NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CEDES POWER TO CHAVEZ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000264 SIPDIS SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2027 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM VE SUBJECT: NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CEDES POWER TO CHAVEZ REF: A. CARACAS 00219 ¶B. CARACAS 00062 ¶C. CARACAS 00035 CARACAS 00000264 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR DANIEL LAWTON FOR 1.4 (B) and (D) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) On January 31, the Venezuelan National Assembly (AN) passed the Omnibus Enabling Law, which gives unlimited power to legislate to President Chavez for 18 months. With this act, the 100-percent pro-Chavez National Assembly eagerly and completely abdicated its responsibility as an independent lawmaking body and as a check and balance in Venezuelan democracy. AN Deputies Saul Ortega and Carlos Escarra met with PolCouns and Poloff before the vote, and were defensive about opposition accusations that they were ceding too much legislative power to Chavez by approving the most extensive decree powers in Venezuelan history. They argued the AN would still review at least 40 laws this year, including the International Cooperation Law, designed to control foreign assistance to NGOs. Escarra, a member of the president's constitutional reform committee, said the BRV also planned to hold a constitutional referendum by mid-September. Ortega said they would like to revive the Venezuela-U.S. parliamentary friendship group and seek a meeting with several members of Congress, notably Speaker Pelosi. End Summary. -------------- Deputies Defend Decree Law -------------- ¶2. (C) On January 31, the Venezuelan National Assembly granted unprecedented legislative power to President Chavez. Literally minutes before granting Chavez the most extensive decree powers in Venezuela's history (Ref A),PolCouns and Poloff met with National Assembly (AN) Deputies Saul Ortega and Carlos Escarra, both Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) deputies from Carabobo and Aragua States, respectively. Neither deputy appeared concerned that Chavez' new power would dismantle the democratic principle of checks and balances and consolidate extreme power in the executive at their expense. In fact, both were eager to refute opposition claims that the legislature was ceding its powers to the President via the Enabling Law (Ley Habilitante),the "first motor of Chavez' "socialist" revolution. ¶3. (C) Escarra explained that the AN had five duties: to legislate, to audit other branches of government, to coordinate public policy, to hold popular consultations with the people, and to serve as spokesperson for the people. Only one--the legislative function--was now being "shared" with the executive. (Note: AN contacts have routinely told us, they see their role as supporting the President, not questioning him.) Ortega added that the AN would still approve at least 40 laws this year, in addition to Chavez' as yet unspecified proposals for constitutional amendments. Escarra defended the duration of the decree powers for 18 months as necessary so the President could decree laws before and after the changes to the constitution were made. The deputies opined that the National Police Law and other bills concerning social and security issues would likely be among the first decree-laws promulgated. Decree laws dealing with the economy, including the hydrocarbons and gas sectors, would likely come after the constitutional reform. -------------- Constitutional Reform Accelerated -------------- ¶4. (C) Escarra, a constitutional lawyer by training and member of the presidential constitutional reform commission, also laid out an ambitious timeline for the constitutional changes, Chavez' "second motor" of the "socialist" revolution. He said the commission was working long hours in order to deliver a draft proposal to Chavez by late February or early March. Escarra predicted the President would take one to two weeks to review their suggestions before submitting a formal proposal to the AN by mid-March. The Assembly would hold three readings of the draft proposal. Between the readings they will hold consultations with the public through the "parliament-in-the-street" program. All CARACAS 00000264 002.2 OF 003 told, the readings and popular consultations could take three to four months. A consultative referendum could then be held in mid-September. ¶5. (C) Escarra described the forthcoming proposed amendments as improvements to "polish up" the existing constitution. He argued that the opposition's arguments that a constitutional assembly was required to implement such changes were spurious because the BRV was not re-writing the constitution, significantly changing the document's structure, or re-founding the country -- the three requirements for calling such an assembly. Escarra said the opposition was trying to insert itself into the process, but lost that opportunity by boycotting the 2005 legislative election. However, Ortega and Escarra said they would have a chance to participate during the popular consultation phase. Ortega noted that the opposition successfully used this mechanism to introduce their proposals within the National Police Law. -------------- Other Motors of Socialism -------------- ¶6. (C) Ortega predicted that separate referenda -- not decree laws or amendments -- would probably be held for some of the other "motors" of Chavez' "socialist" revolution. He said the "new geometry of power" initiative through which Chavez would reconfigure the country's territorial divisions (Ref B) would likely be put to a popular vote (despite the fact that the enabling law specifically grants Chavez authority to issue decree-laws in this area). Ortega said the idea was to group various (mainly rural) areas together to create strategic centers for economic development. The measure is supposedly aimed at trying to balance out Venezuela's unequal distribution of population and could possibly entail re-distributing resources and industries to ensure more even economic and social development. Ortega claimed there was great enthusiasm for this project when the 1999 constitution was written, particularly in the border state of Apure. There was also considerable opposition at the time, and the redistricting ideas were dropped. -------------- -------------- Focused on Mercosur, Some Calls to US Congressmen Possible -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Ortega and Escarra, who are President and Vice President, respectively, of the AN's Foreign Policy Commission, said the committee would mainly focus on Mercosur. Ortega added Venezuela's entry as a full member of the trade bloc appeared to be moving along well, as they had approval from the Argentine and Uruguayan legislatures, as well as the lower house of the Paraguayan Congress. Ortega also mentioned strong interest in passing the International Cooperation Law, which seeks to control and restrict international assistance to NGOs, but he said the BRV would have to take international reaction into consideration. ¶8. (C) Ortega said the Venezuela-U.S. parliamentary friendship group, of which he is also a member, will vote soon on a new president to replace ex-deputy Rafael Isea, who became Vice Finance Minister in January. According to Ortega, the friendship group will seek a meeting with Speaker Pelosi and members who belonged to the "Boston Group." They may also seek a meeting for National Assembly President Cilia Flores with the Speaker. Ortega asked about the status of the bilateral counternarcotics agreement and also feigned ignorance of our long-standing request to open a American Presence Post in Maracaibo. Ortega also passed on complaints he had received about Venezuelans' difficulties in obtaining tourist visas and questioned the veracity of the 3,000 asylum claims reported in the Miami Herald. -------------- One Party To Pick Up Speed Again -------------- ¶9. (C) Ortega, who also sits on the MVR's National Tactical Command, said the push to create a single revolutionary party (Ref C) will probably resume again in February. He noted that several smaller pro-government parties have already agreed to dissolve and join the newly-created United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV),while others with a longer history, like the Communist Party, have been more reluctant. (Note: Pro-government daily Diario Vea reported January 31 that one hold-out, Patria Para Todos (PPT),the CARACAS 00000264 003.2 OF 003 third largest coalition party, agreed to join the PSUV. PPT was widely considered to be the pro-Chavez party least interested in joining the PSUV.) ¶10. (C) Ortega said rank-and-file members of Chavez' presidential campaign team are conducting a census of potential PSUV members in preparation for the party's registration with the CNE. They are hoping the party will eventually comprise four to five million members, compared with the MVR's roughly 1.5 million. Ortega said the party will likely hold a constituent assembly this Spring to develop the party's ideological framework, by-laws, and organizational structure. Some members may be elected, while others, such as AN deputies or heads of the defunct parties, may be appointed by Chavez. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) The 100-percent pro-Chavez National Assembly on January 31 eagerly and completely abdicated its responsibility as an independent lawmaking body and as a check and balance in Venezuelan democracy. Chavez and his supporters have never embraced the concept of separation of power, but with this action, even the pretense has been stripped away. Now that the legislature has effectively voted itself into powerless oblivion, the Chavez government is leaking other equally undemocratic actions -- like giving Chavez power to remove ("scratch out") non-performing elected officials, and even including perhaps reducing the AN from 167 members to 50 by fiat from Hugo Chavez. While Ortega and Escarra were uncharacteristically cordial and eager to show how hard the legislature would be working, their arguments are specious. ¶12. (C) Even taking into account that Chavez and his circle can simply draft and promulgate decrees, without all the messiness of committee work, multiple readings of bills, and incorporating alternative views, the timeline for implementing the constitutional changes is extremely ambitions. The AN has already slipped in its timeline for approving the decree law and the dates Escarra gave for constitutional revision were earlier than those previously announced. The BRV has never been known for its efficiency. Chavez' aggressiveness on multiple fronts will likely lead to more missed dealings, a more frustrated Chavez, and internal tensions and competition within the Chavista camp. BROWNFIELD