OPPOSITION LOOKS TOWARD 2008

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 002364 SIPDIS SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2017 TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE SUBJECT: OPPOSITION LOOKS TOWARD 2008 CARACAS 00002364 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Bolstered by its first electoral victory in nine years, the opposition is preparing for the 2008 state and municipal elections, where it hopes to take back a few governorships and mayoral posts. Mainstream opposition parties Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT),Primero Justicia (PJ) and Copei plan to run consensus candidates to the extent possible, as well as work closely with the student movement. They will also reach out to Accion Democratica (AD) and continue their informal, low profile collaboration with the formerly pro-Chavez Podemos party. The parties are preparing to defend the 1999 constitution against Chavez' potential efforts to re-introduce his reform package or impose some proposals by decree. The opposition is counting on the referendum win, economic difficulties, and the Chavez administration's bureaucratic inefficiencies to draw disgruntled Chavistas to their ranks. However, they face several significant hurdles, including their past inability to agree on candidates, the lack of a clearly defined political alternative attractive to most Venezuelans, and government harassment. End Summary. -------------- Taking Lessons Learned From 2007. . . -------------- ¶2. (C) Opposition party leaders tell us they derived several lessons from the December 2 constitutional referendum results. First, and most important, that they can win an election. Second, that electoral witnesses at the polling stations and election center are key to deterring potential fraud and convincing the GOV to recognize the results. (Copei Deputy Secretary General Alejandro Vivas told Poloffs December 12 that the "No" camp fielded witnesses to roughly 75 percent of the 33,000-plus voting tables, an improvement over last year's presidential election. This coverage gave the opposition confidence in their win, despite contradicting exit polls.) Third, that disgruntled Chavistas were largely responsible for the "No" win. About half of the middle class abstained, but the opposition made significant gains in areas traditionally known as Chavista strongholds, according to various opposition contacts. -------------- . . . Applying Them to 2008 -------------- ¶3. (C) While eager to translate these lessons into wins in the 2008 state and municipal elections to be held by October 31, the three mainstream opposition parties, Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT),Primero Justicia (PJ),and Copei, are planning to take a "step by step approach" to try to erode Chavez, base. Opposition leaders predict Chavez will face a difficult year ahead with mounting economic pressures and food shortages, rising crime, and continuing bureaucratic inefficiencies leading to increased voter discontent. According to Vivas, the opposition will "let Chavez govern" and expose his own deficiencies while they prepare for the 2008 regional elections. ¶4. (C) UNT, PJ, and Copei remain more united in the wake of the referendum victory than they were after Rosales' defeat in the presidential election. They are planning to run unified candidate slates where possible. UNT Secretary General Gerardo Blyde and Vivas told Poloffs the parties currently are identifying and negotiating on candidates. They are reaching out to Accion Democratica to broaden the united front as much as possible, as well. (Comment: The opposition is not known for its party discipline and, if local leaders are left out, they may run as independents, thwarting unity efforts.) Meanwhile, UNT coordinator D'elsa Solorzano, a potential mayoral candidate for a Caracas suburb, told PolCouns December 4 that prospective candidates have been told to work their constituencies now. According to Vivas and Solorzano, the opposition is working within their traditional strongholds, and also slowly making inroads in the usually pro-Chavez barrios. While not expecting to sweep, Blyde was optimistic that the opposition could win additional offices in six to eight states. (Note: The opposition holds two out of 22 governorships and 67 of 337 municipalities. The Podemos party separately elected two governors and ten mayors in the last state and local elections.) NDI Director Karina Espinoza told POLOFF that, at the parties' request, she will begin training electoral witnesses early next year. CARACAS 00002364 002.2 OF 003 ¶5. (C) The opposition is also concerned about Chavez' pledge to re-introduce his constitutional changes, and has made defending the 1999 constitution another priority for 2008. Chavez' supporters are suggesting that voters petition to have the changes reconsidered or that Chavez use his decree powers to implement some initiatives. (Note: According to article 345 of the 1999 constitution, constitutional reforms defeated in a referendum cannot be re-introduced in the same constitutional period (i.e., within the same six years). Article 342 allows 15 percent of registered voters to propose reform proposals, which would then be subject to a national referendum. In February 2007 the National Assembly granted Chavez broad authority to decree laws for 18 months. That power runs out August 1. End note.) ¶6. (C) Former Defense Minister Raul Baduel has publicly called for a constitutional assembly to draft changes to the 1999 Constitution. A constitutional assembly is the third alternative for proposing constitutional amendments. Solorzano opined that a constitutional assembly would be the worst option for the opposition, as it would allow disgruntled pro-Chavez governors and mayors to include their own proposals, such as indefinite re-election for themselves, making the reforms more palatable to Chavista voters and harder for the opposition to fight. The opposition would likely secure only a small percentage of seats in the assembly, making it difficult to counter undemocratic changes and push their own counter-proposals. -------------- What About Podemos? -------------- ¶7. (C) The opposition and Podemos continue to talk privately, but Podemos Secretary General Ismael Garcia is publicly positioning his party as a Chavista-lite, alternative party and will not openly align with the opposition. Vivas told Poloffs they will informally coordinate in select Podemos strongholds to avoid competing with each other. They will likely also coordinate on fielding electoral witnesses as they did this year. We understand that Baduel, who is reportedly allied with Podemos leader and Aragua Governor Didalco Bolivar, is interested in running for Aragua Governor. While the opposition may be willing to consider his candidacy, Vivas said Baduel's push for a constituent assembly has apparently ruffled some feathers. Separately, Vivas said the opposition is also hoping to work with Podemos to introduce legislative proposals aimed at addressing key voter concerns, such as combating crime and expanding social security coverage. -------------- And the Students? -------------- ¶8. (C) The parties expect and are encouraging the students to play a prominent role in next year's elections as campaigners, witnesses, and possibly even as candidates. Some student leaders who already belong to parties, such as Freddy Guevara, Yon Goicochea, and Stalin Gonzalez, were reportedly approached about running for mayorships. Goicochea reportedly declined. Opposition contacts have told us the students are still considering their next moves. Many student leaders think the movement should not simply oppose Chavez' ideas without proposing an alternative, but they also recognize that such proposals should come from political parties. Some student leaders suggested forming an opposition party, but this idea does not seem to be gaining steam, according to opposition party contacts. -------------- Potential Stumbling Blocks -------------- ¶9. (C) Chavez already appears intent on distracting and demoralizing the opposition. In addition to his public rants disqualifying the "No" win as "sh-tty" ("de mierda"),the government has initiated politically-inspired criminal cases against some prominent opposition figures. On December 5, prosecutors issued an arrest warrant for former Miranda Governor Enrique Mendoza for his alleged role in shutting down state television station Venezolana de Television (VTV) during the April 2002 coup. Mendoza led the "No" campaign in Miranda State, where Chavez lost by 13 percent. The opposition has since learned that the government plans to re-initiate cases against Mayors Henrique Capriles Radonski and Leopoldo Lopez, as well. As a result, Vivas said the CARACAS 00002364 003.2 OF 003 opposition has formed a working group to develop a common strategy for defending themselves in these political cases, which will include international lobbying. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) For the first time, the opposition appears to have come through an election somewhat united and largely focused on their next goal. The referendum win should increase opposition turn out at the polls next October now that their supporters see it is possible to defeat Chavez. Chavez' attacks against his own supporters following his defeat and next year's anticipated economic problems may also give the opposition a boost. The opposition still faces significant hurdles, however, such as overcoming their own poor track record of agreeing on consensus candidates and keeping supporters motivated in the face of likely Chavez attacks. Finally, opposition parties still have not clearly staked out comprehensive alternative programs for voters to consider. They have done even less to sell their political programs to Venezuela's poor, the vast majority of voters and Chavez' traditional, extensive electoral base. DUDDY