RCTVQ,S LAST DITCH FIGHT AGAINST BRV CLOSURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000092 SIPDIS SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2031 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM VE SUBJECT: RCTVQ,S LAST DITCH FIGHT AGAINST BRV CLOSURE REF: A. CARACAS 15 ¶B. CARACAS 53 CARACAS 00000092 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Robert Downes, Political Counselor, for Reason 1.4(b). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a January 11 lunch with ChargQ, Polcouns and A/PAO, RCTV President Marcel Granier outlined his plans for a last ditch defense against the closure of RCTV. He believes he has a strong case under both domestic and international law, but doubts the fairness of the former and efficiency of the latter. He will try to rally domestic and international opinion to help the station and is convinced that the best possibility of saving RCTV would be if the governments of Spain, Argentina, Brazil and Chile directly but privately conveyed their concerns to President Chavez. The ChargQ told Granier that the USG supported freedom of expression in Venezuela and would do what it could to assist RCTV, understanding that obvious or public USG support for RCTV could be counterproductive. Granier agreed. Granier emphatically said that the station would not change its programming or content in order to survive. Station management believes that RCTV could be effectively closed as early as the end of March. End summary. -------------- IN CHAVEZ'S CROSSHAIRS -------------- ¶2. (C) President Chavez has a long-standing feud with RCTV, one of the key opposition media, accusing it of continual anti-government efforts since the April 2002 attempt to oust him. RCTV has long been the target of Chavista attacks; beginning in the second half of 2006, however, President Chavez began to suggest he would consider refusing to renew the station's license, which according to the BRV must be renewed in 2007, a contention that RCTV strongly disputes (ref a). Both to us and to the media, Granier said that the government has not contacted them directly on the case. As is typical in the BRV, RCTV is receiving its information from public statements made by various BRV officials. And, as usual, while different BRV spokesmen say different things, they are consistent in saying that RCTV will lose its license no later than May 27. The general manager of RCTV's sister radio outlet told Poloff on January 12 that he expects BRV officials would show up at RCTV at the end of March and instruct the station to shut down pending further legal proceedings, financially crippling the operation. The typically violent and pro-government Tupamaros have already paid visits aimed at intimidating RCTV management. -------------- RCTV'S DEFENSE STRATEGY -------------- ¶3. (C) Granier outlined to Emboffs a series of actions RCTV would take to defend itself. The station is planning to raise a legal defense both in Venezuelan courts and international tribunals, specifically the OAS's Inter-American Human Rights Court. Granier believes he has a solid case in both fora. Briefly, Granier's arguments are a) the BRV is trying to close the station because of its political content, an action supported by neither Venezuelan nor international law; and b) the station's license was effectively renewed for 20 years on June 12, 2002. Granier admits, however, that RCTV is unlikely to get a fair decision from the Chavista-controlled Venezuelan courts. Granier also believes a favorable - or at least a prompt - decision by the Interamerican Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) is also a longshot. ¶4. (C) In a separate conversation, an RCTV lawyer told Emboff that they would try to piggyback this case in the IACHR with an already pending case, in which RCTV is petitioning for special protective measures for the station. A concern, however, is that the previous case involves protection against physical attacks, while the current case pertains to abuse of licensing regulations. Extending the case to cover the new matter is apparently technically permissible, but has not been addressed by the IACHR, according to New York University professor Samuel Issacharoff. ¶5. (C) Granier also hopes to generate support from domestic and international opinion. Granier believes that the Carter Center and President Carter could play a role, and that CARACAS 00000092 002.2 OF 002 President Carter would respond if his good offices were solicited. He believes that a more successful approach would be for various countries friendly to the BRV, specifically Spain, Argentina, Brazil and Chile, to quietly convey their concerns directly but privately to President Chavez. -------------- HOW THE USG CAN HELP -------------- ¶6. (C) ChargQ expressed strong USG support to Granier for freedom of expression in Venezuela. Emboffs and Granier agreed that a direct intervention or comment by the Embassy or USG would be counterproductive. The participants agreed that the most effective actions would be to help RCTV in suggesting U.S. human rights NGOs and academic institutions which might take an interest in the story; working to see that this story receives attention in the international media, especially the U.S. media and the media of the four countries Granier suggested could be helpful in influencing Chavez; and, in the future, possible diplomatic approaches by USG to Spain, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and EU nations asking them to quietly weigh in with the BRV. -------------- RCTV: THE CANARY IN THE COAL MINE -------------- ¶7. (C) Andres Mata, the publisher/owner of Caracas's leading daily El Universal, opined to a PAS officer in December 2006 that RCTV was the canary in the coal mine for the free press in Venezuela. During the lunch Granier stated that he believed that the Venevision television station was next on the list. Despite the widespread belief that Venevision was safe because it has already eliminated any anti-government edge from its reportage and editorial coverage, Granier thinks the BRV will go after it because of its size and reach. Conversely, he believes the stridently anti-Chavez all-news cable outlet, Globovision, might survive for some time. He believes its more-limited cable audience (compared to free-to-air stations like RCTV and Venevision), and the need to show international opinion that criticism is allowed in the Bolivarian Republic, give Globovision a temporary immunity. He stated that radio is very vulnerable to government blackmail, especially because many rural stations probably maintain irregular licenses and paperwork, the result of decades of concessions offered as political favors. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) After years of verbally attacking the press and using new laws to harass it, a bolder, more confident Chavez appears ready to begin shutting down the independent media. His vulgar retort to both OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel Insulza and various representatives of the Church when they defended RCTV demonstrates an increasing disregard for public opinion, both inside and outside Venezuela (ref b). Granier accepts that the odds are long but is determined to go down fighting. It is highly unlikely that an effective domestic and international defense might save RCTV. That said, at the very least, an effective response might slow down attempts to close other media. As with other post-election radicalization foreshadowed by Chavez, the question now is not whether, but when. BROWNFIELD