SRI LANKA: PRESIDENT STRUGGLING IN ATTEMPT TO WOO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000152 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS MCC FOR S GROFF, D NASSIRY, E BURKE AND F REID E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: PRESIDENT STRUGGLING IN ATTEMPT TO WOO CROSSOVERS REF: A) COLOMBO 130 B) COLOMBO 115 (AND PREVIOUS) Classified By: Ambassador Robert O. Blake, Jr., for reasons 1.4(b,d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: President Rajapaksa has yet to announce his anticipated cabinet reshuffle, leading to confusion and speculation in the media and among our political contacts. The Rajapaksa team is struggling to eke out a bare majority of the parliamentary seats. Both the governing Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and major opposition United National Party (UNP) face serious internal rifts as some UNP dissidents prepare to take government ministerial posts. Foreign Minister Samaraweera has come out publicly against the crossover strategy, and in favor of continuing cooperation with the UNP under the MoU. The Marxist, Sinhalese chauvinist JVP has threatened to end its support from outside the government for Rajapaksa if the government takes in three "federalist" UNP MPs. The Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) is continuing discussions with the government on cooperation, with some of its members complaining of intense pressure to fall in line. End summary. UNP DISSIDENTS RESIST RANIL'S OVERTURES -------------- ¶2. (C) President Rajapaksa's cabinet restructuring, expected during the astrologically "auspicious time" between January 23-25, has yet to be announced, leading to rampant rumors and confusion across the political spectrum. Initially, most analysts expected a group of "reformist" dissidents in the major opposition United National Party (UNP) to accept ministerial posts, thereby endangering the MoU between the UNP and the governing Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). Currently, sources in the UNP tell us less than 12 party members will take cabinet positions, while many remain unsatisfied with the portfolios offered. ¶3. (C) A meeting between UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe and his intra-party critic Karu Jayasuriya was unsuccessful in resolving the UNP rift (ref A). Embassy has learned that Jayasuriya's supporters (including his son-in-law, Navin Dissanayake) put pressure on Karu not to cave in to Wickremesinghe's "delaying tactics" (promises on overdue party reforms). The dissident group -- at least those in line for ministerial posts -- are reportedly insisting the crossovers go forward as planned. However, the would-be defectors have failed to deliver enough colleagues to assure the present and his camp a workable majority, making the entire move a questionable exercise for the Rajapaksa team. TRIAL BALLOON FOR RANIL AS PM PROBABLY NOT SERIOUS -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Adding to the confusion over the UNP's position, on January 24 papers quoted UNP Secretary-General Tissa Attanayake as welcoming Telecommunications Minister D.M. Jayaratne's recent suggestion that Wickremesinghe be named prime minister. However, this is probably not a serious proposal that has the President's backing. We think it unlikely Rajapaksa will bypass his party loyalists to appoint opposition leader Wickremesinghe as Prime Minister -- which would put Ranil next in line under the constitution to succeed the president. Wickremesinghe will almost certainly react to senior UNP talent breaking party ranks by moving to exclude them from the party. However, the dissidents can appeal an expulsion to the Supreme Court, which has invalidated several expulsions in the past. This will keep the pot boiling for at least several weeks after the crossovers happen. RIFTS WITHIN SLFP -------------- COLOMBO 00000152 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) Many SLFP parliamentarians who were previously passed over for ministerial positions are balking at the idea of cabinet seats for the UNP crossovers. Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera, a popular, rising star and one of the architects of Rajapaksa's 2005 electoral victory, has weighed in strongly against taking in the UNPers. On January 24, several papers leaked a purported Samaraweera letter to President Rajapaksa advocating continued cooperation with the opposition only under the auspices of the existing MoU, not by offering cabinet posts. The long-rumored rift between the President and the Foreign Minister is NOW an open one. Given the current weakness of his position, however, the President would have a hard time getting rid of Samaraweera. If removed as Foreign Minister (or if he resigns in protest), Samaraweera will remain a factor even as a "backbencher" in the SLFP. He has assiduously been courting an SLFP faction of about 20-25 MPs loyal to former president Chandrika Kumaratunga and disaffected by the Rajapaksa clan's dominance. JVP THREATENS TO END ITS SUPPORT -------------- ¶6. (C) Samaraweera, while considered an SLFP moderate, has also managed to maintain excellent relations with the Marxist, Sinhalese chauvinist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP),the government's former coalition partner. In public statements, the JVP has vehemently objected to three specific UNP "federalists" taking government posts. The JVP expressed concern that the government is failing to keep President Rajapaksa's November 2005 campaign commitments and threatened to end its support for the government from outside. Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa has told us he is uncomfortable SIPDIS about severing ties to the JVP. MUSLIM PARTY STILL UNDER PRESSURE -------------- ¶7. (C) Subsequent to ref B, Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) leader Rauff Hakim met President Rajapaksa to discuss potential cooperation but laid out several conditions for joining the government, which he insisted must be set out in a formal MoU. However, Hakim told Pol Chief on January 24 that his party has "internal compulsions" driving it to continue discussions with the government. His members, he said, are afraid that once the President achieves a simple majority of in parliament, the doors of dialogue will slam shut. They are also worried about the prospect of the President calling an early election. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: President Rajapaksa's strategy of assuring himself a majority by wooing crossovers and reshaping his cabinet has stirred up a hornet's nest. Rather than proceeding smoothly by welcoming in the disaffected UNPers, large swathes within each of the major political parties NOW feel alienated. The President and his senior advisor Basil Rajapaksa will continue to use a mix of threats, persuasion, and enticements to cobble together a bare majority in parliament. Not to succeed at this point would send a signal of weakness and result in a great loss of face. But support for the President will be brittle at best, not least because of the rough tactics Basil has tried to employ. The most likely casualty of the current political tempest is the SLFP-UNP MoU, which held out the prospect of a broadly based "southern consensus" on a devolution proposal to drive the peace process forward. BLAKE