ROUND ONE OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM DEBATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 001718

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL SCUL VE
SUBJECT: ROUND ONE OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM DEBATE

REF: A. CARACAS 01703


B. CARACAS 01635

C. CARACAS 02693

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Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT R. DOWNES
FOR REASON 1.4 (D)


1. (C) Summary. In the days following President Chavez'
rollout of his proposed constitutional revisions, debates are
already taking shape as to the reform process. Chavez'
opponents, still divided over whether or not to participate
at all, have been unsuccessful in their initial attempt to
influence the form of the constitutional referendum or
convoke a constituent assembly. The Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela's (BRV) heavy-handed management of the process
already is drawing criticism, not only from the domestic
opposition, but also from Chavez' former friends and
erstwhile political allies. Student groups and others are
preparing to launch efforts to derail Chavez' proposals (Ref
A). Nevertheless, the BRV is already seeking to boost
popular support for the proposal and minimize any sort of
constructive debate, suggesting that the winner of these
battles is all but completely pre-determined. End Summary

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Debate #1: Voting Procedures
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2. (SBU) Chavez liberally sprinkled throughout his
constitutional reform proposal populist benefits, such as a
reduction in the work week and benefits for self-employed
workers (Ref B) intended to boost popular support for the
reform package and make it more complicated for the
opposition to reject in its entirety. In an attempt to
isolate these popular initiatives from controversial changes,
such as indefinite reelection, Chavez' opponents, and even
some of his allies, are contending that the reforms should be
voted on separately once they are submitted for approval in a
popular referendum.


3. (SBU) An opposition coalition led by Justice First (PJ)
and including A New Time (UNT),Copei, Radical Cause, and
Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) invoked article 344 from the
1999 Constitution and asked the National Electoral Council
(CNE) August 21 to clarify the procedure. The article
permits up to a third of a draft constitutional reform (in
this case 11 of 33 articles) to be voted on separately in a
popular referendum if it is requested by at least a third of
the National Assembly or over five percent of registered
voters via a petition and signature drive. Even pro-Chavez
Podemos Governor Ramon Martinez from Sucre State has asked
the BRV to, at the very least, respect Article 343 of the
1999 Constitution which calls for the National Assembly to
consider and debate the revisions article by article rather
than approved as a bloc as Flores has suggested.


4. (C) Leading opposition politicians tell us they believe
the opposition stands a small chance of defeating the reform
for indefinite presidential election if it were to segregate
it from other proposed measures. They also note that
isolating the more contentious reforms from the populist
measures would make it easier to frame their debate as
pro-democracy rather than as anti-Chavez. Indeed, according
to recent INR data, as of June some 64 percent of Venezuelans
oppose ending presidential term limits and 60.5 percent
support voting on the reforms item by item.


5. (SBU) The BRV quickly--and very transparently--moved to
preclude any invocation of Article 344 and insisted that the
reforms be voted on as one package. National Assembly (AN)
President Cilia Flores August 23 rejected the opposition's
invocation of Article 344. Flores offered the flimsy
justification that voters cannot petition for separation of
the reforms in the referendum because the President, and not
the people, had requested the changes in the first place.
Flores also ruled that the matter would not be referred to
the Supreme Court for clarification since, as per her
interpretation, the 1999 Constitution is quite unambiguous on
the issue. The lone non-Chavista voice on the CNE board of
Directors, Vicente Diaz, rejected Flores' interpretation of
344 and in an impromptu press conference proposed that the
reforms be voted on article by article. The CNE board ruled
against PJ's proposal August 24, with Diaz casting the only
dissenting vote. Chavez himself during an August 25 address
to United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) militants
claimed that the package is "unified and integral" and cannot
be voted on separately.

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Debate #2: The Need for a Constituent Assembly
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6. (SBU) The BRV has already outlined a very short timeline
to ramrod through the passage of the constitutional revision
via legislative debate and referendum rather than through a
constituent assembly. The National Assembly is scheduled to
have the new draft ready for a popular referendum by early
December, limiting the period of congressional and public
debate to three months rather than the two years that is
allowed for by the 1999 document. Some members of Chavez'
coalition have called for additional time for discussion of
the proposals. Podemos AN deputies during a special
legislative session August 21 urged the Assembly not to
impose such a short timetable. Nevertheless, Chavez has
already publicly expressed his approval for a December
referendum. AN President Flores has requested that the CNE
be prepared for a vote--thirty days after the Assembly
approves it--on either December 2, 9, or 16. Timelines and
election dates often slip in the Bolivarian Republic, but the
BRV probably hopes to time the referendum with the start of
the holiday season to coincide with the granting of holiday
bonuses. Moreover, as with the December 2006 presidential
election, a December referendum would minimize the
possibility of street protests following the vote as
Venezuelans turn their attention to Christmas and the New
Year.


7. (SBU) Some opposition leaders and constitutional experts
are calling for a constituent assembly rather than the
fast-tracked debate and vote, the same mechanism Chavez used
in 1999 to draft the new document (Ref C). Luis Miquilena, a
key drafter of the 1999 Constitution who Chavez once called
his "second father," held a press conference to insist that a
constituent assembly is necessary given the National
Assembly's lack of democratic legitimacy following the
extremely low turnout of the 2005 legislative elections. CNE
Director Vicente Diaz, PJ's Julio Borges, and other
constitutional experts have argued that the changes are so
sweeping that they fundamentally alter the character of the
current document and thus necessitate the convocation of a
constituent body. The BRV has categorically denied that the
revisions are so broad, even as Flores noted publicly that
more changes, in addition to the 33 included in Chavez'
reform package, will be made during the review process.

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Debate #3: To Vote or Not to Vote
--------------


8. (SBU) The opposition is already split over whether or not
to participate in the debate and referendum on the
constitutional changes, just as they were in the run-up to
the December 2006 presidential election. PJ, Copei, MAS, and
Radical Cause have signaled they probably will join in the
vote, while UNT is hedging its bets. UNT head and Zulia
State Governor Rosales said in an August 27 press conference
that UNT will deploy over 130,000 "commands" to fight the
reforms nationwide and claimed that Venezuelans cannot fight
"hidden and staying in their homes." He did not, however,
conclusively reject the possibility of ultimately abstaining
from the referendum vote. On the other hand, Democratic
Action, Brave People's Alliance, and National Resistance
Command have said they will not participate in what they
consider a highly unfair electoral process. Meanwhile, the
pro-Chavez party Patria Para Todos (PPT) is lobbying Chavez
to remove term limits from all elected offices, not just for
the President.

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BRV Damage Control
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9. (C) The BRV is characteristically thin-skinned it its
response to criticism from former friends and current
opponents of its handling of the approval process and is
leveling personal attacks on its critics. Chavez during his
August 25 address to PSUV members accused a pro-Chavez
governor, presumably Sucre Governor Martinez, as "going
around talking nonsense." Luis Miquilena's vehement critique
of the revisions, calling it "a constitutional fraud" and its
populist offerings "bait for fools," received widespread
press coverage and a strongly worded BRV counterattack.
Communications and Information Minister Willian Lara alleged
that Miquilena committed "constitutional filicide" when he

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supported the brief April 2002 interregnum against Chavez and
acted as a "bad father" to the 1999 Constitution. Another
former ally to Chavez and participant in his failed 1992 coup
attempt, Yoel Acosta Chirinos, also vowed to oppose the
reforms and said he might meet with Luis Miquilena and others
to form an alliance. Jose Toro Hardy, an opposition
economist and former member of the PDVSA board of directors,
told Econ Counselor, Petroleum Attache, and POLOFF August 27
that he is, in fact, meeting with Miquilena and others in an
attempt to devise a strategy to combat the revisions.


10. (SBU) To counter domestic criticism and demonstrate the
"transparency" of the reform process, the BRV has embarked on
a nationwide campaign to "consult" with the electorate and
promote the new document. The National Assembly, for
example, activated some 9,000 electoral groups throughout the
country August 25 to disseminate the constitutional changes
and maintain direct contact with its constituents. The
Assembly also plans to consult directly with various state
governments. This week, deputies will travel to Valencia to
hear proposals from the central states. Chavez during his
August 25 PSUV speech exhorted the party to fuse the
promotion of the reforms with the party's organizational
activities.


11. (SBU) The BRV has reacted to condemnation from abroad
with equal vitriol and a public relations campaign clearly
intended to convince international audiences of its
democratic credentials. Communications Minister Lara accused
the "New York Times" as being Washington's "media arm" and
the State Department's "macabre arm of disinformation" for
publishing an editorial critical of Chavez' constitutional
revision and erosion of Venezuelan democracy. During his
August 26 "Alo, Presidente," Chavez himself lashed out at a
British journalist who questioned the elimination of term
limits and accused European nations of enslaving other
peoples and questioned the United Kingdom's own democratic
credentials. Reminiscent of the BRV's public relations
campaign in response to international criticism the closure
of RCTV, Foreign Minister Maduro announced August 24 that the
BRV is launching a diplomatic offensive worldwide to
disseminate, explain, and defend the constitutional
revisions. Maduro also said a task force, headed by National
Assembly deputy Alfredo Murga, will be charged with spreading
information on the proposed changes abroad.

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Comment
--------------


12. (C) Chavez' proposed constitutional reforms are drawing
mounting criticism from the still-divided opposition, former
friends, and even some political allies. Nevertheless, a
heavy sense of resignation, apathy, and a lack of real
urgency permeates the political atmosphere in Caracas. While
most observers see the passage of the radical revisions as a
fork in the road for the future of what is left of Venezuelan
democracy, opponents see few avenues left for any real
efforts to counter Chavez. Indeed, the BRV already appears
increasingly heavy-handed in its efforts to ram through the
reforms. While the debates over the changes will continue
and student groups have yet to mount their efforts, Chavez
still retains a formidable electoral machine, backed by
enormous state resources. With roughly 100 days left until
the likely December 9 referendum, there seems little
effective action to stop Chavez from steamrolling passage.
If only by the intensity of its responses to democratic
criticism and rapid deployment of public relations measures,
however, the BRV does seem to recognize the reforms as
potential lightening rods for opposition and divisions even
within Chavismo.


FRENCH