REFERENDUM ELECTORAL CONDITIONS A POTENTIALLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 002273 SIPDIS SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2017 TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE SUBJECT: REFERENDUM ELECTORAL CONDITIONS A POTENTIALLY LOOMING PROBLEM CARACAS 00002273 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: While not a main focus of the referendum campaign, widespread concern over electoral conditions remains, and could become a central issue if the opposition, which believes it has a chance to win, refuses to accept a result which has the no vote losing by a sizable margin. The National Electoral Council (CNE) has tried unsuccessfully to present itself as a neutral arbiter, but has not yet addressed many issues raised during the 2006 presidential election, such as the quality of the voter rolls and uneven media coverage of the "Yes" and "No" campaigns. The lack of international observers to hear complaints and corroborate the "Yes" and "No" camps' versions of events may make a difference in either group's reaction to the results. In the end, however, it appears the opposition has decided the CNE has met a diminimus level of acceptability, hence their decision to urge voters to the polls. End summary. -------------- Conditions Not a Priority, So Far -------------- ¶2. (C) Though not a central theme in the referendum campaign, widespread concern about election conditions still persists. During the November 29 "No" campaign's final rally when student leader Freddy Guevara asked the crowd whether they trusted the National Electoral Council (CNE),he received a resounding "No." Several recent electoral polls also show a decline in support for the CNE compared to before the December 2006 Presidential elections. Yet, neither the government nor the opposition have publicly focused on electoral conditions. The short electoral period, the CNE's willingness to maintain concessions made during the December 2006 presidential elections, and concern about scaring away potential voters (which would harm opposition victory prospects) likely account for much of the opposition's minimizing of electoral issues. Despite the short lead time in the run up to the referendum, post's opposition contacts say they are generally satisfied with the eight audits they have participated in. During a November 30 meeting, Baruta Mayor Henrique Capriles Radonski told PolCouns and POLOFF that the opposition was less concerned with the conditions the CNE agreed to, as with "conventional fraud," such as ghost voting. He and most other opposition contacts say the key is in ensuring that electoral witnesses are present at a majority of the voting stations. ¶3. (C) The CNE has tried to assure voters that the electoral system is secure and transparent, and that the CNE is a neutral arbiter. At the beginning of the campaign, the CNE published a list of concessions made in 2006 that would be maintained this year as well as some "new" features, including televised national debates, limited financing for both campaigns, new audits, and a guarantee that Plan Republica electoral security participants will not be at electoral tables. Nevertheless, some of the "new" features are not new, do not address concerns from last year, or were not implemented. For example, the CNE highlighted an audit of the indelible ink used to prevent people from voting multiple times as a new feature. In 2006, the ink was audited, but the opposition complained that the ink used on election day was not the one audited and easily could be wiped off. (Note: Some informal Embassy observers noted the same.) Additionally, the CNE still did not address opposition concerns about massive inaccuracies in the voter rolls and did not allow greater access to voter data. The CNE also did not host televised debates, claiming the "No" camp refused to participate when it fact it was the BRV that bowed out. ¶4. (C) Some CNE decisions have also shown a pro-government bias as in years past. According to the CNE's own Political Participation and Finance Commission, approximately 104 hours of television and radio advertisements have advocated the "Yes" vote compared to only 39 hours for the "No" vote. An opposition group monitoring campaign media coverage told "El Universal" November 27 that advertisements for the "No" vote had virtually disappeared from government run and affiliated media networks towards the end of November. While the CNE has publicized punitive actions taken against both campaigns, they have yet to address the media imbalance. -------------- Other Issues to Watch -------------- CARACAS 00002273 002.2 OF 002 ¶5. (C) There are other factors that differ from past elections that, while not an issue pre-referendum, could become an issue if the opposition does not recognize defeat: --International Observers: This year will be the first election since 2004 in which no independent international observer teams will participate. Although both blocs were allowed to invite up to 20 notable personalities, as it has done in the past, the CNE is inviting between 100-120 individual international observers from approximately 39 countries, diluting the impact of any concerns issued by opposition invitees. --Poll Workers: The CNE decided to use the same poll workers from last year, due to the short preparation time for the referendum. Normally, these poll workers are supposed to be chosen at random. It is unclear what percentage of those workers are pro-opposition; the opposition is claiming a disproportionate number are from pro-government groups. In addition, the opposition is still struggling to get their electoral witnesses accredited by the CNE. --CANTV: CANTV's traditional role in transmitting the results from polling stations is further complicated now that, since the December 2006 election, the telecommunications company has become government owned. While trying not to sound alarmist or conspiratorial, Sumate leader Roberto Abdul told Poloff November 30 that the president of CANTV is the sister of the head of the CNE's technical department. He thought that relationship could raise new doubts about transparency. --Other tricks: Past issues that could also arise include selective application of rules regarding the opening and closing of polls, delays caused by the digital fingerprint scanners in traditionally pro-opposition areas, early transmission of data, and voters using multiple cedulas (identity cards) to vote. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) While not a major focus for the opposition right now, electoral conditions will likely become an issue post-referendum, particularly if it is in fact a close contest, or if the confident opposition refuses to accept a result claiming a substantial pro-government victory margin. The lack of international observers to hear complaints and corroborate the "Yes" and "No" camps' versions of electoral events may make a difference in either group's reaction to the results. Suspicions over electoral transparency will also likely contribute to a re-fracturing of the opposition after the vote, as abstentionists might blame traditional opposition leaders for once again legitimizing what they see as a completely fraudulent electoral system. In the end, however, it appears the opposition has determined the CNE has met diminimus (if far from ideal) standards, thus justifying its decision to urge its supporters to vote on Sunday. DUDDY