SIFTING THROUGH THE REFERENDUM RUMOR MILL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 002303 SIPDIS SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2017 TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE SUBJECT: SIFTING THROUGH THE REFERENDUM RUMOR MILL REF: CARACAS 2274 CARACAS 00002303 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Since the polls closed on the December 2 constitutional referendum, Caracas has been rife with rampant rumors about the accuracy of the results and Chavez's willingness to quickly accept defeat. While we may never know the real story of events, the opposition has publicly and privately said the National Electoral Council's (CNE) preliminary results coincide with their own review of the vote tally. Chavez' explanation during his concession speech of how he came to accept the results seems plausible, although not completely fathomable given the Venezuelan President's mercurial disposition. Nevertheless, we offer below an explanation of the recent rumors and our take on them. End Summary. -------------- Are Those the Real Results? -------------- ¶2. (C) Quick counts and exit polls conducted the night of December 2 showed varying margins of victory for the "Yes" and "No" votes. The last numbers we received from opposition contacts that night, for example, gave the "No" vote a six-point lead. Sumate told us their quick count of 1200 polling stations yielded a 12 point advantage for the "No" camp, although they have since publicly announced a seven-point win. The close margin of victory, though predicted by several pre-referendum polls, surprised most and led to the following rumors: --"The results were negotiated:" This rumor claims the "No" vote won by a wider margin--up to 50 percent--than the National Electoral Council (CNE) announced, but that Zulia Governor and Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT) leader Manuel Rosales and Primero Justicia's Julio Borges agreed to reduce the lead in exchange for Chavez accepting the results. Abstentionists appear to be propagating this rumor in an attempt to undercut mainstream opposition leaders. --"The CNE changed the results:" Meanwhile, others in the opposition are saying that the CNE reduced the "No" camp's vote total, which explains why opposition electoral expert Enrique Marquez was banned from the totalization room. --"The margin is actually much closer:" This newest rumor, circulating on the Caracas Chronicles blog, claims that the ;"No" vote's margin of victory is much closer than initially thought. The calculations are based on a comparison of how voting districts not included in the CNE's preliminary results voted in the 2006 presidential elections and the general percentage of votes Chavez lost between the 2006 and 2007 votes in the voting tables that have already been counted. ¶3. (C) What we know: UNT leaders have privately and publicly said that the CNE's results coincide roughly with their own tally, which is based on a review of roughly 40 percent of the vote tally sheets (actas). In a December 5 press conference Marquez said the UNT will post the actas on the party's website for public review. In addition, UNT Secretary General Gerardo Blyde told Poloff December 5 that SIPDIS lone opposition CNE Rector Vicente Diaz had promised the UNT the night of the vote that he would not accompany CNE President Tibisay Lucena when she announced the results if the numbers had been tampered with. When Diaz appeared on stage, the UNT was confident that the numbers were correct. Domestic electoral NGO Ojo Electoral fielded CNE-accredited observers to 400 voting tables and also derived results similar to the CNE's preliminary figures. Sumate President Alejandro Plaz, whose NGO frequently questions CNE impartiality, told PolCouns and Poloff December 6 that he believes the CNE's numbers to be fairly accurate as well. Also, Diaz told the media December 3 that both the "Yes" and "No" camps had election monitors in the totalization room at all times, although he admitted the "No" monitor was not a political party representative. -------------- Why Did Chavez Accept? -------------- ¶4. (C) Chavez's acceptance of defeat was as, if not more, surprising to Venezuelans as the "No" camp's win, giving rise to rumors about the Venezuelan President's possible motives: CARACAS 00002303 002.2 OF 002 --"The Military Made Him Do It": One of the more interesting variations of this rumor circulating in opposition circles is that Chavez had a pen drive loaded with the necessary votes to reverse the count, but the military threatened not to contain any violence that broke out in response to the blatant fraud. Another version claims Chavez ordered the CNE to change the vote and called up troops from Maracay to impose martial law, but the military high command refused the order and told Chavez he must accept the results. According to these rumors, the military's non-cooperation enraged Chavez who began throwing chairs, and punching walls and desks, which explains his visibly swollen hands during his concession speech. A related rumor has since emerged that claims Strategic Operations Commander Jesus Gonzalez Gonzalez, a key figure in the military scenarios, has been relieved of duty. --"The Influence of Baduel": This set of rumors, which are also prominently circulating among the opposition, credits former Defense Minister Raul Baduel's influence with the military high command and key military units as the decisive factor in Chavez's decision to concede. One version circulating in the press claims Baduel reached out to senior officers to convince them to prevent Chavez from stealing the election. Others allege the military had a nation-wide frequency ready for Baduel to address the nation if Chavez tried to reverse the results. Yet another version, featured on the popular "Devil's Excrement" blog, says that Lucena had planned to announce a "Yes" vote victory until Baduel--who was at the CNE that night--threatened to go on stage afterwards and declare fraud. His declaration presumably would have then caused the military to intervene to defend the "real" results. --"The CNE said NO": According to a mid-level UNT contact, Chavez ordered Lucena to change the results, but she--backed by the military high command--refused. ¶5. (C) What We Know: DAO contacts have heard nothing to substantiate any of the military rumors, and Gonzalez Gonzalez gave a brief press conference December 5 during which he denied having any role in persuading Chavez to accept the results. He also denied submitting his resignation to Chavez. Defense Minister Rangel vigorously denied the rumors during a press conference the same day as well. Of all the post election rumors, however, some version of a mitigating military role is the most widespread, and persistent. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) While we may never know what made Chavez decide to accept the results, Chavez himself admitted during his concession speech that he wrestled for a long time over whether to release the results before all returns were in (reftel). He said he decided to concede when he was finally convinced that the results could not be mathematically reversed. This strikes us as the most probable explanation. Chavez bases his cabinet and military high command picks on loyalty and has increasingly surrounded himself with yes-men over time, making it difficult to believe they would oppose him on a project so important to home. Additionally, Chavez has become less tolerant of criticism and dissent recently and Chavistas who have disagreed with the Venezuelan President or publicly contradicted the party line, such as Baduel or former Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) president Francisco Ameliach, have quickly found themselves stripped of their responsibilities and/or severely reprimanded. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to imagine any senior cabinet or military officials refusing Chavez's orders. Still rumors abound in Caracas and in the past, some of the more improbable ones have proven true. End Comment. FRENCH