SRI LANKA: TRINCOMALEE TAMILS WARY OF GOVERNMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001165 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS MCC FOR D NASSIRY AND E BURKE E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2017 TAGS: PGOV EAID PTER PHUM PREF MOPS PREL KMCA CE SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: TRINCOMALEE TAMILS WARY OF GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT PLANS REF: A.COLOMBO 001093 B. COLOMBO 00977 C. COLOMBO 001003 Classified By: Ambassador Robert O Blake, for reasons 1.4(b,d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: DCM met with local government officials, civil society leaders, and community members in the eastern city of Trincomalee on August 10-12th to discuss the security and humanitarian situation in the area and promote policies that will foster peace and economic development. The Government Agent, the highest civil authority in the District, gave a positive assessment of the return of internally displaced people (IDPs),plans for a new Special Economic Zone, and newly relaxed security regulations. Discussions with civil society representatives, vendors, fishermen, and IDPs, however, revealed distrust of the Government among the local Tamil community, casting doubt on whether the government's top-down, Sinhalese-centric policy making can help Trincomalee quickly recover from the impact of the conflict. USAID projects in the region are aimed at bringing communities together while providing a better quality of life for Trincomalee residents. End Summary. SPECIAL ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ZONES WILL DISPLACE TAMILS -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In meetings with central and local government representatives, DCM asked how the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and the High Security Zone (HSZ) (ref A and B) would affect residents, including over 10,000 IDPs still hoping to return home. The Government Agent, retired Major General T.T.R. De Silva, told us that at the most, the Government's plans will displace 1,000 families. However, Chairman of the Trincomalee Urban Council S.G. Mugunthan estimated as many as 15,000 individuals, mostly Tamils, would be forced to move. TAMIL MARGINALIZATION FEARED -------------- ¶3. (C) Civil society and local community members told us they suspected that part of the Government's motivation in establishing the SEZ was to fragment Tamil communities by resettling them into Sinhalese-majority communities. Mugunthan observed that parties close to the government would acquire an advantage in local elections if Tamil communities were marginalized (ref B). Father Rajendran, head of the Center for Non-Violent Communication in Trincomalee, went further, saying the Government was encouraging Sinhalese "colonization" to "eliminate Tamils" while labeling it economic development. He cited rumors that the Government is planning to rename some predominantly Tamil towns with new Sinhalese names. He also pointed to the proliferation of Buddha statues as another example of Sinhalese cultural hegemony. Several contacts noted a new Buddha statue erected overnight, by unknown persons, in Trincomalee's predominately Tamil town center. They considered this an affront to Tamils. Surrounded by barbed wire, the Buddha stands in contrast to USAID's adjacent construction site for a new bus stand and shopping center designed to serve as a focal point for social interaction and economic activity. MAINTAINING SECURITY IN TRINCOMALEE -------------- ¶4. (C) Government Agent De Silva said security forces have cleared most of the LTTE out of the Eastern Province but a few "characters" were left behind to "cause trouble." He likened the fight with the LTTE to a fire that has been put out, but still has glowing embers. Nonetheless, he said, things were much better now than they were a year ago. The military has relaxed security restrictions, he said, and IDPs are returning to resettle as a result. De Silva defended the decision to build a fence around Trincomalee's new peripheral road (ref A) as necessary to maintain control of ground the COLOMBO 00001165 002 OF 003 Army had gained at the expense of the LTTE. KARUNA AND LOCAL ELECTIONS -------------- ¶5. (C) DCM noted that the operation of paramilitaries in the district would prevent planned local elections (ref B) from being free and fair. De Silva countered that he had recently met Karuna representatives in his office and they seemed like "nice enough" people. However, others, such as Urban Council Chairman Mugunthan and Father Rajendran, told us the Karuna faction was still committing murders, abductions and extortion, especially outside of Trincomalee town. Father Rajendran said that people no longer report these activities of the Karuna faction because police are unresponsive and the International Committee of the Red Cross is unable to help. ¶6. (C) Father Rajendran speculated the government wanted to hold local elections in the East as soon as possible to consolidate its control of the area and to minimize the IDP vote. He noted that a new law enabled IDPs to vote outside of their normal residence. However, the requirement that all voters have a National Identity Card would preclude many IDPs from voting, he said. This would certainly be the case if the Government rushed to organize elections before programs, including those supported by USAID to facilitate issuance of National Identity Cards can take hold. Father Rajendran thought the best solution was to postpone elections until most IDPs are resettled. He observed that the East had waited 20 years for elections and thought it worth waiting a little longer to ensure a high level of participation in a free and fair election. MURDER OF THE CHIEF SECRETARY -------------- ¶7. (C) No one we spoke with seemed to know who was responsible for the July 16 murder of Chief Secretary H.M. Herath Abeyweera (ref C). De Silva could not confirm that the LTTE had assassinated Abeyweera, but said it was clear the killers had help from inside the Chief Secretary's office. Mugunthan also would not speculate on who would have wanted the Chief Secretary dead, but noted that the Tamil community, which considered the Chief Secretary a friend, doubted that the perpetrators were from the LTTE. LIVELIHOOD OF IDPS AND RETURNEES -------------- ¶8. (C) Government Agent De Silva said IDPs were returning to live in temporary and permanent shelters and the government, with the help of the World Food Program, was providing them with six months of food rations. He encouraged the DCM to speak with returnees because the success of resettlement could be measured by "the smiles on the faces of the returnees." However, Tamil IDPs in Trincomalee town and recently resettled returnees in Eachchilampattai, Trincomalee District, were not smiling. One IDP told the Charge "I hate the government for torturing the Tamil people." As a result, he said, he was beginning to think the LTTE was right to fight the Government. ¶9. (C) About 300 IDPs from the Sampur East or the Muttur East HSZ were living at a Hindu Cultural Center in Trincomalee town. It was the lowest number of IDPs the Center has had recently, but most had been there more than a year. Country Director for the American Refugee Committee (ARC) John Holveck said Government Agent De Silva refused to recognize them as IDPs, refused to distribute food rations, and actively discouraged the ARC from helping them. One IDP remarked that even though the LTTE had severely restricted their freedom, life was better under Tiger control because he was able to pursue his livelihood. He did not want to accept the Government's offer to resettle in other areas, which he COLOMBO 00001165 003 OF 003 said did not have the necessary resources for farming. He added that the Government had never asked his community what it needed. ¶10. (C) A group of returnees resettled in a fishing village outside of Verugal in Eachchilampattai also told DCM they feel less secure now than they did when they were living in IDP camps or LTTE-controlled territories. They did not trust the security forces, who hindered them in pursuing their livelihoods. Most returnees found that their boats and tools had disappeared. Military restrictions made fishing difficult. Women in the village told us the government provided them with 29 kilos of rice on July 24, which they finished in 18 days. They did not know when they would receive more food. Returnees were suspicious of the security force's reasons for questioning, documenting, and photographing some returnees. Greg Norton, an Associate Protection Officer with UNHCR, said services to the returnees will likely improve, but the returnees were not receiving adequate information from local authorities on rations and fishing restrictions. He confirmed that security forces were using Karuna members as "spotters" at nearby Verugal crossing, noting it was unclear what the information would be used for. TOP-DOWN APPROACH FRUSTRATES CITIZENS -------------- ¶11. (C) Urban Council Chairman Mugunthan told us that government funding was scarce, but noted residents were even more frustrated by the government's top-down approach. For example, he said, the Government had not consulted with the Urban Council about the SEZ or the decision to tear down a Council building to construct a market. The next day, at the groundbreaking for a new market co-funded by USAID designed to revitalize the economic and social fabric of Trincomalee town, Mungunthan delivered a stirring speech about the need for grassroots empowerment and greater freedoms. On behalf of the locally elected members of the Trincomalee Urban Council, he thanked USAID for its support. The Government Agent made his disdain for Mugunthan clear: whispering in the ear of our USAID contractor, he said, "When you lie with dogs you get fleas." ¶12. (C) COMMENT: The lack of consultation in Trincomalee with community members, language barriers, and the tendency toward top-down decision-making reinforce the minority communities' distrust and resentment of the central government and will work against the GSL as it seeks to gain their confidence. The government's near-complete control of the East, however, entails significant opportunities, as well as the risks. Trincomalee District, now largely cleared of the LTTE, has enormous potential to heal and prosper economically. Signs that stability is beginning to return to the region are numerous. The U.S. and other donors will need to seize this moment to help the government get its plans for the East's recovery and development right. Septel will outline our USAID Mission's proposals for projects, embedded in the larger effort spearheaded by the UN and multilateral financial institutions, to ensure that the government's resettlement, recovery and development programs will take account of local needs and desires and maximize the opportunities for local input and participation. BLAKE