NORTHERN THAI ACTIVISTS PREDICT CRACKDOWN IN BURMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000156 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/26/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF KDEM MARR MOPS TH BM CH IN SUBJECT: NORTHERN THAI ACTIVISTS PREDICT CRACKDOWN IN BURMA CHIANG MAI 00000156 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Michael K. Morrow, Consul General, Chiang Mai, DoS. REASON: 1.4 (b),(d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) A violent government crackdown against ongoing protests in Burma is the likeliest scenario seen by northern Thai-based activists and NGOs who met with CG and visiting Thailand Desk Officer September 25. As a first step, they anticipate the GOB will attempt to cut off protestors' communications with the outside world - but doubt the GOB can pull it off. Nonetheless, they fear a violent outcome, and are beginning to discuss contingency plans for a new exodus of refugees. Sources here also report some Burmese troops are being redeployed from border areas to Rangoon, and cite a small number of recent desertions by Burmese soldiers. End Summary. -------------- -------------- -------------- Activists Predict Crackdown on Burma Demonstrations -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) A group of seven Burma activists and humanitarian workers warned CG and visiting Thailand Desk Officer that a government crackdown against growing protests in Burma is likely. Aung Zaw, former 1988 protester and editor of the Irrawaddy newsmagazine, cited three possible outcomes: a peaceful transfer of power to the opposition, a voluntary peaceful end to the protests, or a clampdown by the Burmese government (GOB) on protesters. Dismissing the first two as wishful thinking, Zaw predicted the last of these outcomes as the most probable and, in fact, likely. ¶3. (C) Karen National Union (KNU) Senior Foreign Affairs Executive David Taw also expects an imminent GOB crackdown. He said the GOB's Minister of Religion warned senior monks that if the current protests were uncontrollable, the GOB would exert more authority. Taw noted, however, that it is risky for the Burmese regime to crack down on monks due to potential religious backlash. ¶4. (C) Aung Naing, former 1988 protestor and editor of Network Media Group, said activists inside Burma are making contingency plans in case of bloodshed. When asked how long the GOB could sustain the non-violent status quo, Naing replied the regime has already been unusually patient. He reported that soldiers are going undercover as monks, an indicator the GOB was preparing to crack down. -------------- -------------- -------------- Cross-Border Communication Impossible to Shut Down -------------- -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) As a first step prior to a violent crackdown, the GOB would attempt to cut off protestors' communication with the outside world, predicted the Irrawaddy's Aung Zaw. He noted, however, that cutting off communication out of Burma in any comprehensive way would be difficult for the GOB. He explained the current demonstrations in Rangoon reflect a level of organization among protestors that did not exist in 1988, largely as a result of more modes of communication within Burma and across the border. The use of independent satellite services, GSM phones, and other cellular phones illegally smuggled into Burma (and thus unregistered) make it impossible to fully control communication. Zaw acknowledged it would be riskier for protestors in Burma to get information to outside contacts if the GOB tried to cut off communications, but doubted it could succeed in a full cut-off. -------------- -------------- International Pressure and Concerns about China -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) The activists cited sustained international pressure and attention on Burma as a key factor in avoiding bloodshed. They expressed appreciation for the State Department Spokesman's September 24 statement sympathizing with the protests and calling on the regime to exercise restraint and release political prisoners. They said international attention on Burma CHIANG MAI 00000156 002.2 OF 002 is much higher now than in 1988, which is a central reason why the GOB has not yet cracked down violently. Aung Naing stated, however, that even more attention from the international community would be needed to avoid bloodshed. ¶7. (C) The attendees said neighboring countries must play a key role. Ethnic Nationalities Council Secretary General Lian Sakhong urged the USG to initiate a multilateral approach with China and India to resolve the Burma situation (post has emailed to the Department his letter to POTUS; original will follow by pouch). Sakhong said a stable Burma is critical for China and India, which have long-term investments there. He emphasized China's interest in Burma for seaport access to international markets via Yunnan Province. -------------- -------------- NGOs in Thailand Prepare for a Crackdown -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Representatives of NGOs based in Northern Thailand said they are monitoring Burma closely in case a crackdown spurs a new exodus of refugees. Burma Relief Center Director Pippa Curwen expressed hope that neighboring countries would provide immediate assistance in the event of a crackdown. However, she noted with concern that Thai officials recently closed the unofficial checkpoints that dot the Thai-Burma border and typically issue day passes to travelers. Yet the Royal Thai Government (RTG) was accommodating toward refugees in 1988 and would hopefully be so again, she said. Migrant Assistance Program Director Jackie Pollock said humanitarian groups in Thailand were beginning to discuss contingency plans for possible violence in Burma - but the RTG has not joined this dialogue. -------------- Monks Seek Leadership -------------- ¶9. (C) The demonstrating monks lack experience in political activism and are desperately seeking leadership, our interlocutors said. The Irrawaddy's Zaw characterized the monk protestors' recent visit to Aung San Suu Kyi as a plea for direction. Our group expressed differing opinions on the extent of the National League for Democracy's (NLD) readiness to lead should a transfer of power take place. -------------- -------------- Troop Movements and Desertions Reported -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) In a separate meeting with a KNU activist based in Thailand's Mae Sot district, CG was told that about 20 pick-up truck loads of Burmese soldiers from the 22nd Division (deployed in Karen State) and 99th Division (deployed in north-central Burma) have been dispatched to Rangoon in response to the growing protests. Our KNU contact also reported sagging morale in the Burmese army due to low pay and shortages of food and equipment. He reported that seven Burmese soldiers (one NCO and six enlisted) had deserted in Karen State on September 22. He also spoke of a Burmese Army Major who had defected last May or June and was now in Mae Sot - an unusually high rank for a deserter, he said. Our activist interlocutors commented to us that Burmese troops may ultimately resist any orders to fire on protesting monks. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Observers here see international awareness of the Burma situation, and pressure on the GOB, as important leverage in keeping the situation from turning violent. Consequently, they see communication of information from Burma through Thailand as critical to keeping global media sources informed. Importantly, the activists here feel that the Burmese opposition is much better positioned than in 1988 to maintain communication with the outside world in the event of an attempt by the regime to cut them off. MORROW