SIFTING THROUGH THE REFERENDUM RUMOR MILL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 002303

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SUBJECT: SIFTING THROUGH THE REFERENDUM RUMOR MILL

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Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D)


1. (C) Summary: Since the polls closed on the December 2
constitutional referendum, Caracas has been rife with rampant
rumors about the accuracy of the results and Chavez's
willingness to quickly accept defeat. While we may never
know the real story of events, the opposition has publicly
and privately said the National Electoral Council's (CNE)
preliminary results coincide with their own review of the
vote tally. Chavez' explanation during his concession speech
of how he came to accept the results seems plausible,
although not completely fathomable given the Venezuelan
President's mercurial disposition. Nevertheless, we offer
below an explanation of the recent rumors and our take on
them. End Summary.

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Are Those the Real Results?
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2. (C) Quick counts and exit polls conducted the night of
December 2 showed varying margins of victory for the "Yes"
and "No" votes. The last numbers we received from opposition
contacts that night, for example, gave the "No" vote a
six-point lead. Sumate told us their quick count of 1200
polling stations yielded a 12 point advantage for the "No"
camp, although they have since publicly announced a
seven-point win. The close margin of victory, though
predicted by several pre-referendum polls, surprised most and
led to the following rumors:

--"The results were negotiated:" This rumor claims the "No"
vote won by a wider margin--up to 50 percent--than the
National Electoral Council (CNE) announced, but that Zulia
Governor and Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT) leader Manuel Rosales and
Primero Justicia's Julio Borges agreed to reduce the lead in
exchange for Chavez accepting the results. Abstentionists
appear to be propagating this rumor in an attempt to undercut
mainstream opposition leaders.

--"The CNE changed the results:" Meanwhile, others in the
opposition are saying that the CNE reduced the "No" camp's
vote total, which explains why opposition electoral expert
Enrique Marquez was banned from the totalization room.

--"The margin is actually much closer:" This newest rumor,
circulating on the Caracas Chronicles blog, claims that the
"No" vote's margin of victory is much closer than initially
thought. The calculations are based on a comparison of how
voting districts not included in the CNE's preliminary
results voted in the 2006 presidential elections and the
general percentage of votes Chavez lost between the 2006 and
2007 votes in the voting tables that have already been
counted.


3. (C) What we know: UNT leaders have privately and publicly
said that the CNE's results coincide roughly with their own
tally, which is based on a review of roughly 40 percent of
the vote tally sheets (actas). In a December 5 press
conference Marquez said the UNT will post the actas on the
party's website for public review. In addition, UNT
Secretary General Gerardo Blyde told POLOFF December 5 that

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lone opposition CNE Rector Vicente Diaz had promised the UNT
the night of the vote that he would not accompany CNE
President Tibisay Lucena when she announced the results if
the numbers had been tampered with. When Diaz appeared on
stage, the UNT was confident that the numbers were correct.
Domestic electoral NGO Ojo Electoral fielded CNE-accredited
observers to 400 voting tables and also derived results
similar to the CNE's preliminary figures. Sumate President
Alejandro Plaz, whose NGO frequently questions CNE
impartiality, told PolCouns and POLOFF December 6 that he
believes the CNE's numbers to be fairly accurate as well.
Also, Diaz told the media December 3 that both the "Yes" and
"No" camps had election monitors in the totalization room at
all times, although he admitted the "No" monitor was not a
political party representative.

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Why Did Chavez Accept?
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4. (C) Chavez's acceptance of defeat was as, if not more,
surprising to Venezuelans as the "No" camp's win, giving rise
to rumors about the Venezuelan President's possible motives:

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--"The Military Made Him Do It": One of the more interesting
variations of this rumor circulating in opposition circles is
that Chavez had a pen drive loaded with the necessary votes
to reverse the count, but the military threatened not to
contain any violence that broke out in response to the
blatant fraud. Another version claims Chavez ordered the CNE
to change the vote and called up troops from Maracay to
impose martial law, but the military high command refused the
order and told Chavez he must accept the results. According
to these rumors, the military's non-cooperation enraged
Chavez who began throwing chairs, and punching walls and
desks, which explains his visibly swollen hands during his
concession speech. A related rumor has since emerged that
claims Strategic Operations Commander Jesus Gonzalez
Gonzalez, a key figure in the military scenarios, has been
relieved of duty.

--"The Influence of Baduel": This set of rumors, which are
also prominently circulating among the opposition, credits
former Defense Minister Raul Baduel's influence with the
military high command and key military units as the decisive
factor in Chavez's decision to concede. One version
circulating in the press claims Baduel reached out to senior
officers to convince them to prevent Chavez from stealing the
election. Others allege the military had a nation-wide
frequency ready for Baduel to address the nation if Chavez
tried to reverse the results. Yet another version, featured
on the popular "Devil's Excrement" blog, says that Lucena had
planned to announce a "Yes" vote victory until Baduel--who
was at the CNE that night--threatened to go on stage
afterwards and declare fraud. His declaration presumably
would have then caused the military to intervene to defend
the "real" results.

--"The CNE said NO": According to a mid-level UNT contact,
Chavez ordered Lucena to change the results, but she--backed
by the military high command--refused.


5. (C) What We Know: DAO contacts have heard nothing to
substantiate any of the military rumors, and Gonzalez
Gonzalez gave a brief press conference December 5 during
which he denied having any role in persuading Chavez to
accept the results. He also denied submitting his
resignation to Chavez. Defense Minister Rangel vigorously
denied the rumors during a press conference the same day as
well. Of all the post election rumors, however, some version
of a mitigating military role is the most widespread, and
persistent.

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Comment
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6. (C) While we may never know what made Chavez decide to
accept the results, Chavez himself admitted during his
concession speech that he wrestled for a long time over
whether to release the results before all returns were in
(reftel). He said he decided to concede when he was finally
convinced that the results could not be mathematically
reversed. This strikes us as the most probable explanation.
Chavez bases his cabinet and military high command picks on
loyalty and has increasingly surrounded himself with yes-men
over time, making it difficult to believe they would oppose
him on a project so important to home. Additionally, Chavez
has become less tolerant of criticism and dissent recently
and Chavistas who have disagreed with the Venezuelan
President or publicly contradicted the party line, such as
Baduel or former Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) president
Francisco Ameliach, have quickly found themselves stripped of
their responsibilities and/or severely reprimanded. Under
these circumstances, it is difficult to imagine any senior
cabinet or military officials refusing Chavez's orders.
Still rumors abound in Caracas and in the past, some of the
more improbable ones have proven true. End Comment.

FRENCH