WHY CHAVEZ' CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM FAILED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 002284 SIPDIS SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017 TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE SUBJECT: WHY CHAVEZ' CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM FAILED REF: CARACAS 2274 CARACAS 00002284 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Chavez's defeat in the December 2 constitutional referendum is a rejection of the aggressive, radical agenda which he tried to impose this year. Chavez's sweeping proposals kept many of his supporters from voting, and lead many to vote against him. They also energized new sources of opposition--notably university students, former governing partner Podemos, and former Defense Minister Baduel--sowing more doubt within his base. Chavez's overreach galvanized the traditional opposition parties, enabling them to field "No" bloc witnesses at most of the polls to prevent electoral fraud. While the defeat will almost certainly give the opposition a springboard for rebuilding, slow Chavez's revolution," and may widen existing cracks in his movement, the vote is probably a temporary setback for Chavez. The enabling law allowing him to rule by decree will permit him to implement much of his agenda. His acceptance of the loss also boosts his democratic credentials with the international community (septel). End summary. -------------- Too Much, Too Fast, Too Hard -------------- ¶2. (C) Fresh from his overwhelming win in the 2006 presidential election, Chavez started 2007 by announcing an ambitious agenda for deepening his Bolivarian Revolution that included proposing constitutional reform, forming a single pro-government United Socialist Party (PSUV),launching a "Morality and Enlightenment" public education campaign, expropriating strategic sectors (energy and telecommunications),energizing community councils, and designing a territorial re-districting plan ("New Geometry of Power"). He quickly tried to implement this agenda-- bullying pro-Chavez parties and government employees into joining the PSUV, ramming his reform package through the National Assembly, and securing broad decree powers from the legislature which he used to nationalize the oil fields and telecommunications company CANTV. In addition, Chavez ignored domestic and foreign entreaties when he shut down independent free-to-air television station Radio Caracas Television (RCTV),which he accused of fomenting the short-lived 2002 coup. These actions created friction among his own supporters and other groups, such as the university students, and contributed to his defeat in the December 2 constitutional referendum. ¶3. (C) However, the Chavez electoral machine's failure to turn out voters to the polls (reftel) was the primary factor in the "Yes" camp's defeat. Despite Chavez's attempts to frame the referendum as a plebiscite on his leadership, his controversial proposals and his aggressive push to enact the reform alienated many supporters. Polls consistently showed voter's disagreement with the elimination of term limits and restriction of private property. As a result, many Chavez supporters decided to stay home or to vote against the proposals. With their political influence and futures threatened by Chavez's proposal to name regional vice presidents, transfer resources to the community councils, and eliminate presidential term limits, many of the governors and mayors that Chavez relies on to activate his political machine apparently did not mobilize Chavez's base. Likewise, Chavez's radicalization and earlier efforts to force supporters to join the PSUV alienated coalition partners, such as Patria Para Todos (PPT),who provided only lukewarm support. ¶4. (C) Chavez's international forays and conflicts may have hurt him as well. Chavez spent several days of the last month of the campaign abroad, just as the "No" bloc ramped up its campaign. Chavez tried to regain momentum when he returned from France, appearing on television almost every night during the last week of the campaign to explain why the changes were needed and to urge voters to the polls. He also trotted out the well-worn accusations of Washington backing the opposition and trying to undermine him, but that old message did not elicit greater voter participation. Additionally, some speculate that his spat with Colombian President Uribe following the latter's termination of Chavez's mediation with the FARC also may have caused a significant number of naturalized Colombian supporters to stay home in protest. -------------- CARACAS 00002284 002.2 OF 003 Students -------------- ¶5. (C) While Chavez is largely responsible for his own defeat, a number of factors on the opposition side also contributed to the referendum results. University students, for example, provided new energy, credibility, and manpower to the "No" campaign. Their initial strategy of holding their own anti-reform marches successfully circumvented Chavez's attempts to paint them as "traditional opposition" or U.S. stooges. Their formal switch to the "No" camp during the final week provided the momentum the bloc needed, and may have even helped convince abstentionist political parties, such as Accion Democratica, to advocate participation. The students' participation also enabled the opposition to supply electoral witnesses for most polling sites, an important factor in deterring potential fraud and allowing the "No" bloc to independently track the referendum results. -------------- Podemos and Baduel -------------- ¶6. (C) Like the students, former BRV coalition partner Podemos provided badly needed logistical support for the "No" camp. Podemos is the second largest pro-Chavez political party and it controls Aragua State, one of Venezuela's most populous electoral districts. Their participation in the "No" campaign--along with the students--enhanced the opposition's ability to cover the polls and potentially swung the vote in the "No" camp's favor. In addition, Podemos and former Defense Minister Raul Isaias Baduel's carefully targeted criticism of the reform package, as opposed to the traditional opposition's blanket Chavez bashing, sowed doubt among Chavez supporters that may have persuaded some ultimately not to vote. One unsubstantiated rumor also posits that Baduel would have gone on the air to appeal to the military had Chavez attempted to steal the vote or not recognize the results, possibly influencing Chavez's decision to accept the vote. (Comment: Though he still appears to be highly regarded within the military, it is unclear whether Baduel's intervention would have carried any weight.) -------------- Role of Civil Society -------------- ¶7. (C) Civil society groups, including human rights NGOs, the Catholic Church, and business associations like Fedecamaras, ran effective voter education programs and get-out-the-vote campaigns that also raised voter doubts and helped shore up opposition. The NGOs bombarded low income voters with pamphlets, media advertisements, and open fora based on focus group findings that many voters were not aware of the changes, but usually opposed the changes once informed. The Catholic Church's strong declarations against the reform and the even stronger Chavista reaction it engendered seems to have caught the attention of some poor voters, Chavez's traditional base. (Note: Although most Venezuelan are only nominally Catholic, the Church is still held in high regard and it sponsors social programs in many poor, pro-Chavez neighborhoods.) Finally, criticism from the private sector, which had been reluctant to openly challenge Chavez since 2004, may have encouraged many middle class voters to participate, increasing the chances for opposition turnout. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) The referendum results appear to represent a rejection of Chavez's more radical project rather than a show of support for the opposition or a rejection of Chavez himself. In fact Chavez himself, during his concession speech, provided the most likely reason for his defeat, citing preliminary CNE results showing the opposition received only slightly more votes than it received in the 2006 presidential election, while Chavez' vote total was almost 3 million less. Chavez's defeat will almost certainly breathe new life into the opposition as it prepares for the 2008 regional elections. While the defeat may promote some defections within Chavismo, it is likely only a temporary setback for Chavez. He still controls the National Assembly, the courts, and a majority of states. He still also retains broad decree authority for the next eight months, which he can use to implement parts of his socialist agenda. CARACAS 00002284 003.2 OF 003 Additionally, his quick acceptance of the defeat bolsters his democratic credentials internationally and removes pressure on regional leaders to tag him as the authoritarian leader he is. FRENCH