A/S FRAZER PRESSES EGYPT ON SUDAN, SOMALIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 003480

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR AF AND NEA/ELA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2017
TAGS: PREL EG SU SO
SUBJECT: A/S FRAZER PRESSES EGYPT ON SUDAN, SOMALIA


Classified by Minister Counselor for Economic and Political
Affairs William R. Stewart for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer
met ith her MFA counterpart, Assistant Foreign Minister for
African Affairs Shamel Nasser, on November 25, to discuss
Sudan and Somalia. Nasser argued that the security situation
in Somalia had been better under the Islamic Courts Union
(ICU) prior to the arrival of the Ethiopians, while A/S
Frazer pushed back firmly that the security situation in
Somalia had not been good for many years prior to the
Ethiopians, and the ICU was the source of instability, not
security. On Sudan, with Nasser arguing that a more low-key,
less aggressive approach would work better with Bashir, while
A/S Frazer made the point strongly that the GoS does respond
to pressure, but then reneges on commitments it makes after
the pressure is reduced. End summary.


2. (C) On November 25, AF Assistant Secretary Frazer met with
Assistant Foreign Minister for African Affairs Shamel Nasser
at the Foreign Ministry. (Note: Nasser was joined by Deputy
Assistant Minister for Sudan and East Africa, Abdel Hamid
Marzouk; Cabinet Advisor for African Affairs, Ahmed Abu
Zeid; Chef de Cabinet of the Deputy Foreign Minister and
Coordinator for African Affairs, Counselor Hisham Qadry; and
MFA Director of African Organizations, Counselor Maged Nafaa.
A/S Frazer was joined by Special Assistant Fatuma Sanneh,
CAO Helen Lovejoy, and ECPO Min-Couns William Stewart, as
notetaker. End note.) Their hour-long meeting focused on
recent events in Sudan and Somalia. Concerning Sudan's
north/south conflict, A/S Frazer said the U.S. is in the
complex position of seeking dialogue with the Government of
Sudan while at the same time enforcing sanctions. However,
she said there are no additional sanctions envisioned at this
time. A/S Frazer noted Sudanese president Bashir's habit of
apparently bowing to external pressure to change his
behavior, only to renege and revert to his previous actions
once the external pressure was removed.


3. (C) Assistant Minister Nasser said that Egypt sees things
in Sudan largely the same way as the U.S. "We are not happy
with what is happening in Sudan." Egypt agrees with the U.S.
and others that the situation in Sudan "must change."
However, Egypt believes the best way to effect change in
Sudan is not through external pressure or sanctions, but
through dialogue. "We talk to the Sudanese and try to
persuade them to change and become more responsive to the
international community." The problem, he opined, was that
when Darfur moved to the center of the international
community's agenda, it took attention away from the CPA and
the north-south conflict. Unfortunately, the north-south
conflict is far from being resolved. "It is even less secure
than Darfur. We face serious problems in implementing the
CPA." Egypt hopes that in the upcoming referendum, the
Sudanese will choose to stay united. If not, he said, and a
process of fragmentation begins, "no one can say where it
will end. It could lead to a catastrophe."


4. (C) A/S Frazer said that the issues in Sudan are complex
and interrelated. She disagreed that the U.S. somehow took
its eye off the north-south conflict and became preoccupied
with Darfur. She underscored that for the U.S., "the
north-south conflict is core." We believe in the unity of
Sudan. One of the points of conflict is oil. The
north-south conflict is more about what is under the land
than what is on its surface. The failure to implement the
Abyei Protocol has hampered implementation of the CPA.
During his recent visit to Washington, SPLM leader and First
Vice President Salva Kiir said he would not return to the
cabinet until Abyei is addressed. Nonetheless, A/S Frazer
said it was clear that there was no decision by the south to
secede from Sudan at this time. The U.S. wanted the
southerners to return to the government, but it was clear
they would not do so until Abyei is addressed.


5. (C) Turning to Darfur, Nasser said that Egypt had been
deeply disappointed by the refusal of the UN to accept
Egyptian peacekeepers for Darfur. The hybrid force, he
noted, was supposed to be predominantly African, yet the UN
rejected Egyptians and tried to force northern Europeans and
Thais on Sudan. Such an attitude, Nasser averred, only
serves to enhance Sudanese paranoia that the international
community has a "hidden agenda" for Sudan. "This attitude of
the UN is unhelpful." Director for Sudan Affairs Wael Aboul
Zeit added that the key was to foster better dialogue between
the NCP and the SPLM, and to encourage moderates on both
sides while isolating hardliners. Aboul Zeit said that Egypt
is hosting a meeting on Darfur in Sharm el-Sheikh on December
4th which will seek to find common ground between the
Sudanese factions. "We sense the Juba process is not going

CAIRO 00003480 002 OF 002


well," Aboul Zeit said. We feel we need an "Arusha II,8 and
have been talking with a Group of Four (Egypt, Eritrea,
Libya, and Chad) on how to move forward in Sudan.


6. (C) Responding to Nasser's comments on peacekeepers, A/S
Frazer noted that the agreement had talked about peacekeepers
in Sudan being made up of a preponderance of African troops
-- not solely by them. The AMIS African troops are perceived
as corrupt and discredited by many of the local people in
Darfur. They reject AMIS as collaborating with the Sudan
Government and as unable to protect them. The problem now,
A/S Frazer continued, is that we are reaching a difficult
situation if even the local people have a veto over who the
UN can send as peacekeepers. The other problem is
backtracking by Bashir who is using this situation to delay
the deployment of desperately needed peacekeepers. Also,
Eritrea, Libya, and Chad are sponsoring the rebels, and are
in fact liable to sanctions themselves.


7. (C) Turning to Somalia, Nasser said the situation there
was "very bad," with no prospect for a political settlement
in the near future. Egypt was very disappointed with
Ethiopia. "When they (the Ethiopians) invaded Somalia last
year, they told us it would only be a matter of weeks. That
was nearly a year ago." Now, Nasser continued, the
Ethiopians tell us they cannot pull out, or else they would
leave a security vacuum that the Islamic Courts Union would
return to fill. The key, Nasser asserted, was a genuine
political process that included all factions. "It is hard to
see how we can achieve a lasting solution in Somalia if we
exclude all former members of the ICU from talks." Egypt
favors a greater role in Somalia for the AU, Nasser added.
"It would also be good if the UN stepped in."


8. (C) A/S Frazer underscored strongly that the former
members of the ICU "excluded themselves." The problem, she
explained, is that they refuse to participate until the
Ethiopians leave. "We didn't like the ICU, but what they
brought was stability," Nasser said. "The Ethiopians have
triggered the violence." A/S Frazer disagreed vigorously; it
was the ICU that was directly responsible for the violence.
Nonetheless, Nasser stressed, there are rising pressures in
Egypt and throughout the Arab world to "do something" about
Somalia. These feelings are fed by pictures and stories of
Somali women and children being killed by the Ethiopians.
One way to take concrete action in this regard, A/S Frazer
noted, would be to strongly support AMISOM. No country will
send troops to Somalia, Nasser opined, if there is no hope of
a political settlement.


9. (C) A/S Frazer said that Saudi Arabia was playing a
constructive role in Somalia by offering to help the TFG and
we should approach them about helping to finance a
multi-national peacekeeping force there. Djibouti might also
be able to play a useful role. While the U.S. is prepared to
talk with "almost anyone" about how to make progress in
Somalia, we feel the Ethiopians must not leave until someone
else can effectively step in and provide security. The U.S.
would be happy to see an Arab/Africa/Islamic force, A/S
Frazer said. Nasser agreed, adding that a force made up of
such troops would be much more likely to be accepted by the
Somalis themselves. However, he warned, any force that goes
to Somalia, must go with a political process in place, with a
"clear exit strategy."


10. (C) Turning to relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea,
A/S Frazer said she foresaw continuing tensions between them
on their disputed border, but discounted any possibility of
armed conflict in the near future. However, a terrorist
attack or other incident could spark a wider conflict, and
that is something for us all to be concerned about. Nasser
agreed: "Ethiopia cannot afford a war with Eritrea while it
is still in Somalia." The chance of a "small clash,"
however, is great -- "in some places the Ethiopians and
Eritreans are only 70 meters apart.


11. (U) A/S Frazer has cleared this cable.
Ricciardone