THAKSIN LOYALISTS POISED TO RECAPTURE NORTH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000182

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM TH
SUBJECT: THAKSIN LOYALISTS POISED TO RECAPTURE NORTH

REF: A. A) BANGKOK 5749 (THAI POLITICAL PARTIES: ELECTION PLAYBILL)


B. B) CHIANG MAI 177 (SMALLER PARTIES CASH-STRAPPED, TALK OF MERGER)

C. C) CHIANG MAI 143 (GOVERNOR'S PROMOTION SENDS INTERESTING SIGNALS ABOUT REFERENDUM, SONTHI TIES)

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CLASSIFIED BY: Michael K. Morrow, Consul General, Chiang Mai,
DoS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
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Summary
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1. (SBU) The pro-Thaksin People's Power Party (PPP) is
expected to win 55 to 65 of the 77 constituency seats up for
grabs in northern Thailand, observers report. This would be
less than the 71 constituent seats swept by the former Prime
Minister's Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party in the 2005 election, but
slightly better than its 2001 showing. The north, a traditional
stronghold for native son Thaksin, strongly supports the PPP due
to its clear affiliation with Thaksin, who remains a popular
figure here. Northern voters also trust PPP as the successor to
a TRT party that made good on its promises to implement populist
economic policies that had a visible impact. In contrast, the
Thai economy, and notably consumer confidence, have lagged under
the government appointed by coup leaders who ousted Thaksin last
year. PPP's main rivals in the north will be the Democrat Party
and its ally, Chart Thai. Little is expected of the other TRT
spin-off parties, which lack strong networks up north and are
considered by many northerners to have deserted favorite son
Thaksin. While northern PPP leaders are confident, and with
good reason, they are nonetheless wary the military government
will use a variety of tools to undercut the party and keep it
from maximizing its outcome. End Summary.

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North is Thaksin Territory
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2. (U) Of the 400 constituency seats in the new parliament to
be elected December 23, 77 will come from the 17 provinces of
the northern region. In the last two elections, this region was
solidly in the hands of former PM Thaksin Shinawatra's Thai Rak
Thai party: TRT grabbed 55 of the seats in 2001, and
steamrolled to 71 seats in 2005. In this year's election the
north will also account for up to 20 of the 80 party-list seats,
reflecting two of the eight regional party lists.


3. (U) Observers here expect the TRT "successor" party, the
pro-Thaksin People's Power Party, to win 55 to 65 of the north's
77 constituency seats. This would be less than the 71 seats TRT
took in 2005, but slightly better than its 2001 showing. In
addition, a recent analysis by "The Nation" daily newspaper
pegged PPP to win about half of the north's 20 party-list seats.


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PPP = Thaksin = Victory
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4. (C) The PPP's main campaign strategy in the north is to use
former PM Thaksin as its selling point. Former Chiang Rai TRT
MP Samart Kaewmeechai, who is now the PPP Deputy Spokesman,
believes northern voters are still loyal to Thaksin, who hails
from a Chiang Mai suburb. PPP candidates are distributing
photographs of Thaksin, and telling people to vote for its
candidates if they want the exiled prime minister to return to
Thailand and fight corruption allegations against him. Chiang
Mai University Political Science Professor Tanet Charoenmuang
agrees, telling us the people want Thaksin to come back to
Thailand, and have not forgotten that he is "the only one who
delivered on his promises." Rachan Wiraphan, head of the rival
Democrat Party's Chiang Mai branch, admits this strategy is
effective. He told us the PPP's message of "If you want Thaksin
to come back to Thailand, vote for us" is succeeding.

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PPP Banks on TRT's Track Record
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5. (C) Northern voters also trust PPP as the successor to a TRT
party that made good on its promises to implement populist
economic policies that had a visible impact, particularly among
the rural poor. Former TRT MP Samart told us a key PPP selling
point would be its proven effectiveness in implementing policies
that "solve people's problems." Thus PPP's economic platform is
largely a continuation and/or renewal of TRT policies including
universal health care, the one-million-baht-per-village Village
Development Fund, and loan support for small and medium
enterprises at the tambon (district) level. (Comment: many

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economists and media commentators have assailed these programs
as debt-generating populist policies, yet numerous political
parties have embraced these and similar programs in their
campaigning. End Comment).


6. (C) Former Chiang Mai TRT MP Nopphakhun Ratphathai, now
running under the PPP banner, is also banking on TRT's track
record. He told us people at the grassroots level had
appreciated "unprecedented" benefits under the Thaksin
administration. Thus they will remain loyal to the PPP
successor party, especially as they compare PPP's platform to
those of competing parties. CMU's Dr. Tanet draws the same
conclusion though with a different twist. He told us rural
voters do not care about corruption allegations against Thaksin
because they believe all politicians are corrupt; what
distinguishes TRT/PPP is they give back to the people despite
their corruption.

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It's the Economy, Stupid
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7. (C) Current economic conditions also play into PPP's hands,
our sources agree. According to PPP Deputy Spokesman Samart,
northerners have suffered economically during the 14 months of
the current government's rule, and consumer confidence is down.
(Note: consumer confidence in Thailand fell for the 12th
straight month in October 2007, according to a recent university
survey reported by Reuters). Samart claimed that, under PM
Thaksin, people tended to spend 80% of their income and save the
rest; but now the ratio is reversed - reflecting consumers'
economic anxiety.

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Assessing the Competition
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8. (C) PPP's main competition in the north will come from the
Democrat Party (DP) and its ally, Chart Thai. Observers expect
these long-established parties to make some inroads into the
overwhelming position TRT held in 2005, but the going will not
be easy. DP Chiang Mai head Wiraphan told us of challenges in
taking on - and countering - TRT/PPP populist policies. Some of
the programs were sound, he said, such as the SME fund that
helped people understand the real costs of running a business.
Others were popular but unsound, such as the Village Development
Fund, which boosted consumerism instead of investment and
tripled debt levels among farmers and teachers. The challenge
for the Democrat Party is that people have gotten used to these
populist policies and do not understand the long-term negative
effects.


9. (C) Wiraphan is also concerned about voter perceptions that
past TRT governments (2001-2006) were better at policy
implementation than past DP-led governments (1997-2001). He
admitted Thaksin was more effective than past DP leaders in
using the press to promote his government's policies. Chiang
Rai Governor Preecha Kamolbutr agrees. He told us that, while
the Democrats can make inroads in the north, many voters believe
that on the biggest issues - livelihood and income - past DP-led
governments had a weaker record than did subsequent TRT-led
ones. Wiraphan lamented that most voters tend to overlook the
fact that the DP took office when Thailand's economy had
bottomed out following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and
later did a lot to shore it up.

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Little Expected of Other TRT Spin-off Parties
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10. (C) The alphabet soup of other TRT spin-off parties (see
Ref A) lack strong networks up north and are considered by many
northerners to have deserted native son Thaksin. Many former
TRT parliamentarians who had defected or were intending to
defect have returned to the PPP fold out of concern their
constituents would desert them for the PPP, party Deputy
Spokesman Samart reported. The PPP's Nopphakhun agreed, saying
many former TRT MPs dared not defect for fear of "punishment" by
voters at the polls. (Comment: though we note Chart Thai,
currently aligned with the DP and not one of the above-mentioned
spin-off parties, recently attracted some high-profile former
TRT figures). Nopphakhun pointed out that many of the leaders
of the other spin-off parties are among the 111 former TRT
executives who were banned from politics for five years after

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the May 2007 dissolution of TRT and, in the eyes of many voters,
are betraying Thaksin in the selfish hope of getting back in the
military's good graces. The spin-off parties are also
experiencing financial difficulties (Ref B).


11. (U) The spin-off parties could have some limited success in
the competing for the 20 election-list seats up for grabs in the
north. Analysis by "The Nation" predicts the four main spin-off
parties could, between them, garner up to six of these seats -
though with no single party taking more than two seats.

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PPP Wary of Manipulation by Authorities
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12. (C) While northern PPP leaders are confident, they are
nonetheless wary the military and current government will use a
variety of tools to undercut the party and keep it from
maximizing its outcome. Former MP Nopphakhun is unhappy that
2006 coup leader and former Council for National Security (CNS)
Chairman General Sonthi Boonyaratglin has a degree of oversight
of the upcoming elections in his new position as Deputy Prime
Minister. Sonthi has clearly been hostile to TRT and PPP all
along, Nopphakhun said, and will make things hard for PPP
campaigners. Party Deputy Spokesman Samart is more sanguine,
focusing instead on new Army Commander and CNS Chairman Anupong
Paojinda, under whose leadership army officers will be more
professional and less political, PPP believes. CMU's Dr. Tanet
- not affiliated with PPP - has a similar view of Anupong as a
professional military servant.


13. (C) One tool at the government's disposal is the Interior
Ministry's Provincial Administration Department (PAD),which has
an important administrative role in the supervision of
elections. Samart sees the PAD as a channel for the government
to influence and/or control votes via its network of tambon
(district) and village heads. Nor is it lost on PPP that the
newly appointed PAD Director General has strong past connections
to Deputy PM Sonthi (Ref C). Samart added, however, that tambon
and village heads no longer have as central a role in elections
as in the past, due to the rise of grassroots volunteer
organizations.


14. (C) PPP's biggest concern is that the National Election
Commission (ECT) will unfairly penalize it for minor campaign
transgressions. Samart worried the new election laws are open
to interpretation and manipulation, and could be used by
authorities to disqualify PPP candidates and otherwise constrain
PPP campaigning. Similarly, Nopphakhun expressed concern the
government can manipulate the judiciary to decide the fate of
individual candidates. CMU's Dr. Tanet also expects the
government to have the ECT and other authorities curb or find
fault with PPP campaign activities.

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Comment
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15. (C) Northern PPP leaders have good reason to be confident
of capturing at least as many seats as TRT did in 2001. Voter
loyalty to native son Thaksin, public satisfaction with the
Thaksin government's populist policies, and displeasure with the
sluggishness of the current coup-installed administration should
combine to keep the north firmly in the hands of Thaksin
loyalists. Moreover, many observers point to the August 19
constitutional referendum as a successful test of strength for
the Thaksin camp in the north. The 17 provinces of the northern
region passed the CNS-backed draft by a relatively narrow margin
(51.4% compared to a nation-wide approval rate of 56.6%),and
seven of the eight provinces comprising the so-called "Upper
North" rejected the draft outright. The real challenge in the
north for the PPP will be to work within the confines of an
unfriendly administrative/regulatory environment - historically
not a strongpoint for the free-wheeling, free-spending Thaksin
camp - and prevent the competition from holding PPP's victory
margin down to the lower end of its projected seat total.
MORROW