RECALL REFERENDA FIZZLES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 001249 SIPDIS SIPDIS HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2017 TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE SUBJECT: RECALL REFERENDA FIZZLES REF: A. CARACAS 00805 ¶B. CARACAS 00931 ¶C. CARACAS 01015 CARACAS 00001249 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES FOR REASON 1.4 (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: The recall referendum effort was largely a non-event as neither the opposition, nor the government actively engaged in the process. Very few voters participated in the June 16-18 petition drive to collect signatures for recall referenda against nine governors, some 100 mayors, and other local elected leaders. National Electoral Council (CNE) results indicate nine low-profile officials--eight mayors and a legislative council member--will face a recall vote in October. The low turnout was not a surprise since none of the major political parties backed the effort, though pro-government and opposition officials are blaming each other and the CNE for the event's "failure" and the money wasted in organizing it. What effort that was put into the recall process involved largely internal squabbles within Chavismo. Lone opposition CNE director Vicente Diaz described the signature drive to PolCouns and POLOFF as a "missed opportunity," but thought the exercise underscored the need for a comprehensive referendum law. While many parties, NGOs, and international election observers have called for electoral reforms for years, it is not a BRV priority. -------------- Voters Ignore Signature Drive -------------- ¶2. (U) The National Electoral Council (CNE) held petition drives nationwide June 16-18 to solicit signatures in favor of holding recall referenda against nine governors, 109 mayors, and 49 local legislative council members who reached the mid-point of their terms October 31, 2006. The process is extremely complex and sets a fairly high bar for removing an official from office. According to electoral rules, a recall is triggered when signatures are collected from at least 20 percent of the electorate in the targeted official's voting district (Ref A). The CNE set up 1,570 signature collection sites for the event. Of the more than 10 million voters eligible to participate only 186,008 turned out. The CNE announced June 22 that of the 167 targeted officials, only nine low-profile officials will face a recall vote. The petition drive was not entirely quiet. A clash between Podemos and Fifth Republic Movement members in a Bolivar state municipality resulted in one dead and four wounded, and caused the CNE to expand signing hours in that area. -------------- Who's Responsible? -------------- ¶3. (C) The low voter turnout was not a surprise, as most major political parties were not backing the recall effort. Party representatives from across the political spectrum had consistently told us that they believed the recalls were a waste of time and resources since succession procedures for recalled local officials in many states were either unclear or designated a replacement from the same party (Refs B and C). They preferred to focus instead on the next state and local elections, which are due by late 2008. Opposition party reps also noted that continued distrust of the BRV-stacked CNE and the legacy of the 2004 Tascon List, through which the BRV retaliated against Chavez' recall proponents, would prevent their supporters from turning out. This is particularly true in recalls for local officials, where in small communities it is easy for the affected officials to identify and retaliate against those seeking their recall. Low participation was further assured when even the small pro-Chavez grassroots organizations that had requested the recall proceedings began backing out, citing CNE refusal to meet their demands, which included approving all of their recall petitions and using all voting centers in the petition drive. ¶4. (SBU) The low turnout projections still did not prevent pro-government and opposition political parties from blaming each other or the CNE for the drive's "failure." Former Vice President Rangel, conveniently ignoring the fact that pro-Chavez groups promoted most of the recalls, blamed the opposition for not creating the necessary conditions for participation. Many recall promoting organizations criticized the CNE for poorly advertising the event, and accused CNE table workers and witnesses of using threats to CARACAS 00001249 002.2 OF 002 deter would-be signers. Venezuelan Communist Party Secretary General Oscar Figuera said fear of political retaliation, electoral fatigue, poor distribution of signature collection sites, and the length of the process contributed to general voter apathy. ¶5. (U) Opposition parties Un Nuevo Tiempo and Copei as well as the NGO Ciudadania Activa also highlighted the legacy of the 2004 CNE recall norms which they said had "distorted the constitutional right" to recall officials. These groups criticized the CNE's "hijacking" of what they say should have been a citizen-driven process leaders as well. Baruta Municipality Mayor Henrique Capriles Radonski, one of those susceptible to recall, called the event a "failure of the CNE" and blasted the Council for wasting money organizing the event. -------------- CNE: "Not Us" -------------- ¶6. (C) Lone opposition CNE director Vicente Diaz told PolCouns and POLOFF June 20 that the signature drive represented "a lost opportunity to change the political panorama." He said the real reason for the scant turnout was that Chavez did not order his supporters to participate. Diaz defended the CNE's decision to run the event to protect would-be signers from potential political retaliation, although he admitted that a lingering distrust of the CNE remains. He also explained that the CNE decided to limit the number of petition sites, and hence reduce costs, since it knew the political parties were not planning to participate. Diaz thought that, if anything, the experience served to underscore the need for a recall referendum law, which he said CNE lawyers are currently working on. He further suggested that instead of blaming the CNE for the failed drive, the opposition should highlight the weakness of the pro-government machine and intra-Chavismo divisions as evidenced by the violence in Bolivar state. Other CNE directors have publicly rejected political party criticism. CNE President Tibisay Lucena, for example, put the advertising onus on recall promoters, saying that CNE ads promoting the petition drive would have constituted support for a political position. -------------- "There Oughta Be a Law!" -------------- ¶7. (C) The experience has also prompted calls for revising existing recall rules and creating a comprehensive referendum law. Opposition Baruta Mayor Capriles and pro-government Libertador Mayor Freddy Bernal, annoyed that a relatively small organization could start the recall process, said legal requirements for convoking a recall should be revised. Bernal also suggested the Presidential Commission for Constitutional Reform review constitutional provisions regarding the recall referendum so that the process "does not ridicule the popular will, nor trample democracy." Pro-government Patria Para Todos leader Jose Albornoz called for a recall referendum law that would clarify succession rules for recalled local officials and better regulate the process, speculating that clearer rules might spur participation. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) The signature drives did not "succeed" because Chavez did not indicate it was a priority and the opposition saw no advantage in participating. While a theoretically innovative democratic exercise, the recall mechanism in current practice does little more than strengthen the President (or any incumbent) at the expense of his opponents, and occasionally allow frustrated constituents to express dissatisfaction with their elected leaders without significantly altering the political landscape. Although political parties, NGOs, and international election observers have stressed the need for electoral reform for years, it is not a BRV priority. BROWNFIELD