the east. The Ambassadors shared concerns over speculation that, following the security forces' defeat of the LTTE in Vakarai this month, the GSL may argue that the Ceasefire Agreement signed in 2002 -- which allowed the LTTE a level of autonomy in areas they controlled east and north -- is no longer valid. Furthermore, the GSL mistakenly believes the Tigers will give up their claims on the east if security forces do not pursue military gains in the north. Brattskar will travel to Kilinochchi to meet with the LTTE's senior political leadership on February 1-2, after which Co-chair Ambassadors recommend that Washington convene a Co-Chair conference call with capitals on February 7 or 8. End summary. "In Your Face" Donors' Forum -------------- ¶2. (C) Ambassador and Brattskar agreed that at the January 28-29 Sri Lanka Development Forum in Galle, which both attended, the donors -- particularly the United States, the World Bank, and the Japanese -- had gotten their points across to President Rajapaksa and his brothers, Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa and Presidential Advisor Basil SIPDIS Rajapaksa regarding NGO access and the futility of a military solution to the ethnic conflict. ¶3. (C) Despite these strong messages at the Development Forum, Brattskar contended, "the GSL will do what they want to do anyway. The GSL feels their military campaign is going well, and that they either have the international community's support (e.g. from China, Pakistan and others who provide military support) or can ignore the more difficult positions of the more critical members of the international community." He pointed out that Gothabaya had given an interview to Reuters on January 25 declaring the security forces would "chase the Tigers" out of the north but two days later, at the Development Forum "had to add that they're pursuing a 
peaceful settlement, because they know that's what we want to hear." Trading Trincomalee for Kilinochchi -------------- ¶4. (C) In a conversation with President Rajapaksa at the Development Forum, Ambassador told Brattskar that the President compared the Sri Lankan conflict with that of Nepal, saying: "Just as the Nepalese insisted on disarming the Maoists, we must disarm the LTTE. We can't negotiate with armed terrorists." Ambassador pointed out to the President that the disarming of the Maoists was taking place in the context of a wider political settlement, which had not yet taken place in Sri Lanka. Brattskar (strictly protect this part) paraphrased a separate conversation he had with Basil Rajapaksa confidentially at the forum: "Basil told me to convey to the LTTE that if they get out of the east, the security forces won't go for the north. The GSL thinks it has a back channel message (from the LTTE) that the LTTE will accept this." Brattskar indicated the Tiger leadership would not entertain this proposal. Legitimizing Karuna -------------- ¶5. (C) Brattskar will travel to Kilinochchi to meet with the LTTE's senior political leadership on February 1-2. In addition to the GSL's proposal to trade the east for the COLOMBO 00000189 002 OF 002 north, Brattskar said the LTTE would be "likely to dismiss" this week's cross-over of 19 United National Party (UNP) Members of Parliament to President Rajapaksa's government and the majority this would give the President to present a devolution proposal acceptable to the southern parties. He lamented indications he was now hearing from GSL insiders that the GSL may be able to negotiate with other Tamil actors, such as the Karuna group or the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP) "if the LTTE doesn't like" the GSL's proposals. Such a situation "would be quite frightening," Brattskar commented. ¶6. (C) Brattskar continued: "I also worry that the GSL will try to legitimize Karuna in the east. I met him many times before his split from Prabhakaran. He is extremely intelligent, very ambitious, and absolutely ruthless. It is short sided of the GSL to build him up. He is an easterner and therefore can't replace Prabhakaran. In supporting Karuna, the GSL risks creating what the Indians created in Prabhakaran." CFA Death Anniversary? -------------- ¶7. (C) Ambassadors Blake and Brattskar shared concerns that the GSL might declare the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement null and void on February 22, the fifth anniversary of its signing, in response to pressure from the nationalist monk-led Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) party. Such a move would allow the GSL to remove the Norwegians as facilitators of the peace process, possibly exclude the LTTE from negotiations and legitimize their military gains in the east . Recommended Co-Chair Conference Call -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ambassadors agreed to meet on the afternoon of February 2 following Brattskar's return from his meeting with the Tiger leadership in Kilinochchi. The two Ambassadors also agreed it would be useful to recommend that Washington convene another Co-Chair conference call with capitals and Colombo Embassies on February 7 or 8 to discuss our strategy now that the GSL has mostly secured the East militarily and is looking now to establish facts on the ground, such as a proposed coal power plant from India in Sampur, to permanently reduce the Tamil balance in the east. Co-Chairs could also compare notes on the GSL's likely next steps on the military front, and the GSL's delay in developing a devolution proposal. ¶9. (C) Comment: The situation is very fluid in Colombo in the aftermath of the Cabinet re-shuffle. As the GSL contemplates next steps, we believe it would be useful for the Co-Chairs to compare notes and agree on a common strategy to: 1) discourage military moves north; 2) oppose any moves by the GSL to alter permanently the ethnic balance of the East; 3) encourage rapid resettlement of IDPs and refugees from India to the east; and 4) encourage more rapid progress toward a credible devolution plan. BLAKE