VENEZUELA: CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM BACK TO FRONT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 001419 SIPDIS SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2017 TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM VE SUBJECT: VENEZUELA: CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM BACK TO FRONT BURNER FOR NOW REF: A. CARACAS 243 ¶B. 06 CARACAS 2275 CARACAS 00001419 001.3 OF 003 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR DANIEL LAWTON FOR 1.4 (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: After saying in early May that constitutional reform was not a priority for this year, President Chavez surprised everyone by announcing two months later that he would present his proposed changes in the second half of July. Around the same time, an alleged draft of one of his constitutional reform committee's working papers was leaked. While the committee members are denying the draft's authenticity, constitutional lawyer Jose Vicente Haro outlined for POLOFF and Econoff July 2 parts of the draft that, based on discussions with at least one committee member, he believes are accurate. The following is a review of the possible political and judicial changes, including elimination of presidential term limits, redistricting to weaken state and local government powers, and reduced protection of human rights. Septel will cover economic changes. Most of the proposals are aimed at consolidating Chavez' control and eliminating potential rivals, but ironically are planting more seeds for disillusionment and opposition to his policies. End Summary. -------------- On Again, Off Again "Reform" -------------- ¶2. (C) In early 2007, President Chavez announced plans to change the 1999 Constitution and appointed a presidential committee to recommend modifications. The committee was originally expected to present its findings to Chavez by early March. He would then submit a proposal to the National Assembly (NA),which would discuss it during formal and "parliament in the street" sessions, and hold three votes. The proposal would then to be submitted to a consultative referendum perhaps as early as August 2007. We understand that the committee did submit a draft close to schedule (although several updates have since been submitted). However in early May, Chavez suddenly announced that constitutional reform was not a priority and could "probably wait until next year." Many contacts, including pro-government sources and those close to them, have said Chavez was forced to delay his plans due to discontent within Chavismo over some proposals, such as the elimination of presidential term limits and public backlash to the BRV's shutdown of RCTV. In late June, Chavez changed course again and announced that he would submit a constitutional proposal to the NA in the second half of July. -------------- What Will Change? -------------- ¶3. (C) Around the same time of Chavez' June announcement, an alleged draft of one of the committee's working papers was leaked to the local press. Rumors suggest it was either leaked by disgruntled committee members who disagreed with some of the president's plans, or as a trial balloon to test public reaction. Many of its proposals are consistent with changes proposed by Chavez and other BRV officials. We were told the leak came from opposition party Primero Justicia, who received it from a pro-government contact. Reform Committee members deny the draft's authenticity, but constitutional lawyer Jose Vicente Haro, a former NA legal counsel and advisor to the 1999 Constitutional Assembly, has spoken to committee member Carlos Escarra and told POLOFF and Econoff July 2 which parts of the document Escarra told him were accurate. The following is a review of the proposed political and judicial changes. -------------- "Continuous" re-election -------------- ¶4. (C) Chavez has repeatedly announced his intention to stay in office well beyond the constitutionally-set two-term limit--either until 2021, the 200th anniversary of Venezuela's independence or 2030, the 200th anniversary of Simon Bolivar's death. This desire is thought to be the main driver behind the constitutional amendment effort. In an effort to clarify (and ease fears) regarding this proposal, President of the NA Cilia Flores explained on July 13 the BRV's plans to introduce the idea of "continuous," rather than indefinite re-election. According to Flores, the change CARACAS 00001419 002.3 OF 003 is merely technical and stems from the opposition's inaccurate assumption that indefinite re-election implies Chavez will remain in power for life. Continuous re-election, however, Flores said, means Chavez will be eligible to run for office as many times as he wishes, but must still be re-elected by popular vote ever six years. She added that the provision would only apply to the president, while all other elected officials must abide by the term restrictions outlined in the 1999 Constitution. Currently, governors and mayors may serve two consecutive four-year terms and legislators for two consecutive five-year terms. -------------- Territorial Redistribution -------------- ¶5. (C) Billed as the "new geometry of power," it is unclear what Chavez' re-districting plans (one of his "five motors" of socialist transformation) will entail. Chavez has said he plans to re-draw state boundaries and create special federal territories and communal cities to create a more even economic and population distribution, and facilitate economic development. He has also mused about grouping states together into four to eight sectors that would each be overseen by a vice president. Many political watchers believe that objective to be the elimination and/or undermining of most opposition-run areas, including Zulia State and the Greater Caracas municipalities of Chacao and Baruta, which are led by capable administrators and popular, charismatic political figures Manuel Rosales, Leopoldo Lopez, and Henrique Capriles, respectively. However, others note Chavez' long standing dislike of state and municipal governments, which are to some extent independent concentrations of power; this will weaken and worsen them. Currently Venezuela is divided into 23 states, the Capital District of Caracas, 331 municipalities, federal territories, which include Bird Island (disputed by Dominica and Trinidad and Tobago),La Orchilla, and other islands off of Venezuela's coast. ¶6. (C) The proposed amendment would preserve the existing political-administrative divisions but also allow Chavez, with approval from a majority of the National Assembly, to create "special and/or communal territories" within states or municipalities. Special administrators answerable only to the president would run these areas. The Capital District of Caracas would become a Federal District, and according to Haro, would encompass the upscale, opposition-run municipalities of Baruta and Chacao. The amendment also calls for municipalities to take into account the "nature and necessities of the community," which could further facilitate re-districting of these entities. ¶7. (Comment: These changes would essentially undo the decentralization process that began in the early 1990s, and ironically, opened political space for Chavez' eventual rise to power. The proposal has rankled some of Chavez' own governors and mayors, who are understandably reluctant to give up their power and influence. The move is also expected to generate backlash from the public, which has grown accustomed to relying on or at least coping with local officials instead of the relatively inefficient and overly bureaucratic national government.) -------------- Community Councils -------------- ¶8. (C) The alleged working paper establishes the community councils, Chavez' fifth motor of socialist transformation, as a separate branch of government called the Popular Power Branch. Billed as the cornerstone of Chavez' "participatory democracy," communal councils are grassroots community organizations that the BRV has been pushing to the political forefront. With up to USD 8 billion in direct central government funding, the councils could theoretically plan and execute local projects, independent of any elected local government involvement. They are largely intended to strengthen Chavez' direct connection to his supporters at the expense of local leaders. (Comment: By reducing their authority through redistricting and transferring their funding to the community councils, Chavez would effectively erode the autonomy of regional and local governments and block the rise of potential rivals. It seems unlikely however that Chavez will give real power and control of resources to these local councils. End Comment.) CARACAS 00001419 003.3 OF 003 -------------- Treatment of Human Rights -------------- ¶9. (C) The alleged working paper contains a number of changes that, if approved, would jeopardize protection for human rights. For example, article 23 of the current constitution gives international human rights treaties ratified by Venezuela immediate and direct constitutional rank, and article 31 allows all victims of human rights violations to ask international human rights courts for protection from the state. The revised version would subordinate these treaties to national law and victims of human rights violations would be required to exhaust all appeal options in domestic courts before going to international courts. Moreover, the new article 31 would make Venezuelan courts responsible for implementing international courts' sentences "within the limits of domestic law." Currently, the state is responsible for "adopting the necessary measures prescribed by the international courts." These changes would essentially cut off all avenues of redress for BRV political prisoners and victims of human rights abuses, as Chavez' control over the court system (Reftels) would allow the BRV to tie up their domestic appeals for years. ¶10. (C) These potential changes coincide with several recent measures the BRV has pursued to insulate itself from international criticism of its human rights practices. Over the past six years, the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IACHR) has admitted 20 cases against Venezuela. During the last IACHR session in March, the BRV representative blasted the Commission for its alleged anti-Chavez bias, setting the stage for a possible withdrawal from the Commission. In fact, Chavez threatened to pull out of the Inter-American system in May 2007 when the IACHR referred a 2002 request by RCTV reporters for protection from the state to the Inter-American Human Rights Court. As with the proposed changes regulating international economic treaties (septel),Haro believes the BRV prefers to loosen its compliance with human rights accords to avoid the international stigma that pulling out of the treaties would bring. ¶11. (C) Haro also highlighted proposed changes to article 337 governing Chavez' ability to declare a "state of exception," akin to a state of emergency. If approved, the new article would broaden the requirements for and circumstances under which Chavez could declare a "state of exception." Whereas the current article preserves the rights to due process, information, and other "intangible rights," the new article would eliminate them. Haro was concerned that the ease with which Chavez could call a state of exception could permit an indefinite suspension of civil liberties and easier round-up of political opponents. Moreover, suspending access to information could facilitate more BRV-sponsored human rights abuses while complicating efforts to prosecute violators. The lack of information was a key problem in investigating claims of human rights abuses against the military during the response to the 1999 Vargas floods. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) The reforms highlighted above coincide with many of the themes Chavez has mentioned in the last six months and are likely to appear in some form in the actual proposal. Most of the changes are designed to increase Chavez' direct control, sideline challengers, limit outside influence, but in the long run, could ironically prove to be his undoing. So far, Chavez has survived largely by blaming others for his administration's shortcomings, but by increasing dependence on the executive, he limits the number of possible scapegoats and increases his own vulnerability to public discontent. FRENCH