VENEZUELAN ARMY HOSTS U.S. MILITARY DELEGATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000701 SIPDIS SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPT PASS TO WHA/AND AND PM E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2017 TAGS: MARR MASS PGOV PM PREL VE SUBJECT: VENEZUELAN ARMY HOSTS U.S. MILITARY DELEGATION CARACAS 00000701 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR DANIEL LAWTON FOR REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. An eight person U.S. Army delegation attended a March 26-30 Conference of American Armies (CAA) seminar on Disaster Relief in Venezuela, the first U.S. military delegation hosted in-country since 2003. U.S. participants were generally well received. Failure to conduct the exercise portion of the conference proved to be a major organizational flaw in the multilateral event. The week-long event provided a glimpse into how the Venezuelan Army (VENAR) will approach the CAA once it assumes the Secretariat in ¶2008. END SUMMARY. -------------- Background -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Founded in 1960 at the request of the State Department, the Conference of American Armies (CAA) is designed to promote interoperability, improve hemispheric security, and strengthen Inter-American cooperation on an army-to-army basis. The CAA is made up of twenty member armies and five observer armies. It conducts a two-year cycle of Specialized Conferences hosted by different member armies which culminate in a Commanders' Conference organized by the army hosting the CAA Permanent Executive Secretariat (PESCAA). Member armies voluntarily rotate as hosts of the PESCAA and coordinate all CAA activities in addition to hosting the Commanders' Conference. The Brazilian Army currently holds the PESCAA, and the Venezuelan Army will coordinate the 2008-2009 cycle. -------------- Treatment of the U.S. Delegation -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (BRV) hosted the "Specialized Conference on Disaster Relief" of the Conference of American Armies (CAA) March 26-30. The U.S. Army delegation to the multilateral conference was generally well treated by Venezuelan officials and did not report any incidents of concern. The delegation included six conference participants, the Commander of the MilGroup at Post, and an Army Chaplain from Army South. Similar to the other member delegations, the U.S. contingent received VIP treatment upon arrival and departure from Caracas, escort officers (one of whom spoke fluent English),housing in the Military Guest House on the base Fuerte Tiuna, and a "cultural day" at Margarita Island. Additionally, the visiting Army Chaplain was not prevented from giving several outreach presentations to religious organizations and the Embassy community outside of the military base. ¶4. (C) The U.S. delegation perceived the Venezuelan officials to be professional but distant. VENAR officers, for example, did not exchange business cards or host the U.S. officers out, as is customary. Similarly, the Chaplain requested a meeting with his VENAR counterpart, but the request was denied several days after the Chaplain's departure. -------------- Shortfalls -------------- ¶5. (C) The VENAR failed to produce a scheduled, multinational exercise as promised, CAA's first such attempt. (Note: The exercise was supposed to simulate a disaster relief response within Venezuela. End Note.) The details surrounding the cancellation are unclear, although it appears to be the result of time mismanagement coupled with the day-long social trip to Margarita Island. The U.S. delegation expressed disappointment over the cancellation as it would have allowed them to collect lessons learned, gauge the planning capabilities of the VENAR, and assist host country Uruguay in the execution of the next CAA exercise planned for June. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) According to U.S. participants, the VENAR staged a professional conference, despite the lack of an exercise. VENAR officials refrained from making anti-American remarks during the conference, and even mentioned U.S. relief efforts in 1999 during the Vargas humanitarian crisis (although they did not mention Chavez' decision to turn away the bulk of U.S. military assistance). The participation of U.S. delegates to the conference does not signal increased American - Venezuelan cooperation on military issues; however, it provided a window into how the VENAR will approach hosting the CAA Permanent Executive Secretariat during the 2008-2009 cycle. ¶7. (C) Despite the BRV's relentlessly hostile attitude toward the United States, the VENAR did not try to exclude the U.S. delegation from this conference and treated our participants with respect. It is possible that they calculated that doing so would have represented a break unacceptable to many other conference participants. The VENAR appears to be trying to present itself as eminently professional in the run-up to assuming CAA executive secretary responsibilities. It remains to be seen if the VENAR will try to press a Bolivarian agenda once it takes on that role in 2008-2009. BROWNFIELD