U/S BURNS' 12/4 MEETING WITH JAPAN DEPUTY FOREIGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CANBERRA 001783 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017 TAGS: PREL AS SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' 12/4 MEETING WITH JAPAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER YABUNAKA Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Daniel A. Clune for reasons 1.4 (b and d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C/NF) Summary: In a December 4, 2007 meeting in Canberra, Australia with Under Secretary Burns, Deputy Foreign Minister Mitoji Yabunaka outlined Japan's goals to improve the relevance of multilateral fora in Asia and its desire for greater United States engagement in the region. The two also addressed the necessity to engage China to be a more responsible actor in world affairs, UNSC Reform, and next steps in combating Iran's nuclear program following release of the unclassified NIE. Under Secretary Burns expressed confidence that India would meet the requirements to conclude the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation initiative and emphasized Japan's support would be helpful. End summary. -------------- Stronger U.S. Commitment to Asia Needed -------------- ¶2. (C) While expressing pleasure at the success of the recent meeting between President Bush and Prime Minister Fukuda in Washington, DFM Yabunaka's extended opening statement conveyed GOJ concern that a change in the U.S. administration in 2009 would also bring about significant shift in U.S. priorities in Asia. In particular, the Japanese feared a downgrade in the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance in favor of China. Japan desired the United States to display much stronger engagement and commitment to regional architecture in East Asia in the light of China's rise, noting that the success of Japan's regional strategy depended upon improving the effectiveness and relevance of multilateral fora such as the Asian Regional Forum (ARF),and APEC. A more robust U.S. commitment to multilateral fora, Yabunaka said, was central to their success. Yabunaka also said that a broadening of the mandate of the Six Party Talks, after the immediate issue of the DPRK's nuclear program was resolved by measurable actions by North Korea, of course, would be an effective method of advancing interests in the region. There were some bilateral issues requiring resolution, including Host Nation Support, renewal of the counterterrorism bill allowing refueling operations in the Indian Ocean, and beef. ¶3. (C) In reply, U/S Burns said that he believed strongly that the U.S.-Japan alliance was a fundamental pillar of American diplomacy. He assured Yabunaka that the U.S.-Japan alliance enjoyed strong bipartisan support and that Japan would continue to be a great ally regardless of who was in the White House in 2009. Stating that in the twenty-first century many of America's most vital interests resided in Asia, compared to Europe in the 20th century, U/S Burns said the United States would be happy to discuss regional architecture with Japan and noted that 2008 would see many high level visits by USG officials to Japan, host of the G8 process. He also assured Yabunaka that North Korea must achieve a verifiable disablement of its nuclear program. China: Warming Relations with Japan, a Responsible Stakeholder? -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) DFM Yabunaka noted that PM Fukuda's diplomacy with China was already yielding dividends. As proof, Yabunaka QChina was already yielding dividends. As proof, Yabunaka listed successful recent meetings in Singapore between Japanese and Chinese officials, the advent of the High Level Economic Consultations (HEC),a resumption of military exchanges, and a genuine change in tone by the Chinese. He noted that PM Fukuda would visit China in either late December or early January and that China's President Hu Jintao would visit Japan in the spring of 2008. Even serious irritants, such as the boundary dispute in the East China Sea, were not insurmountable in this new era of improved relations, Yabunaka observed, as there seemed to be some CANBERRA 00001783 002 OF 003 bilateral desire to reach an accord on that issue before PM Fukuda visited, although specific proposals had yet to emerge. Yabunaka also said Japan wanted to increase cooperation with China on environmental protection, but China's lax observance of IPR hindered greater technology transfer. ¶5. (C) U/S Burns reiterated that the United States sought engagement with, not containment of China. While we disagreed on human rights, religious rights, intellectual property rights, and other issues, we saw China as an emerging stakeholder on key foreign policy issues. In particular, China had been extremely responsible in its role in the Six Party Talks since the DPRK 2006 nuclear test, though they had been less helpful on Sudan and Burma, with a mixed record on Iran. UNSC Reform -------------- ¶6. (C) U/S Burns said that the President's UNGA speech was an opening; he had told Indian Foreign Secretary Menon in Madrid that India should seriously engage Japan and Brazil to design a package that could receive the necessary 128 votes in support. The U.S. saw two basic options: increase the permanent members by a small amount; or look into a ten-year arrangement, open to renewal. The U.S. would not agree to any formulation without Japan as a new member. We were ready to negotiate seriously with Japan, Brazil, and India to create plans that had a good chance of capturing the 128 votes necessary to succeed in the General Assembly, although we thought the barriers to a successful resolution were considerable. Yabunaka expressed hope that such proposals stand a better chance of success with improving Sino-Japanese ties; he later passed U/S Burns the latest Japanese UNSC reform proposal. -------------- Greater Engagement by Japan on Iran -------------- ¶7. (C) U/S Burns said that by virtue of Japan's G8 Presidency in 2008, the GOJ could play a major role in resolving the Iranian issue by promoting the effectiveness of sanctions. U/S Burns emphasized that the recently released unclassified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE),which stated that Iran had abandoned its nuclear weapons program in 2003, showed that Iran was both a rational actor and susceptible to strong, coordinated, international pressure, especially financial. Significantly, uranium enrichment and its ballistic missile program continued; further sanctions would strengthen diplomatic efforts. DFM Yabunaka said that Japan would continue to apply pressure. ¶8. (C) U/S Burns said that his December 1 meeting in Paris and subsequent phone calls with Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister He Yafei represented significant strides in cooperation in creating a united front in opposition to Iran's nuclear program. The Under Secretary said he was reasonably confident that China would support a third UNSC resolution sanctioning Iran. 9.(C) Stating that effective pressure on Iran would encompass tiered travel bans, an expanded asset freeze, inspections of cargo bound to Iran from certain nations, arms restrictions, a reduction in export credits, and sanctioning the Qods Force, U/S Burns said he hoped to convince China to agree to most of the above, which would allow some negotiation on the Qmost of the above, which would allow some negotiation on the questions of export credits. While pleased with China's progress on the Iranian issue, U/S Burns noted that China and Russia - and most certainly Iran - might point to the NIE conclusion as a reason for lessening sanctions or delaying action. India: Progress on Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) The United States hoped India would be able to reach an acceptable and comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency by the end of December, after which the deal would need to be reviewed by the Nuclear CANBERRA 00001783 003 OF 003 Suppliers' Group, noted U/S Burns. DFM Yabunaka said that Japan understood and agreed with the basis of the plan, although the government did face some domestic political pressure due to very strong non-proliferation sentiments among the Japanese public. U/S Burns replied that the United States had been very clear with India that any nuclear tests would have extremely adverse consequences for the agreement. He suggested that the Japanese representative should be in touch with the U.S. lead, Dick Stratford. ¶11. (C) Turning briefly to Pakistan and Afghanistan, U/S Burns noted that a stable Pakistani border region was essential to successful operations in Afghanistan. DFM Yabunaka said Japan was ready to double aid to Pakistan, but needed to monitor the situation very closely. He also said that Japan intended to complete the ring road in Afghanistan by the end of 2009. CLUNE