JEFE SUPREMO: HUGO CHAVEZ'S PERSONALITY CULT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 001597 SIPDIS SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO F0R POLAD DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER) E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI VE SUBJECT: JEFE SUPREMO: HUGO CHAVEZ'S PERSONALITY CULT CARACAS 00001597 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR DANIEL LAWTON, REASON 1.4 (D) ¶1. (C) Summary. President Chavez and his supporters are devoting considerable resources to construct a cult of personality for the Venezuelan president (see Embassy Caracas website on Siprnet for accompanying photo essay). Flattering images of the Venezuelan president dominate government buildings, public works, and government-run media. Chavez typically appears on all local, non-subscription TV and radio stations on average three times a week to deliver lengthy speeches, in addition to hosting his "Alo, Presidente" talk show on state-run TV most Sunday afternoons. Chavez is ever trying to position himself in the public's mind as the political descendant of Venezuelan founder Simon Bolivar as well as the living embodiment of the "will of the people." Jetting the globe bearing lucre, Chavez is also endeavoring to assume Fidel Castro's international mantle as an anti-American leader. Chavez' outsized personality cult is a formidable political tool, but also appears to contribute to Chavez' alternating overconfidence and thin-skinned narcissism. End Summary. -------------- Here, There, and Everywhere -------------- ¶2. (C) President Chavez has long relied on his personal charisma and popular image to secure broad political support. Over the last several months, he and his Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (BRV) government have devoted even more energy and resources to cultivating the Venezuelan president's cult of personality. Flattering and "heroic" images of Chavez dominate government buildings, public works, and pro-government media. For example, the BRV's tax authority headquarters (SENIAT) in Caracas displays an eight-story building-wide photo of Chavez hugging a small boy. The prevailing gold standard for pro-Chavez officials is to run billboards, TV spots, and newspaper ads showing pictures of themselves next to the Venezuelan president. ¶3. (C) Chavez memorabilia is a staple at many informal Venezuelan street markets. The 25-inch tall Hugo Chavez action figure depicts the Venezuelan president in either his military uniform or in his trademark red short-sleeved shirt; a button triggers the broadcast of a brief recording of Chavez speaking to a cheering crowd. Chavez wrist watches feature both the Venezuelan leader in military uniform or in a business suit adorned with the presidential sash. Innumerable varieties of Chavez T-shirts are also available at street markets, as well as posters, statuettes, key chains, and other "revolutionary" souvenirs. -------------- Chavez on Every Channel -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Chavez delivers televised speeches on average three times a week, and most of his speeches last a minimum of three hours. Venezuelan law requires all non-subscription TV and radio stations, including those privately owned, to air Chavez's speeches and other government broadcasts whenever the BRV requests. There have been over 1500 BRV-mandated broadcasts of Chavez' speeches since 1999, according to Reporters Without Borders. Minister of Popular Power for Communications and Information William Lara announced July 17 that the BRV plans to require local cable networks to air BRV-mandated broadcasts, including Chavez speeches. ¶5. (SBU) In addition, seven government-controlled television stations, as well as many more community TV channels and local radio stations, cheerlead for the Venezuelan president, his closest supporters, and his policies. Chavez also hosts his trademark several-hours long talk show, "Alo, Presidente," most Sundays on a government network. Chavez experimented some months ago with moving a shorter version of his show to prime time during the work week, but subsequently returned to his original Sunday afternoon time slot and format. The Venezuelan President has broadcast 289 editions of "Alo, Presidente" since beginning the broadcasts in 1999. His August 5th broadcast lasted a record eight hours. -------------- Myth-Making -------------- ¶6. (C) Chavez and his supporters are also working hard to promote politically attractive myths about Chavez' rise to power. Anzoaetegui Governor Tarek William Saab, a staunch Chavez supporter, has dedicated some USD 500,000 to build a plaza and scenic overlook in honor of Chavez. The plaza is on the hill in the small village of San Mateo where Chavez claims he and a handful of other military personnel first formed a clandestine "People's Army" in 1977. Chavez is expected to attend the inauguration of the plaza in November to commemorate the 30th anniversary of his determination to "remake" Venezuela. Chavez's hillside pledge conveniently mirrors Simon Bolivar's claim that while reflecting on a hilltop in Rome, he vowed to secure Latin America's independence from Spain. ¶7. (C) Chavez personally led many of the BRV's well-funded events to commemorate the fifth anniversary of the April 11, 2002 interregnum. Chavez and the BRV devoted considerable air time to promote an "official" history of the short-lived coup, claiming that Chavez never resigned from office but agreed to be detained by military officers to prevent bloodshed. At his April 13 mass rally, Chavez blamed the April 11-13, 2002 events on the United States and called those days Venezuela's "Bay of Pigs". Similarly, Chavez led the BRV's overblown efforts in February to memorialize the failed coup attempt that he led on February 4, 1992 as well as the February 27, 1989 "Caracazo" rioting that helped discredit Venezuela's traditional political parties. -------------- Chavez = People -------------- ¶8. (C) The presumption of Chavez and his supporters that Chavez speaks for the Venezuelan people is a cornerstone of the leader's personality cult. The Venezuelan president sprinkles his stump speeches with assertions that only he can protect the Venezuelan people from domestic "oligarchs" and the "empire" (United States) and feigns fatigue over the "burden" of power. By this same logic, he dismisses his critics as "traitors" or "lackeys" of the United States. Chavez repeatedly weaves in anecdotes from his childhood on the rural plains of Barinas and early military career in his speeches to underscore that he is "one of the people" (and not a long-serving and ever more powerful sitting president). ¶9. (C) Chavez exploits his self-identification as the embodiment of the people to justify many of his most controversial and anti-democratic measures. Defending his proposal to amend the 1999 Constitution to eliminate presidential term limits, Chavez repeatedly claims "the people want it" (public opinion polls show a majority oppose). He cautioned small, allied parties questioning Chavez's effort to forge a single pro-government party that the votes they received in the December 2006 presidential election were not for them, but "for Chavez." Chavez said taking the popular, private Radio Caracas TV network off the non-subscription airwaves in May and replacing it with TVes, a state-funded station, would better serve the people (TVes' low ratings indicate otherwise). -------------- Move Over, Bolivar -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Pictures of Venezuela's independence hero Simon Bolivar have traditionally dominated government offices, but Chavez portraits are starting to compete with, and even supplant, depictions of "The Liberator" in officialdom. Most notably, Chavez swore in his new cabinet in January in front of an enormous picture of himself, instead of the traditional portrait of Bolivar. At the same time, Chavez continues to stake exclusive claim to the political legacy of Bolivar, quoting frequently -- and very selectively -- from the speeches and writings of Venezuela's greatest national hero to try to attach historical legitimacy to his own ill-defined "Bolivarian revolution." ¶11. (SBU) As Chavez radicalizes his own domestic agenda, he continues to manipulate history further to claim that Bolivar was a proto-socialist. In addition, Chavez shrouds his proposal to eliminate presidential term limits with the historical aura of Venezuela's founder. Chavez began his second six-year term of office after being re-elected in December 2006, but he openly talks about remaining president until 2021, Venezuela's bicentennial, or 2030, the 200th anniversary of Bolivar's death. -------------- Castro's Heir -------------- ¶12. (C) By dint of a heavy travel schedule and foreign assistance pledges (many of which go unfulfilled),Chavez is making considerable efforts to export his personality cult. Over the last year, he visited the ailing Fidel Castro several times, trying to position himself internationally as Castro's heir. Burnishing his anti-American credentials, the Venezuelan president led efforts to forge close ties with Iran, Syria, Belarus, and Russia. In Latin America, particularly in Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Ecuador, he actively promoted his "Bolivarian revolution" and ALBA integration plan as a substitute model of development for "savage capitalism." ¶13. (C) While Chavez basks in the international limelight, he also overreaches and makes mistakes. Chavez went on a March 8-13 "shadow tour" to Argentina, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Haiti, and Jamaica in an unsuccessful effort to upstage President Bush's March 8-14 visit to Latin America. Chavez's infamous "Bush is the devil" speech at the September 2006 UNGA grabbed international attention but undermined the BRV's efforts to secure a UN Security Council seat, an international stage that Chavez very much coveted. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶14. (C) So far, Chavez has not erected statues of himself or put his visage on Venezuelan stamps and currency, but it may only be a matter of time. At a minimum, Chavez and his supporters can be expected to use the Hugo Chavez personality cult for political advantage. Chavez is already framing the upcoming battle over rewriting the constitution as a vote for or against him, thus shrouding the controversial content of the proposed changes. But at the same time, Chavez increasingly appears to be making the mistake of believing his own propaganda, making him even more thin-skinned and narcissistic. Chavez, for example, seems to crave public confrontation with senior USG officials and spends an enormous amount of time defining and justifying himself in opposition to the USG. Ignoring Chavez and/or re-framing Chavez' personal insults with well-reasoned defenses of democracy and free enterprise continues to pay dividends. The high road consistently denies Chavez the international attention and validation he seeks. FRENCH