Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07CARACAS2364
2007-12-18 16:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:
OPPOSITION LOOKS TOWARD 2008
VZCZCXRO4720 PP RUEHAG RUEHROV DE RUEHCV #2364/01 3521649 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 181649Z DEC 07 ZDK FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0317 INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 002364
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION LOOKS TOWARD 2008
CARACAS 00002364 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 002364
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION LOOKS TOWARD 2008
CARACAS 00002364 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D)
1. (C) Summary: Bolstered by its first electoral victory in
nine years, the opposition is preparing for the 2008 state
and municipal elections, where it hopes to take back a few
governorships and mayoral posts. Mainstream opposition
parties Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT),Primero Justicia (PJ) and
Copei plan to run consensus candidates to the extent
possible, as well as work closely with the student movement.
They will also reach out to Accion Democratica (AD) and
continue their informal, low profile collaboration with the
formerly pro-Chavez Podemos party. The parties are preparing
to defend the 1999 constitution against Chavez' potential
efforts to re-introduce his reform package or impose some
proposals by decree. The opposition is counting on the
referendum win, economic difficulties, and the Chavez
administration's bureaucratic inefficiencies to draw
disgruntled Chavistas to their ranks. However, they face
several significant hurdles, including their past inability
to agree on candidates, the lack of a clearly defined
political alternative attractive to most Venezuelans, and
government harassment. End Summary.
--------------
Taking Lessons Learned From 2007. . .
--------------
2. (C) Opposition party leaders tell us they derived several
lessons from the December 2 constitutional referendum
results. First, and most important, that they can win an
election. Second, that electoral witnesses at the polling
stations and election center are key to deterring potential
fraud and convincing the GOV to recognize the results.
(Copei Deputy Secretary General Alejandro Vivas told Poloffs
December 12 that the "No" camp fielded witnesses to roughly
75 percent of the 33,000-plus voting tables, an improvement
over last year's presidential election. This coverage gave
the opposition confidence in their win, despite contradicting
exit polls.) Third, that disgruntled Chavistas were largely
responsible for the "No" win. About half of the middle class
abstained, but the opposition made significant gains in areas
traditionally known as Chavista strongholds, according to
various opposition contacts.
--------------
. . . Applying Them to 2008
--------------
3. (C) While eager to translate these lessons into wins in
the 2008 state and municipal elections to be held by October
31, the three mainstream opposition parties, Un Nuevo Tiempo
(UNT),Primero Justicia (PJ),and Copei, are planning to take
a "step by step approach" to try to erode Chavez, base.
Opposition leaders predict Chavez will face a difficult year
ahead with mounting economic pressures and food shortages,
rising crime, and continuing bureaucratic inefficiencies
leading to increased voter discontent. According to Vivas,
the opposition will "let Chavez govern" and expose his own
deficiencies while they prepare for the 2008 regional
elections.
4. (C) UNT, PJ, and Copei remain more united in the wake of
the referendum victory than they were after Rosales' defeat
in the presidential election. They are planning to run
unified candidate slates where possible. UNT Secretary
General Gerardo Blyde and Vivas told Poloffs the parties
currently are identifying and negotiating on candidates.
They are reaching out to Accion Democratica to broaden the
united front as much as possible, as well. (Comment: The
opposition is not known for its party discipline and, if
local leaders are left out, they may run as independents,
thwarting unity efforts.) Meanwhile, UNT coordinator D'elsa
Solorzano, a potential mayoral candidate for a Caracas
suburb, told PolCouns December 4 that prospective candidates
have been told to work their constituencies now. According
to Vivas and Solorzano, the opposition is working within
their traditional strongholds, and also slowly making inroads
in the usually pro-Chavez barrios. While not expecting to
sweep, Blyde was optimistic that the opposition could win
additional offices in six to eight states. (Note: The
opposition holds two out of 22 governorships and 67 of 337
municipalities. The Podemos party separately elected two
governors and ten mayors in the last state and local
elections.) NDI Director Karina Espinoza told POLOFF that,
at the parties' request, she will begin training electoral
witnesses early next year.
CARACAS 00002364 002.2 OF 003
5. (C) The opposition is also concerned about Chavez' pledge
to re-introduce his constitutional changes, and has made
defending the 1999 constitution another priority for 2008.
Chavez' supporters are suggesting that voters petition to
have the changes reconsidered or that Chavez use his decree
powers to implement some initiatives. (Note: According to
article 345 of the 1999 constitution, constitutional reforms
defeated in a referendum cannot be re-introduced in the same
constitutional period (i.e., within the same six years).
Article 342 allows 15 percent of registered voters to propose
reform proposals, which would then be subject to a national
referendum. In February 2007 the National Assembly granted
Chavez broad authority to decree laws for 18 months. That
power runs out August 1. End note.)
6. (C) Former Defense Minister Raul Baduel has publicly
called for a constitutional assembly to draft changes to the
1999 Constitution. A constitutional assembly is the third
alternative for proposing constitutional amendments.
Solorzano opined that a constitutional assembly would be the
worst option for the opposition, as it would allow
disgruntled pro-Chavez governors and mayors to include their
own proposals, such as indefinite re-election for themselves,
making the reforms more palatable to Chavista voters and
harder for the opposition to fight. The opposition would
likely secure only a small percentage of seats in the
assembly, making it difficult to counter undemocratic changes
and push their own counter-proposals.
--------------
What About Podemos?
--------------
7. (C) The opposition and Podemos continue to talk privately,
but Podemos Secretary General Ismael Garcia is publicly
positioning his party as a Chavista-lite, alternative party
and will not openly align with the opposition. Vivas told
Poloffs they will informally coordinate in select Podemos
strongholds to avoid competing with each other. They will
likely also coordinate on fielding electoral witnesses as
they did this year. We understand that Baduel, who is
reportedly allied with Podemos leader and Aragua Governor
Didalco Bolivar, is interested in running for Aragua
Governor. While the opposition may be willing to consider
his candidacy, Vivas said Baduel's push for a constituent
assembly has apparently ruffled some feathers. Separately,
Vivas said the opposition is also hoping to work with Podemos
to introduce legislative proposals aimed at addressing key
voter concerns, such as combating crime and expanding social
security coverage.
--------------
And the Students?
--------------
8. (C) The parties expect and are encouraging the students to
play a prominent role in next year's elections as
campaigners, witnesses, and possibly even as candidates.
Some student leaders who already belong to parties, such as
Freddy Guevara, Yon Goicochea, and Stalin Gonzalez, were
reportedly approached about running for mayorships.
Goicochea reportedly declined. Opposition contacts have told
us the students are still considering their next moves. Many
student leaders think the movement should not simply oppose
Chavez' ideas without proposing an alternative, but they also
recognize that such proposals should come from political
parties. Some student leaders suggested forming an
opposition party, but this idea does not seem to be gaining
steam, according to opposition party contacts.
--------------
Potential Stumbling Blocks
--------------
9. (C) Chavez already appears intent on distracting and
demoralizing the opposition. In addition to his public rants
disqualifying the "No" win as "sh-tty" ("de mierda"),the
government has initiated politically-inspired criminal cases
against some prominent opposition figures. On December 5,
prosecutors issued an arrest warrant for former Miranda
Governor Enrique Mendoza for his alleged role in shutting
down state television station Venezolana de Television (VTV)
during the April 2002 coup. Mendoza led the "No" campaign in
Miranda State, where Chavez lost by 13 percent. The
opposition has since learned that the government plans to
re-initiate cases against Mayors Henrique Capriles Radonski
and Leopoldo Lopez, as well. As a result, Vivas said the
CARACAS 00002364 003.2 OF 003
opposition has formed a working group to develop a common
strategy for defending themselves in these political cases,
which will include international lobbying.
--------------
Comment
--------------
10. (C) For the first time, the opposition appears to have
come through an election somewhat united and largely focused
on their next goal. The referendum win should increase
opposition turn out at the polls next October now that their
supporters see it is possible to defeat Chavez. Chavez'
attacks against his own supporters following his defeat and
next year's anticipated economic problems may also give the
opposition a boost. The opposition still faces significant
hurdles, however, such as overcoming their own poor track
record of agreeing on consensus candidates and keeping
supporters motivated in the face of likely Chavez attacks.
Finally, opposition parties still have not clearly staked out
comprehensive alternative programs for voters to consider.
They have done even less to sell their political programs to
Venezuela's poor, the vast majority of voters and Chavez'
traditional, extensive electoral base.
DUDDY
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION LOOKS TOWARD 2008
CARACAS 00002364 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D)
1. (C) Summary: Bolstered by its first electoral victory in
nine years, the opposition is preparing for the 2008 state
and municipal elections, where it hopes to take back a few
governorships and mayoral posts. Mainstream opposition
parties Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT),Primero Justicia (PJ) and
Copei plan to run consensus candidates to the extent
possible, as well as work closely with the student movement.
They will also reach out to Accion Democratica (AD) and
continue their informal, low profile collaboration with the
formerly pro-Chavez Podemos party. The parties are preparing
to defend the 1999 constitution against Chavez' potential
efforts to re-introduce his reform package or impose some
proposals by decree. The opposition is counting on the
referendum win, economic difficulties, and the Chavez
administration's bureaucratic inefficiencies to draw
disgruntled Chavistas to their ranks. However, they face
several significant hurdles, including their past inability
to agree on candidates, the lack of a clearly defined
political alternative attractive to most Venezuelans, and
government harassment. End Summary.
--------------
Taking Lessons Learned From 2007. . .
--------------
2. (C) Opposition party leaders tell us they derived several
lessons from the December 2 constitutional referendum
results. First, and most important, that they can win an
election. Second, that electoral witnesses at the polling
stations and election center are key to deterring potential
fraud and convincing the GOV to recognize the results.
(Copei Deputy Secretary General Alejandro Vivas told Poloffs
December 12 that the "No" camp fielded witnesses to roughly
75 percent of the 33,000-plus voting tables, an improvement
over last year's presidential election. This coverage gave
the opposition confidence in their win, despite contradicting
exit polls.) Third, that disgruntled Chavistas were largely
responsible for the "No" win. About half of the middle class
abstained, but the opposition made significant gains in areas
traditionally known as Chavista strongholds, according to
various opposition contacts.
--------------
. . . Applying Them to 2008
--------------
3. (C) While eager to translate these lessons into wins in
the 2008 state and municipal elections to be held by October
31, the three mainstream opposition parties, Un Nuevo Tiempo
(UNT),Primero Justicia (PJ),and Copei, are planning to take
a "step by step approach" to try to erode Chavez, base.
Opposition leaders predict Chavez will face a difficult year
ahead with mounting economic pressures and food shortages,
rising crime, and continuing bureaucratic inefficiencies
leading to increased voter discontent. According to Vivas,
the opposition will "let Chavez govern" and expose his own
deficiencies while they prepare for the 2008 regional
elections.
4. (C) UNT, PJ, and Copei remain more united in the wake of
the referendum victory than they were after Rosales' defeat
in the presidential election. They are planning to run
unified candidate slates where possible. UNT Secretary
General Gerardo Blyde and Vivas told Poloffs the parties
currently are identifying and negotiating on candidates.
They are reaching out to Accion Democratica to broaden the
united front as much as possible, as well. (Comment: The
opposition is not known for its party discipline and, if
local leaders are left out, they may run as independents,
thwarting unity efforts.) Meanwhile, UNT coordinator D'elsa
Solorzano, a potential mayoral candidate for a Caracas
suburb, told PolCouns December 4 that prospective candidates
have been told to work their constituencies now. According
to Vivas and Solorzano, the opposition is working within
their traditional strongholds, and also slowly making inroads
in the usually pro-Chavez barrios. While not expecting to
sweep, Blyde was optimistic that the opposition could win
additional offices in six to eight states. (Note: The
opposition holds two out of 22 governorships and 67 of 337
municipalities. The Podemos party separately elected two
governors and ten mayors in the last state and local
elections.) NDI Director Karina Espinoza told POLOFF that,
at the parties' request, she will begin training electoral
witnesses early next year.
CARACAS 00002364 002.2 OF 003
5. (C) The opposition is also concerned about Chavez' pledge
to re-introduce his constitutional changes, and has made
defending the 1999 constitution another priority for 2008.
Chavez' supporters are suggesting that voters petition to
have the changes reconsidered or that Chavez use his decree
powers to implement some initiatives. (Note: According to
article 345 of the 1999 constitution, constitutional reforms
defeated in a referendum cannot be re-introduced in the same
constitutional period (i.e., within the same six years).
Article 342 allows 15 percent of registered voters to propose
reform proposals, which would then be subject to a national
referendum. In February 2007 the National Assembly granted
Chavez broad authority to decree laws for 18 months. That
power runs out August 1. End note.)
6. (C) Former Defense Minister Raul Baduel has publicly
called for a constitutional assembly to draft changes to the
1999 Constitution. A constitutional assembly is the third
alternative for proposing constitutional amendments.
Solorzano opined that a constitutional assembly would be the
worst option for the opposition, as it would allow
disgruntled pro-Chavez governors and mayors to include their
own proposals, such as indefinite re-election for themselves,
making the reforms more palatable to Chavista voters and
harder for the opposition to fight. The opposition would
likely secure only a small percentage of seats in the
assembly, making it difficult to counter undemocratic changes
and push their own counter-proposals.
--------------
What About Podemos?
--------------
7. (C) The opposition and Podemos continue to talk privately,
but Podemos Secretary General Ismael Garcia is publicly
positioning his party as a Chavista-lite, alternative party
and will not openly align with the opposition. Vivas told
Poloffs they will informally coordinate in select Podemos
strongholds to avoid competing with each other. They will
likely also coordinate on fielding electoral witnesses as
they did this year. We understand that Baduel, who is
reportedly allied with Podemos leader and Aragua Governor
Didalco Bolivar, is interested in running for Aragua
Governor. While the opposition may be willing to consider
his candidacy, Vivas said Baduel's push for a constituent
assembly has apparently ruffled some feathers. Separately,
Vivas said the opposition is also hoping to work with Podemos
to introduce legislative proposals aimed at addressing key
voter concerns, such as combating crime and expanding social
security coverage.
--------------
And the Students?
--------------
8. (C) The parties expect and are encouraging the students to
play a prominent role in next year's elections as
campaigners, witnesses, and possibly even as candidates.
Some student leaders who already belong to parties, such as
Freddy Guevara, Yon Goicochea, and Stalin Gonzalez, were
reportedly approached about running for mayorships.
Goicochea reportedly declined. Opposition contacts have told
us the students are still considering their next moves. Many
student leaders think the movement should not simply oppose
Chavez' ideas without proposing an alternative, but they also
recognize that such proposals should come from political
parties. Some student leaders suggested forming an
opposition party, but this idea does not seem to be gaining
steam, according to opposition party contacts.
--------------
Potential Stumbling Blocks
--------------
9. (C) Chavez already appears intent on distracting and
demoralizing the opposition. In addition to his public rants
disqualifying the "No" win as "sh-tty" ("de mierda"),the
government has initiated politically-inspired criminal cases
against some prominent opposition figures. On December 5,
prosecutors issued an arrest warrant for former Miranda
Governor Enrique Mendoza for his alleged role in shutting
down state television station Venezolana de Television (VTV)
during the April 2002 coup. Mendoza led the "No" campaign in
Miranda State, where Chavez lost by 13 percent. The
opposition has since learned that the government plans to
re-initiate cases against Mayors Henrique Capriles Radonski
and Leopoldo Lopez, as well. As a result, Vivas said the
CARACAS 00002364 003.2 OF 003
opposition has formed a working group to develop a common
strategy for defending themselves in these political cases,
which will include international lobbying.
--------------
Comment
--------------
10. (C) For the first time, the opposition appears to have
come through an election somewhat united and largely focused
on their next goal. The referendum win should increase
opposition turn out at the polls next October now that their
supporters see it is possible to defeat Chavez. Chavez'
attacks against his own supporters following his defeat and
next year's anticipated economic problems may also give the
opposition a boost. The opposition still faces significant
hurdles, however, such as overcoming their own poor track
record of agreeing on consensus candidates and keeping
supporters motivated in the face of likely Chavez attacks.
Finally, opposition parties still have not clearly staked out
comprehensive alternative programs for voters to consider.
They have done even less to sell their political programs to
Venezuela's poor, the vast majority of voters and Chavez'
traditional, extensive electoral base.
DUDDY