SRI LANKA: GOVERNMENT STRUGGLES FOR SURVIVAL ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001656 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM MOPS CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: GOVERNMENT STRUGGLES FOR SURVIVAL ON FINAL BUDGET VOTE REF: A) COLOMBO 1616 B) COLOMBO 1551 C) COLOMBO 1640 D) COLOMBO 1079 Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The third and final reading of the budget on December 14 is shaping up as a battle royal for the government's survival -- and the government is losing ground in the count. On December 12, Sri Lankan Muslim Congress leader Rauff Hakeem and three of his five Members of Parliament crossed to the opposition side. Other representatives of Sri Lanka's minorities were weighing their options. The Sinhalese nationalist JVP found itself in a bind, reluctant to sacrifice its credibility by supporting a budget it opposed just weeks ago, but in poor shape to face early elections. In a deeply disturbing development, the armed "Pillaiyan" group again took hostages, abducting family members and staff of three Tamil National Alliance parliamentarians in Batticaloa. Ambassador noted the USG's concern about the abductions to Chief Presidential political strategist Basil Rajapaksa, who implausibly denied knowledge of the incident, undertook to see what he could do. Win or lose, the government has lost its effective governing majority. The extreme tactics it is employing have further sapped its democratic credibility. End summary. MUSLIM CONGRESS TO VOTE AGAINST BUDGET -------------- ¶2. (C) Sri Lanka Muslim Congress leader and Minister of Posts and Telecommunications Rauff Hakeem told Ambassador on December 10 that he had decided it was time for his group of six MPs to leave the government. The pressure from his Muslim constituents, he said, was becoming intense: they could not understand why the SLMC was remaining in a government that did not respond to their concerns. Hakeem noted that some of his MPs who are either Ministers or Deputy Ministers were reluctant to take this step, but that he hoped to persuade them of the wisdom of his decision over the next 48 hours. He would then notify the government that his group would vote against the budget. Presumably, they would resign their ministerial posts at the same time. ¶3. (C) Hakeem said that he was not afraid of fighting an early election. He was confident the government side would probably lose if the election came soon. He told us he was 
worried that the government might resort to extralegal means, such as issuing threats, once they learned he was leaving. Admitting he had only confided in us, he was clearly hoping for a U.S. intervention if this proved to be the case. Hakeem also told us that he was going to speak to Ceylon Workers Congress leader Thondaman immediately after our meeting. ¶4. (U) Sri Lankan media reported on December 12 that last-minute interventions by Tourism Minister Milinda Moragoda and others had failed to persuade Hakeem to reconsider. Hakeem and three of the other five SLMC Members of parliament crossed over to the opposition on December 12. In theory, this reduced the government's majority to just three seats (assuming that the Speaker of Parliament, a UNP member, would vote with the opposition in the case of a tie). ¶5. (SBU) Hakeem's move was a signal to fence-sitters anxious not to be caught on the wrong side of the final budget vote on December 14. It was not clear, however, what effect the Muslim Congress's defection would have on other waverers. The Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC),a party with six MPS that represents "Up-Country Tamils," was reportedly waiting to make a final decision. The CWC filed a fundamental rights suit in the Supreme Court against the recent roundup of Tamils in the Colombo area (ref a) that is currently under litigation. The CWC previously left the government on August COLOMBO 00001656 002 OF 003 2, 2007 (ref d) only to return within a few weeks. ¶6. (C) The Muslim Congress's defection puts the Sinhalese nationalist JVP in a tight spot. In the last round, the JVP had the best of both worlds, enjoying the luxury of voting en masse against the budget while knowing the government would survive (ref b). This banished, at least temporarily, the specter of the government side and the JVP having to face an early election in which both could expect to lose a sizable number of seats. One of Basil Rajapaksa's better options now is to try to split the JVP, getting some of its more vulnerable members to vote with the government, or at least to abstain. JVP parliamentary leader Wimal Weeranwansa is known to be close to both Basil and Gothabaya Rajapaksa. (It is also widely rumored that he is vulnerable to corruption charges about which Basil is well-informed.) Weerawansa could probably bring three or four other JVP members along if he decided to break party solidarity. The JVP as a whole has staked out such a strong position against the budget, inflation and government corruption that it could ill afford at this point to sacrifice its credibility by switching sides. ARMED GROUP SEIZES TAKES HOSTAGES TO SWING BUDGET VOTE -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) At about 3:00 pm local time on December 11, in Batticaloa, Pillaiyan cadres (the former "Karuna group") abducted family members of two Tamil National Alliance Members of Parliament and the personal secretary of a third TNA MP, a 54-year-old former government employee. The abductors reportedly warned family members of the MPs that the TNA should be absent from Parliament or abstain from voting against the budget if they wanted to see the victims alive on Saturday. TNA Member of Parliament Suresh Premachandran told Pol Chief that two of the affected MPs were currently in Oslo for a meeting and expected back on December 13. According to Premachandran, the Pillaiyan cadres had threatened to kill those two TNA MPs if they attempted to return to Sri Lanka before the vote. ¶8. (C) Ambassador called Parliament's newest MP (and brother of the President) Basil Rajapaksa and told him that Embassy had received several calls about the abduction of relatives of three TNA MPs by Pillaiyan and threats to kill them if the MPs do not vote for the budget. Ambassador said the U.S. was very disturbed about this serious threat to Sri Lanka's democracy, and urged the government to do everything possible to get the MPs' relatives released. Basil responded that he was in Parliament and had not heard of the incident. Basil said that he was "standing next to an (unnamed) TNA MP who was asking him about easing fishing restrictions in Jaffna, but who had not mentioned this." Ambassador said that we were confident of the information. Basil thanked him for the call and said he "would do my best." ¶9. (C) In fact, TNA MP Premachandran raised the matter of the abductions of TNA family members as an urgent matter at the opening of Parliament on December 12. The head of the TNA parliamentary delegation, Sampanthan, reiterated his members' outrage at the incident a couple of hours later. Opposition leader Ranil Wickremesinghe called the Ambassador to REPORT that he was trying to persuade the affected TNA MPs to vote against the budget despite the threats against them. Meanwhile, Embassy sources in Batticaloa expressed worry that more abductions might occur on December 12. COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) There can be little doubt that the latest abductions were undertaken at the urging of the government. On November 19, the abducted son-in law of a TNA MP was released immediately after the budget vote. (The MP did not show up COLOMBO 00001656 003 OF 003 in Parliament for the vote). Both President Rajapaksa and Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa had previously confided to us that Pillaiyan was someone they felt they could do business with (ref c). It is not clear what interest the Pillaiyan group, an armed Tamil paramilitary with no representation in Parliament, would have in influencing the outcome of a budget vote were it not for the close relationship with GSL security forces. ¶11. (C) There are likely to be other defections from the government to the opposition. However, other crossovers from the main opposition UNP to the government could effectively cancel these out. The UNP reported being in negotiations with some of its more junior members who had crossed to the government side in January to return. Other UNP parliamentarians told us they were being offered staggering inducements to defect. Basil Rajapaksa was reportedly offering Hakeem's Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications to anyone willing to join the government ranks. We heard directly from another UNP member that he had been offered 500 million rupees (approximately five million dollars) and the lucrative Ports and Aviation Ministry to switch sides. Yet another UNP front-liner told us he had been offered the Prime Minister's post if he could bring five of his colleagues with him to join the government. At the same time, the government appeared to be turning up the pressure by fabricating a criminal money laundering case against him (septel). ¶12. (C) The government's credibility in making such extravagant promises is not established, since it had apparently yet to fulfill many such obligations arising out of the November 19 round. If MPs judge that the government is apt to come out on the losing end, they will be all the more reluctant to accept such assurances. Whether the government manages to squeak through the third and final "reading" of the budget, it is clear that the government's majority in Parliament has effectively vanished. The government will constantly be faced with the need to scrape together majorities for legislation it needs to pass, including the twice-monthly renewals of the emergency regulations and approval of the government's policy statement in January. By resorting to such extreme methods to pass its annual budget, the government has eroded its democratic legitimacy. BLAKE