AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH FORMER VP RANGEL - MAY 4

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000920 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR DFISK HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER) E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV VE SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH FORMER VP RANGEL - MAY 4 CARACAS 00000920 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES, REASON 1.4 (D) ¶1. (C) Summary. The Ambassador met former Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel May 4 and probed as to how the USG could best initiate a pragmatic, bilateral dialogue with the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (BRV). Rangel said President Chavez wants dialogue, but U.S. criticism of BRV policies undermines the prospects of starting one. The former VP nevertheless suggested the BRV and USG could potentially develop a pragmatic relationship, akin to the BRV's relationship with Colombia, sometime in the next 20 months. Rangel recommended that the Ambassador's successor maintain a low profile and that the USG avoid "personalizing" bilateral relations. The Ambassador reminded Rangel that it is Chavez and other BRV officials who continue to make personal attacks on USG officials. Rangel said he may be willing to facilitate channels of communication to current BRV officials for the Ambassador's successor. End Summary. -------------- Long Time, No See -------------- ¶2. (C) The Ambassador met May 4 with former Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel at Rangel's home. Former VP Chief of Staff Rene Arreaza arranged the meeting at the Ambassador's suggestion. Rangel, who had not met with the Ambassador since December 2004, welcomed the Ambassador and scoffed at the idea that the Ambassador had not been welcome in his office when he was VP. Rangel reported that he was working harder now than when he was vice president. Rangel said he is in frequent contact with Chavez and other senior leaders of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (BRV). He is also hosting a weekly talk show on a private television station. Asked if he was meeting in his capacity as a journalist or former VP, Rangel said the latter and assured the Ambassador that their conversation was a private one. -------------- Promoting Bilateral Dialogue -------------- ¶3. (C) The Ambassador asked Rangel for his advice on how to get some sort of pragmatic dialogue going between the BRV and USG. Rangel said he believes dialogue is still essential and added that President Chavez wants dialogue. However, the BRV 
perceives that Washington is sending mixed signals. The BRV appreciated WHA A/S Shannon's recent comments that patience is required for a long-term relationship with BRV, but disliked recent public comments made by the Deputy Secretary suggesting that the BRV system would eventually collapse. Critical messages complicate the possibility for dialogue. ¶4. (C) The Ambassador asked if Rangel was saying that there could not be dialogue until there was no public difference of opinion between the two governments. If so, that does not offer much hope for dialogue. The United States and Venezuela have different systems, models, and visions on which we are unlikely to agree. We had serious dialogue with the USSR for 45 years despite fundamental differences. Was that impossible with the BRV? Rangel responded that dialogue was possible despite fundamental differences. He said the two countries needed an approach more like the Venezuela-Colombia relationship. Chavez and Uribe did not agree on much, but had managed to keep the bilateral relationship on a pragmatic footing. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador said the USG had unsuccessfully probed the possibility of serious dialogue at least twice in last 12 months. He noted that in April 2006 he had suggested to then-Foreign Minister Ali Rogdriguez that we meet to discuss areas for a pragmatic dialogue. He had agreed, and suggested another visit the following week. The BRV leaked the conversation to the local press and the next day Chavez announced that A/S Shannon wanted to visit Venezuela, effectively scotching the initiative. The Ambassador also noted that he met with the current Foreign Minister Maduro in December 2006, after Chavez' re-election. There appeared to be agreement on six areas for possible pragmatic dialogue, so we followed up in January with Vice FM Jorge Valero with concrete suggestions on how to proceed. We have not received any response from BRV since then. CARACAS 00000920 002.2 OF 002 ¶6. (C) The Ambassador asked if USG officials were missing a BRV signal. Rangel said "no," and attributed the lack of BRV follow-up to an ongoing internal policy debate within the BRV. The BRV has hawks and doves just like USG, Rangel said, so it is a matter of timing. Rangel disagreed with the suggestion put forward by some BRV contacts that the BRV believes dialogue is impossible until the next U.S. administration. He said he believes dialogue is still possible over the next 20 months. -------------- Looking Ahead -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador asked if Rangel had any advice for the Embassy, going forward. Rangel said the next U.S. ambassador should not appear so much in public, should refrain from comments likely to set off Chavez, and should not allow himself to be "used" by the opposition. The Ambassador responded that suggesting that a U.S. ambassador have no public presence would be a tough sell. The former VP told the Ambassador that he had been too public and had handled himself too well in public, and that bothered Chavez. Rangel said Chavez also did not like the Ambassador getting into the barrios in support of USAID programs. ¶8. (C) In addition, Rangel said the USG should be careful with the Venezuelan expatriate community in the United States. He advised against creating a "personalized" relationship, like that between the United States and Cuba. The Ambassador noted that, to his knowledge, the USG had refrained from mentioning Chavez by name for years, specifically so as not to personalize the bilateral relationship. On the other hand, the Venezuelan president had launched a series of highly personal attacks on U.S. leadership. Rangel excused this behavior, saying Chavez would be Chavez; he is a loquacious fellow who thrives on confrontation. But Chavez always pulls back from the brink, added Rangel. ¶9. (C) The Ambassador said some people analyzed Chavez as having made a calculation that it was in his interest to maintain a confrontational attitude toward the United States. Rangel said that analysis is largely true. In the aftermath of the short-lived April 2002 coup and the subsequent national strike, Chavez had decided that it was in his interest to challenge the United States. Rangel argued that USG actions had provoked Chavez. The Ambassador said that was not our analysis, but he and Rangel agreed that an argument over history would be a sterile one. ¶10. (C) Noting that the USG did not have many reliable channels of communication to the BRV, the Ambassador said his successor would need more. Rangel suggested that he could serve to facilitate the development of those channels, but said he did not want to be a channel himself because he is out of government. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Rangel's suggestions that the Embassy lower its profile is evidence of the effectiveness of our tactics in getting our messages out. Although he has resumed his journalistic career, former VP Jose Vicente Rangel said he would not publicize or speak about his May 4 meeting with the Ambassador. So far, Rangel has honored this commitment, but we will have to wait and see whether he continues to do so. WHITAKER