PPT: WHAT DOESN'T DESTROY US, MAKES US STRONGER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 001015

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SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: PPT: WHAT DOESN'T DESTROY US, MAKES US STRONGER

REF: A. CARACAS 820

B. CARACAS 616

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Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT DOWNES FOR 1.4 (D)


1. (C) Summary: A perhaps over-optimistic Patria Para Todos
(PPT) Secretary General and National Assembly Deputy Jose
Albornoz told PolCouns May 18 that he was confident his party
would survive the current pressure to join Chavez' United
Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV),and would eventually
reconcile with Chavez. He thought the PSUV would end up
slightly smaller than Chavez' previous party, the Fifth
Republic Movement (MVR),and was pessimistic about prospects
for coalition partner Podemos, which he criticized for being
too vocal in its criticism of the PSUV. Albornoz thought
ongoing efforts to recall elected officials would fail, as
political parties have conceded that it is a waste of
resources to seek to recall an official whose position would
be up for grabs next year. Albornoz also gave credence to
rumors that discontent over some of Chavez' proposals may be
holding up progress toward implementing "profound"
constitutional changes. End Summary.

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PPT Down, but Not Out
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2. (C) During a May 18 meeting with PolCouns and Poloff,
Patria Para Todos (PPT) Secretary General Jose Albornoz said
he was optimistic that the party would survive and ultimately
be strengthened by its decision not to join Chavez' United
Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) (Ref A). Comparing the
ruling coalition to an elevator, Albornoz said the PPT was
currently "on a lower floor," but would "rise to a higher one
again." He added that, "the important thing is to be in the
elevator." Albornoz acknowledged that PPT's decision not to
dissolve into the PSUV had caused friction with Chavez, but
thought the party's relatively low-key announcement of its
decision compared, for example, to fellow coalition partner
Podemos' public criticism of the PSUV, would allow for an
eventual reconciliation. Albornoz claimed that public
opinion also seemed to support the PPT's decision, and that
consequently the party has experienced an increase in
membership requests. He said they were putting off accepting
any new members until August, however, when friction may have
died down.


3. (C) Albornoz said that roughly 97% of PPT's base voted
against joining the PSUV during the PPT's national conference
in mid-April. Many members reportedly opposed the move
because they did not want to be perceived as supporting local
Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) leaders, such as Caracas Mayor
Juan Barreto and Libertador Mayor Freddy Bernal, with whom
the party has had disagreements in the past. (Note: Albornoz
claimed that focus groups conducted after the 2006 election
indicated a similar sentiment motivated pro-Chavez supporters
to vote for the PPT rather than the MVR in the presidential
race, contributing to its 600,000 vote total.) If anything,
Albornoz said the decision helped the party shed some dead
weight, characterizing some of the defectors as having
obstructed party development and being more driven by
opportunism than by ideology. He noted they may have lost a
few generals, but the rank and file remained committed. He
claimed those who left did not take many followers with them.
(Note: PPT has so far lost nine of 13 board members, which
included six of its 11 National Assembly deputies, as well as
both of its cabinet officials, one of its two governors, and
various mayors.)

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Prospects for Coalition Partners
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4. (C) At the rate registration for the PSUV was going,
Albornoz thought the party might be smaller than its
predecessor Fifth Republic Movement (MVR). He thought the
PSUV had played its best cards to encourage membership, using
Chavez and VP Jorge Rodriguez to rally supporters, and
threatening BRV employees. Now that registration has covered
the major cities, Albornoz did not think there would be any
significant gains in membership.


5. (C) Returning to the earlier analogy, it was unclear
whether Albornoz thought Podemos was even in the elevator.
He said Podemos would face a tough road ahead because of its
vocal opposition to the PSUV, which had alienated Chavez and
his supporters. He claimed not to be surprised at the number

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of Podemos defections (Ref B),opining that many of that
party's members were opportunistic.

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Recall Referenda Will Fail
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6. (C) Albornoz was confident that none of the recall
referenda would succeed. He claimed that the BRV's initial
plan was to encourage recalls against weaker pro-government
governors, believing their recalls would fail, strengthening
their position in the run up to the 2008 state elections.
However, government and opposition political parties had
since realized that a recall campaign is costly for both
sides and would accomplish little since even if the official
is recalled, they will just be replaced by someone from the
same party. Since it was too late to stop the recall
process, Albornoz claimed the BRV had directed the National
Electoral Council (CNE) to use fingerprint machines during
the petition drive to ensure that recall promoters would fail
to collect sufficient signatures in favor of a recall.
(Comment: Employing the machines is likely to discourage
voter participation, given Chavista and opposition
supporters' strong suspicions that the government can use the
machines to track their political preferences. Signatures
must be collected from 20 percent of the electorate to
trigger a recall vote.)

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Constitutional Reform
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7. (C) Asked about the status of Chavez' apparently stalled
constitutional reform initiative, Albornoz opined that
divisions within mid- and lower levels of the MVR were
constraining progress. Albornoz, who is also a National
Assembly (NA) deputy, suggested that there were divisions
among deputies, as has been recently rumored, as well as
among other high ranking Chavista officials. Citing Chavez'
"new geometry" redistricting ideas (the "fourth motor" of
socialist transformation) as an example, Albornoz said that
current governors and mayors could not be expected to
willingly give up the little remaining influence they have.


8. (C) In terms of specific issues that might be included in
the constitutional proposal, Albornoz said provisions
regarding the recall referendum will likely be revised, as
parties realize that it is a relatively meaningless mechanism
for change. He also mentioned that PPT proposed
re-instituting state funding for political parties and
changing provisions on proportional representation to ban
morochas. (Note: The 1999 Constitution eliminated funding
for political parties. Morochas are an electoral device
whereby a party competing for NA seats could run its
best-known candidates in single district races under the
colors of a clone party and put its lesser-known candidates
on its own party list, thus reducing the possibility of
minority party representation.) (Comment: Given Albornoz'
estrangement from the ruling circle in the NA, it is likely
that he is out of the loop on the actual details of the BRV's
constitutional amendment proposals.)

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Comment
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9. (C) Although the PPT may attract some Chavistas that are
bothered by the idea of a single revolutionary party,
Albornoz, projections for the PPT's future seem optimistic.
The PPT's already limited influence has certainly diminished
with the defections of important government officials.
Despite Albornoz' extensive efforts to curry favor with
Chavez over the past year--such as by leading a National
Assembly witch hunt of Sumate--the PPT may find itself out in
the cold if Chavez maintains his "with me or against me"
approach to party building (Ref A),as is likely. Albornoz'
predictions for the PSUV and Podemos are more credible. The
PSUV continues to show steady--if not slow--growth,
registering a total of almost two million voters after four
weekends of party registration, according to official CNE
figures. PSUV organizers may not meet Chavez' goal of
recruiting four million members by the end of the
registration drive without ramping up pressure or
manipulating the process, but the party will still dominate
the Venezuelan political landscape.

BROWNFIELD