RECALL REFERENDA FIZZLES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 001249

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: RECALL REFERENDA FIZZLES

REF: A. CARACAS 00805


B. CARACAS 00931

C. CARACAS 01015

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Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES FOR REASON 1.4 (D)


1. (C) Summary: The recall referendum effort was largely a
non-event as neither the opposition, nor the government
actively engaged in the process. Very few voters
participated in the June 16-18 petition drive to collect
signatures for recall referenda against nine governors, some
100 mayors, and other local elected leaders. National
Electoral Council (CNE) results indicate nine low-profile
officials--eight mayors and a legislative council
member--will face a recall vote in October. The low turnout
was not a surprise since none of the major political parties
backed the effort, though pro-government and opposition
officials are blaming each other and the CNE for the event's
"failure" and the money wasted in organizing it. What effort
that was put into the recall process involved largely
internal squabbles within Chavismo. Lone opposition CNE
director Vicente Diaz described the signature drive to
PolCouns and POLOFF as a "missed opportunity," but thought
the exercise underscored the need for a comprehensive
referendum law. While many parties, NGOs, and international
election observers have called for electoral reforms for
years, it is not a BRV priority.

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Voters Ignore Signature Drive
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2. (U) The National Electoral Council (CNE) held petition
drives nationwide June 16-18 to solicit signatures in favor
of holding recall referenda against nine governors, 109
mayors, and 49 local legislative council members who reached
the mid-point of their terms October 31, 2006. The process
is extremely complex and sets a fairly high bar for removing
an official from office. According to electoral rules, a
recall is triggered when signatures are collected from at
least 20 percent of the electorate in the targeted official's
voting district (Ref A). The CNE set up 1,570 signature
collection sites for the event. Of the more than 10 million
voters eligible to participate only 186,008 turned out. The
CNE announced June 22 that of the 167 targeted officials,
only nine low-profile officials will face a recall vote. The
petition drive was not entirely quiet. A clash between
Podemos and Fifth Republic Movement members in a Bolivar
state municipality resulted in one dead and four wounded, and
caused the CNE to expand signing hours in that area.

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Who's Responsible?
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3. (C) The low voter turnout was not a surprise, as most
major political parties were not backing the recall effort.
Party representatives from across the political spectrum had
consistently told us that they believed the recalls were a
waste of time and resources since succession procedures for
recalled local officials in many states were either unclear
or designated a replacement from the same party (Refs B and
C). They preferred to focus instead on the next state and
local elections, which are due by late 2008. Opposition
party reps also noted that continued distrust of the
BRV-stacked CNE and the legacy of the 2004 Tascon List,
through which the BRV retaliated against Chavez' recall
proponents, would prevent their supporters from turning out.
This is particularly true in recalls for local officials,
where in small communities it is easy for the affected
officials to identify and retaliate against those seeking
their recall. Low participation was further assured when
even the small pro-Chavez grassroots organizations that had
requested the recall proceedings began backing out, citing
CNE refusal to meet their demands, which included approving
all of their recall petitions and using all voting centers in
the petition drive.


4. (SBU) The low turnout projections still did not prevent
pro-government and opposition political parties from blaming
each other or the CNE for the drive's "failure." Former Vice
President Rangel, conveniently ignoring the fact that
pro-Chavez groups promoted most of the recalls, blamed the
opposition for not creating the necessary conditions for
participation. Many recall promoting organizations
criticized the CNE for poorly advertising the event, and
accused CNE table workers and witnesses of using threats to

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deter would-be signers. Venezuelan Communist Party Secretary
General Oscar Figuera said fear of political retaliation,
electoral fatigue, poor distribution of signature collection
sites, and the length of the process contributed to general
voter apathy.


5. (U) Opposition parties Un Nuevo Tiempo and Copei as well
as the NGO Ciudadania Activa also highlighted the legacy of
the 2004 CNE recall norms which they said had "distorted the
constitutional right" to recall officials. These groups
criticized the CNE's "hijacking" of what they say should have
been a citizen-driven process leaders as well. Baruta
Municipality Mayor Henrique Capriles Radonski, one of those
susceptible to recall, called the event a "failure of the
CNE" and blasted the Council for wasting money organizing the
event.

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CNE: "Not Us"
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6. (C) Lone opposition CNE director Vicente Diaz told
PolCouns and POLOFF June 20 that the signature drive
represented "a lost opportunity to change the political
panorama." He said the real reason for the scant turnout was
that Chavez did not order his supporters to participate.
Diaz defended the CNE's decision to run the event to protect
would-be signers from potential political retaliation,
although he admitted that a lingering distrust of the CNE
remains. He also explained that the CNE decided to limit the
number of petition sites, and hence reduce costs, since it
knew the political parties were not planning to participate.
Diaz thought that, if anything, the experience served to
underscore the need for a recall referendum law, which he
said CNE lawyers are currently working on. He further
suggested that instead of blaming the CNE for the failed
drive, the opposition should highlight the weakness of the
pro-government machine and intra-Chavismo divisions as
evidenced by the violence in Bolivar state. Other CNE
directors have publicly rejected political party criticism.
CNE President Tibisay Lucena, for example, put the
advertising onus on recall promoters, saying that CNE ads
promoting the petition drive would have constituted support
for a political position.

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"There Oughta Be a Law!"
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7. (C) The experience has also prompted calls for revising
existing recall rules and creating a comprehensive referendum
law. Opposition Baruta Mayor Capriles and pro-government
Libertador Mayor Freddy Bernal, annoyed that a relatively
small organization could start the recall process, said legal
requirements for convoking a recall should be revised.
Bernal also suggested the Presidential Commission for
Constitutional Reform review constitutional provisions
regarding the recall referendum so that the process "does not
ridicule the popular will, nor trample democracy."
Pro-government Patria Para Todos leader Jose Albornoz called
for a recall referendum law that would clarify succession
rules for recalled local officials and better regulate the
process, speculating that clearer rules might spur
participation.

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Comment
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8. (C) The signature drives did not "succeed" because Chavez
did not indicate it was a priority and the opposition saw no
advantage in participating. While a theoretically innovative
democratic exercise, the recall mechanism in current practice
does little more than strengthen the President (or any
incumbent) at the expense of his opponents, and occasionally
allow frustrated constituents to express dissatisfaction with
their elected leaders without significantly altering the
political landscape. Although political parties, NGOs, and
international election observers have stressed the need for
electoral reform for years, it is not a BRV priority.

BROWNFIELD