Respected NGO Analyst Tells Donor Ambassadors to Expect Protracted Conflict in Sri Lanka

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000158 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE STATE FOR SCA/INS USPACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: n/a TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PUM PTER EAID CE SUBJECT: Respected NGO Analyst Tells Donor Ambassadors to Expect Protracted Conflict in Sri Lanka 1.(SBU) Summary: In a hard-hitting presentation to donor ambassadors on January 25, as part of preparations for the January 29-30 Development Forum in Galle, the highly respected Executive Director of the Center for Policy Alternatives, Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, said the Government of Sri Lanka is more interested in consolidating a legislative majority than developing a credible devolution proposal. Likewise the LTTE has been significantly weakened by recent fighting and has never in its history been willing to engage in peace talks from a weak position. Saravanamuttu therefore expects a period of protracted conflict. Saravanamuttu also warned that whatever devolution proposal emerges from the All Parties Process will be significantly weaker than the initial "majority report" of the experts panel. He chided the donors for allowing the GSL to take us for a ride by promising peace and respect for human rights while actually pursuing a military strategy and a "creeping authoritarianism" that has worsened even since the announcement of the Commission of Inquiry on human rights. End Summary. GSL Strategy: -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Saravanamuttu began by noting that neither the GSL nor the LTTE has an interest in peace right now. He said the GSL's objective is to consolidate its legislative majority and weaken the opposition UNP party. Before entering into peace talks, its priority is to weaken the LTTE. However, Saravanamuttu does not believe that the GSL attaches significant priority to developing a credible devolution proposal and predicted that whatever devolution proposal emerges from the All Parties Process will be significantly weaker than the initial "majority report" of the expert's panel. He commented that the problem with the GSL's strategy to weaken the LTTE is that the LTTE has never once demonstrated any willingness to negotiate from a position of weakness over the last 25 years and is unlikely to do so now. LTTE's Strategy Has Failed Miserably -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Saravanamuttu characterized the LTTE's strategy as having failed miserably. It had failed to gain any significant benefits for the Tamil people from years of peace talks. It had suffered significant losses on the battlefield in 2006 and its hope that the international community would react to deteriorating humanitarian conditions as a result of fighting by taking stronger action against the GSL had also failed. The cumulative effect of these failures was the gradual erosion of the LTTE's support in the Tamil community. Moreover, the LTTE losses in Vakarai and elsewhere in the east marked a significant blow to LTTE efforts to maintain the north and east as a putative Tamil homeland. Militarily, Saravanamuttu believed the LTTE would find it difficult to launch any significant military counter-offensive in 2007 because of their weakened capabilities and declining capacity to recruit new cadres. The likely alternative would therefore be for the LTTE to initiate more terrorist actions in the south including against economic targets, both to show it is still strong and to create an incentive for the GSL to return to talks. Bleak Outlook for 2007 COLOMBO 00000158 002 OF 002 -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Saravanamuttu predicted that the outlook for at least the early part of 2007 is for protracted conflict. The GSL has an advantage in the balance of forces. It has also successfully weakened all of the media in 2006, but particularly the independent Tamil media. As a result, few in the south are aware of the devastating humanitarian impact that the conflict had in 2006, while most are aware of the military successes. Not surprisingly, therefore, public opinion polls show that a majority of the Sinhalese people believe a military solution is possible. ¶5. (SBU) Saravanamuttu also ticked off the following trends that he urged the donor community to be aware of and attempt to counteract. -- a "creeping authoritarianism" that has led to a growing consolidation of power in the hands of the President and his brothers; -- emergency regulations are being used to further curtail freedom of expression and other human rights; -- an attitude by the GSL of "let?s see what we can get away with" with the international community: in Saravanamuttu?s view, the GSL does not take seriously "critical statements and snubs" from the international community because the donors have not thus far been willing to take more punitive action. Even if the western countries are willing to take such action, the GSL knows it has other options such as the Chinese, Pakistanis and Israelis who are willing to provide offensive military equipment with no conditions attached. -- Saravanamuttu concluded by urging the donors not to place too much faith in what the Commission of Inquiry on human rights could accomplish. The Commission could only make recommendations that the GSL would be free to ignore. Moreover, significant human rights abuses had occurred since the announcement of the Commission. ¶6. (SBU) Comment: Saravanamuttu is one of the most respected analysts and thinkers in the Sri Lankan NGO community. While we think the GSL will be more serious about pursuing a devolution and peace strategy than Saravanamuttu predicts, he may well be right. His thinking also underlines the significant pressures that NGO leaders like him who speak relatively freely are under.