CHAVISTAS USE RECALL REFERENDA TO SETTLE SCORES

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 000931

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (PARA 5)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: CHAVISTAS USE RECALL REFERENDA TO SETTLE SCORES

REF: A. CARACAS 00805

B. CARACAS 00820 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D)


1. (C) Summary: In late 2006, most of Venezuela's governors,
mayors, and local legislators completed the mid-point of
their term, at which point they became vulnerable to being
recalled. The National Electoral Council has approved
requests to initiate recall proceedings against more than 200
mostly Chavista officials, and in mid-June will formally
collect signatures from those favoring a recall vote. If
enough signatures are collected, a referendum will be held by
early October. Most of the requests appear to be driven by
local intra-Chavista rivalries, and are unlikely to succeed
without Chavez' backing. The exceptions are those in Aragua
and Sucre states, where President Chavez has publicly
endorsed efforts to remove pro-government governors in
response to their public criticisms of his single
revolutionary party proposal. End Summary.

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Chavistas Seek to Recall Their Own
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2. (U) Venezuelan law permits the recall of elected
officials through a petition and referenda process once they
complete the mid-point of their terms (Ref A). For most
state and local officials, including governors, mayors, state
legislators, and council members, the mid-point occurred on
October 31, 2006. The National Electoral Council (CNE) has
approved requests to initiate recall petitions against more
than 200 mostly pro-Chavez officials and has announced a
three-day drive for June 16-18 to collect signatures for a
recall. If at least 20 percent of the electorate in the
particular voting district sign the petitions, the CNE will
then convoke a recall vote, probably by early October.

For an official to be recalled:
-- 25 percent of the electorate in the voting district must
participate;
-- more people must vote for recall than against it; and,
-- the number of those voting in favor of the recall must
equal or exceed the number of votes the official received
when elected.


3. (U) A total of twelve governors, over 100 mayors, and
various local legislators are on the recall list. Among the
more notable Chavistas are Chavez crony and Miranda state
Governor Diosdado Cabello, the formerly described "Scribe of
the Revolution" and Anzoategui Governor Tarek William Saab,
Carabobo state Governor Luis Acosta Carlez, and Caracas
Libertador municipality Mayor Freddy Bernal. Chavez' cousin
Mayor Ramon Frias (Arismendi, Barinas state) and ex-Vice
President Rangel's son and Sucre municipality Mayor Jose
Vicente Rangel Avalos are on the list as well. So far, the
most notable opposition figure on the list is Baruta Mayor
Henrique Capriles Radonski. Despite initial speculation,
Zulia Governor and national opposition leader Manuel Rosales
is not on the list of potential recall victims.

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Revenge or Accountability?
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4. (C) The recall efforts against Aragua and Sucre state
Governors Didalco Bolivar and Ramon Martinez (both Podemos
party leaders),respectively, appear to be clear cases of
political retaliation for their and Podemos' public criticism
of and refusal to join Chavez' United Socialist Party of
Venezuela (PSUV, Ref B). Recalls were approved against both
governors within days of their public objections to joining
the PSUV, and Chavez subsequently publicly rebuked them and
called on his followers to "revoke them both." Aragua state
has the highest percentage of recall petitions, which if
successful, would result in the ouster of the governor, all
but two mayors, and the entire legislative council, and would
likely trigger new state-wide elections.


5. (C) The recall effort in Aragua state could be "the fight
to watch" as Bolivar, three-time governor of the state, was
well entrenched in Aragua long before Chavez. Many
observers, noting his popularity, believe it unlikely that he
would lose in a fair vote. Martinez, who is also Podemos'
president, has a similar background, and by all accounts is
digging in for a major fight. However, he has recently been
plagued by accusations of corruption, and may have problems
defeating a government-supported recall.


6. (C) Most of the other recall efforts appear to be driven
by personal rivalries or vendettas. For example:

--Anzoategui state: Former Chavista Foreign Minister Luis
Alfonso Davila and his Progressive Anzoateguians Opinion
Group is pushing the recall effort against Governor Tarek
William Saab (Fifth Republic Movement, MVR). Saab was
Chavez' imposed candidate for governor in 2004, causing
friction with local MVR officials from the start of his
governorship. His main rivals have been the pro-Chavez
mayors of the state's main cities Barcelona (the capital) and
Puerto La Cruz. His popularity has steadily declined in the
past few years, but Chavez has expressed confidence in Saab's
ability to overcome the current challenge.

--Bolivar state: According to opposition insider Anibal
Sanchez, the attempt to recall Governor Francisco Rangel
Gomez (MVR) is one of the few that could succeed. Rangel
Gomez is reportedly opposed by all of the state's mayors
because he has not shared kickbacks from infrastructure
projects.

--Monagas state: The recall request against Governor Jose
Gregorio "Gato" Briceno (Migato, or The Independent "We All
Win" Movement) was sponsored by the governor's long-time
rival, Maturin Mayor Numa Rojas (MVR). In retaliation,
Briceno has brought one against Rojas, too. Local MVR
representatives, including the state's National Assembly
representatives, are reportedly trying to negotiate a truce
between the officials by which both sides would drop their
recall efforts.

--Carabobo state: Governor Luis Acosta Carlez has been a
divisive figure within the Carabobo state chapter of the MVR.
Things came to a head in 2005 when the MVR's national
committee had to intervene in the local branch to restore
order. The party has investigated several of Carlez' aides
for corruption as well. The recall is sponsored by the head
of the pro-Chavez journalist group, Periodistas Por la Verdad
(Journalists for the Truth),but former National Assembly
member for Carabobo Pedro Diaz Blum says it is not supported
by the local MVR chapter and will therefore not succeed.

--Zulia state: Pro-opposition San Francisco Mayor Saadi
Bijani (Copei) told the Ambassador that he thinks the central
government is pursuing the recall effort against him over the
objections of local MVR leaders. Neither it, nor the effort
against pro-Chavez Maracaibo Mayor Gian Carlo DiMartino
(MVR),is expected to prosper, however. Meanwhile, Governor
Rosales (Un Nuevo Tiempo, UNT) is trying to encourage a
recall against himself to reaffirm his popularity in the
state. (Note: Rosales suffered his first electoral defeat in
Zulia during the 2006 presidential election, narrowly losing
the state to Chavez 51-48, but retains significant popularity
in the state.)

--Caracas, Libertador municipality: Mayor Freddy Bernal
(MVR) has long fought with Caracas Metropolitan Mayor Juan
Barreto (MVR),most recently about the year in which Caracas
was founded, and a faction of the latter's supporters may be
behind this recall effort. Bernal is supported by the local
legislative council, and his close ties to President Chavez
will help him stave off revocation.

--Baruta municipality: Though not likely to be removed, many
opposition supporters are disappointed with Mayor Henrique
Capriles Radonski's (PJ) administration. While
pro-government supporters are most likely behind the effort,
opposition insider Anibal Sanchez said opposition members may
participate to informally censure Capriles, who is often
described as arrogant and unwilling to cooperate with other
opposition groups.


7. (C) The BRV may see advantages to allowing some recalls
to succeed, such as:

--Sucre municipality: According to an opposition contact,
Chavistas might allow the Mayor Jose Vicente Rangel Avalos
(MVR) to be recalled because of reported widespread
discontent with his administration.

--Yaracuy state: Governor Carlos Gimenez (formerly Podemos,
now PSUV) has occasionally clashed with the MVR's Yaracuy
leaders in the past because of his perceived efforts to
strengthen his former party's standing at the expense of the
MVR. While we cannot identify for certain the motivations
for this recall, it is one of the few that, if successful,
would allow Chavistas to say they are fighting corruption.
Gimenez was summoned to appear before the National Assembly's
Oversight Committee May 2 to answer allegations of
malfeasance in relation to concessions of government
contracts.

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Chavista Reaction: Indignant to Prepared
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8. (C) Many Chavista officials on the list have reacted with
indignation to their potential recall, accusing the
petitioning groups of being "counterrevolutionaries" seeking
to betray or undermine the "revolution." Others have said
they welcome the chance to defend their administration. Some
officials, such as Rangel Gomez and Bernal, have announced
the establishment of campaign teams similar to the Maisanta
and Miranda structures Chavez used in his recall and
re-election campaigns, respectively. Chavez told targeted
officials during a recent "Alo Presidente" show to follow his
example in 2004 and "demonstrate the effectiveness of their
administration." If they are recalled, he said they simply
"have to go." He even "invited" voters to convoke a recall
vote against his father, Barinas state Governor Hugo Chavez
de los Reyes, to try to demonstrate that no one is or should
be immune (in theory).

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Opposition Maintains Distance
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9. (C) While they are enjoying the Chavista infighting, most
opposition leaders see the recalls as an attempt to distract
from the BRV's serious administrative problems and/or
potentially controversial projects in the pipeline. Most
doubt the recalls will succeed without Chavez' backing. UNT
and Proyecto Venezuela leaders say their parties will not
join the signature drives, partly out of concern that their
anti-Chavez signatures would be added to the BRV's
computerized "Tascon List," which identifies friends and foes
of Chavismo. However, it is possible that they might quietly
encourage their supporters to participate in an actual recall
vote.


10. (C) The opposition also probably sees little incentive
to enter the referendum fray. Most opposition supporters
still strongly distrust the Chavista-stacked CNE, suffer from
electoral fatigue, and are therefore unlikely to respond to a
get-out-the-vote campaign. A recall vote, if held, would be
the eleventh electoral event in ten years. The opposition
has lost every one. Also, Venezuelan law states that if the
recall succeeds, the incumbent is replaced by someone from
within the government, which means that even if a Chavista is
recalled, they would be trading one pro-Chavez official for
another. On the other hand, if the recall fails, the
incumbent will be strengthened in the run-up to the next
regional election, which is scheduled for 2008. At a time
when the opposition has been forced to focus on rebuilding
their ranks, gearing up for a recall vote this year distracts
from ongoing attempts to develop local leaders for next
year's race and risks demoralizing newly-energized supporters
in the event of a loss.

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Comment
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11. (C) The multiple recall referenda efforts once again
show the fractious nature of Chavismo and may foreshadow the
difficulties Chavez could face in maintaining a single
pro-government "revolutionary" party. Chavez may allow some
recalls to succeed to drop under-performers, punish perceived
disloyalty, and maintain a pretense of democracy. However, a
serious weakening of the Chavista movement as a result of the
recall process is unlikely, as Chavez' supporters, even those
in high level positions, would probably be unwilling to cross
the Venezuelan president and revoke someone perceived to be
close to him. Moreover, if there were even a remote chance
of surprises, the Chavez-controled CNE could easily prevent
them through manipulation of the rules or the results.

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