Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07CARACAS1671
2007-08-22 17:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:  

CHAVEZ' NEW PARTY PLAGUED BY ORGANIZATIONAL

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM VE 
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VZCZCXRO7318
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHCV #1671/01 2341719
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221719Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9546
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 001671 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM VE
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ' NEW PARTY PLAGUED BY ORGANIZATIONAL
PROBLEMS

REF: A. CARACAS 001145


B. CARACAS 001635

CARACAS 00001671 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES,
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 001671 SIPDIS SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER) E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM VE SUBJECT: CHAVEZ' NEW PARTY PLAGUED BY ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS REF: A. CARACAS 001145 ¶B. CARACAS 001635 CARACAS 00001671 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary. The organization of aspiring members of President Chavez' United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) into neighborhood "battalions" has been plagued by confusion and poor attendance. Scant grassroots party activity to date raises serious doubts that the PSUV has almost six million members, as Chavez claims. Party organizers postponed August 18 elections of battalion spokesperson indefinitely, and the PSUV founding congress scheduled to start in early September may be postponed until 2008. President Chavez and PSUV organizers are urging PSUV members to prioritize getting Chavez' proposed constitutional changes passed over the divisive process of selecting the leadership and articulating the platform of the PSUV. Despite ongoing organization problems, the PSUV is still likely to be a powerhouse electoral machine, particularly given the government resources Chavez can put at the disposal of his party. End Summary. -------------- Inflated Registration -------------- ¶2. (SBU) President Chavez claimed on his June 10 nationwide "Alo, Presidente" broadcast that over 5 million voters signed up to join his proposed single pro-government party, the PSUV (Ref A). Vice President and PSUV Coordinating Commission Chief Jorge Rodriguez subsequently told a June 23 gathering of PSUV promoters and "aspiring militants" that 5,669,000 voters had registered with the PSUV. The Vice President also predicted that the final tally of PSUV members would soon reach six million. Rodriguez discounted local press reporting that turn-out was light during the April 29-June 3 party registration drives, calling such reports part of "the plan of the national bourgeoisie and its imperialist masters to try to disfigure and slow down the tremendous moral and political push of our revolution." ¶3. (SBU) At the same June 23 PSUV rally, Chavez shared statistics on PSUV registration that invite skepticism. For example, the Venezuelan president reported that in three states (Apure, Cojedes, and Delta Amacuro) as many or more persons
joined the PSUV as voted for Chavez in the December 2006 presidential election. He claimed that some 95 percent of his presidential vote total in Zulia, home state of opposition governor and former presidential candidate Manuel Rosales, signed up for the party. Chavez also reported that over 42,000 persons over the age of 80 as well as 745,000 professionals signed up for the PSUV. ¶4. (C) CNE Rector Vicente Diaz told poloff that the CNE cannot independently corroborate the PSUV's registration claims. Although the CNE provided logistical support, including digital scanning devices, for the party's registration drive, Diaz said PSUV organizers used their own software to compile membership lists and did not transmit that information to the CNE. Diaz noted wryly that in the June 3 mayoral bi-election in Catatumbo Municipality in Zulia State the opposition candidate soundly defeated the pro-government candidate, with the pro-government candidate polling far fewer votes that the number of voters who have purportedly joined the PSUV. -------------- Where's My Battalion? -------------- ¶5. (SBU) With considerable fanfare, PSUV organizers announced that PSUV members would form some 25,000 "battalions" of between 200 and 400 persons between July 21 and August 18 all over Venezuela. The coordinating committee of the PSUV selected ideologically trained "promoters" to organize the initial meetings of battalions and to organize discussions on topics such as "Revolution and Latin American Unity," socialism, sustainable development, social classes, "Free Market Economy versus Socialist Economy" as well as on President Chavez' speeches. Chavez told the June 23 PSUV rally that aspiring PSUV members needed to attend their battalion formation meetings because the "true revolutionary" puts the "revolution before anything else; the revolution is life; the revolution is the homeland." CARACAS 00001671 002.2 OF 002 ¶6. (SBU) Despite the presidential push to encourage big turn-outs, the initial battalion meetings appeared to be generally both poorly organized and attended. Vice President Rodriguez expressed satisfaction to the media on August 10 that 1.6 million were regularly attending weekly battalion meetings. Even if true, that represents less than a quarter of the voters who purportedly joined the PSUV. In Aragua State where Chavez polled 537,000 votes, for example, PSUV organizers say only some 10,000 persons participated in battalion meetings. National Assembly Deputies Iris Varela and Flor Rios told the pro-government daily "Vea" that the Coordinating Committee needed to do a better job of informing PSUV members which battalion they belong to and where their battalion meetings would be held. ¶7. (SBU) Varela and National Assembly Deputy Luis Tascon have also criticized the selection of PSUV promoters for incorporating well-connected opportunists over loyal Chavistas. In addition, the PSUV suggestion that members contribute Bs. 1000 to Bs. 50,000 (47 cents to USD 23) monthly to party coffers is reportedly sparking further internal party grousing. President Chavez' proposals for constitutional change currently include public financing for electoral campaigns. Three pro-Chavez parties, the Communist Party, Patria Para Todos (PPT),and Podemos decided earlier this year not to dissolve and join the PSUV unconditionally. -------------- Constitutional Changes Take Priority -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Vice President Rodriguez abruptly announced August 17 that battalions would not elect spokespersons the next day, as originally planned. Instead, Rodriguez encouraged "aspiring militants" in the PSUV to discuss Chavez' proposals to change 33 articles of the 1999 Constitution (Ref B). Rodriguez also said the PSUV coordination committee is also reviewing the dates for the party's founding congress. Noting that party organizers are not trying to "hurry" the party formation process, Rodriguez hinted that the September 8-December 15 party congress would be postponed. Earlier the same week, National Assembly Deputy Francisco Ameliach told the media that the PSUV party congress would likely be postponed until early 2008, after a public referendum on constitutional changes. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Chavez' efforts to forge a monolithic pro-government party have been plagued by delays, division, and disorganization from the beginning. The lack of significant popular participation in forming PSUV battalions may also indicate that Chavez enjoys far more breadth than depth of political support. The Venezuelan president himself admits publicly that he is still a long way from establishing a "great revolutionary machine." Chavez told the mass July 23 PSUV rally that Fidel Castro was right when he told him that the Cuban revolution will survive Fidel's death because of the Cuban Communist Party, but Chavez' revolution could not outlast Chavez. The Venezuelan president's strategic decision to focus on securing public approval for his constitutional changes appears to be a recognition that the PSUV formation process so far has been more a divisive than a mobilizing force within Chavismo. Although still very much a work-in-progress, the PSUV is likely to be a formidable electoral machine. The BRV's propensity to blur the distinction between government and political party and the lack of any significant, grassroots competition from opposition parties play to the PSUV's advantage. FRENCH

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