EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD CHANGES ITS TUNE:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 CAIRO 003422

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV KISL PHUM EG
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD CHANGES ITS TUNE:
IDEOLOGICAL REVISIONS PUBLISHED IN LEADING EGYPTIAN
NEWSPAPER

REF: A. CAIRO 1638

B. CAIRO 2654

C. CAIRO 3066

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Economic and Political Affairs
William R. Stewart, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The ideological architect and former leader
of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ),Sayid Imam al-Sharif, jailed
in Egypt since 2004, recently issued an 111-page book,
published in full in 15 installments in a leading Egyptian
independent daily newspaper, detailing "revisions" to his
previous ideology of violent jihad. Sharif's prior writings
provided the blueprint for the violent tactics utilized not
only by EIJ, but Al Qaida and other extremist groups. His
revised approach seeks to reinterpret the meaning of jihad
and to set new parameters for it. Rather than outright
rejecting the concept of violent jihad, Sharif attempts to
establish Shari'a-based "rules of engagement" for conducting
jihad, while also offering non-violent alternatives to
pursuing the goals of jihad. Sharif condemns indiscriminate
killing overall, the killing of foreigners in Muslim
countries, "treachery" against foreigners inside their own
countries, and the fighting of the ruler of a Muslim country,
unless he is a declared an "unbeliever." Three thousand EIJ
detainees who signed up to the revisions have reportedly been
released from prison over the past several months. Some
local analysts view Sharif's new stance as an opportunistic
jailhouse change of heart, brought about either due to GOE
coercion or by a desire to improve his treatment in prison or
create the possibility for an early release from his life
sentence. However, the majority of experts we spoke with
were convinced of Sharif's sincerity, and see the revisions
as an authentic re-evaluation of the use of violence and of
EIJ's goals, and a credible attempt to provide an alternate
jurisprudence for EIJ.


2. (C) Summary Continued: The EIJ revisions are
unquestionably a positive step, and the disavowal of violence
by a group with such a blood-stained history is a major
development in the world of jihadist ideology. However, the
current influence of EIJ and Sharif among jihadists writ
large is difficult to gauge, and it is still too early to
judge the impact of the EIJ revisions, if any, both among
non-EIJ affiliated Egyptian extremists, and among radical
groups across the Muslim world. The revisions have created a
buzz in the Arab media and on the Internet, a dynamic which
encourages public discourse on the topic of extremism and
violent tactics, and which could potentially feed into
ongoing debates between jihadist factions. End summary.


3. (SBU) The Egyptian media has been abuzz for the past
several weeks reporting on the "revisions" of former EIJ
leader Sayid Imam al-Sharif (aka Dr. Fadl and Abdel Qadir Ibn
Abdel Aziz),one of the founders, ideological architects, and
leaders of the terrorist group (he was "Emir" of the movement
from 1989-1993),which was responsible for several past
violent attacks in Egypt, including assassination attempts on
Egyptian ministers and President Hosni Mubarak. The Jihad
Organization, the precursor group from which EIJ later
sprang, was responsible for the assassination of
then-President Anwar Sadat. Sharif, 57 years old, was once a
close comrade and mentor of Ayman al Zawahiri; both left
Egypt for Saudi Arabia in the early 1980's, and the two
reportedly traveled to and worked together in Afghanistan
from 1986 onwards. Sharif is infamous for previously
authoring "Basic Principles in Making Preparations for
Jihad," the so-called jihadi bible, which offers a blueprint
for the violent tactics later adopted by Al Qaida. While
leader of EIJ, Sharif emphasized the importance of "takfir"
(declaring other Muslims apostates) and the execution of
apostates, whom he defined as including anyone registered to
vote, as he considered voting to be a violation of God's
sovereignty over governance. In June 2001, EIJ joined forces
in an alliance with Al Qaida, although Zawahiri and Sharif
allegedly parted ways in 1993, when Sharif reportedly left
the group and moved to Yemen. Sharif has been jailed since
he was arrested in Yemen in 2001; he was subsequently
extradited to Egypt in 2004, where he is currently serving a
life sentence in Torah prison.

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111 PAGES OF THEOLOGICAL REVISIONS
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4. (SBU) While the Egyptian press has been offering hints
about the revisions for months (ref A),the actual finalized

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text was not released until November 18, when the independent
Egyptian newspaper "Al Masry Al Yom" and the Kuwaiti paper
"Al Jarida" published the first in a 15-part series of
near-daily articles which serialized the full 111-page book,
titled "Rationalizing Jihadist Action in Egypt and the
World." (Note: OCS has circulated translations of each
installment of Al Masry Al Yom's publication of the
revisions. The full text of the revisions can be found at
the OCS website, www.opensource.gov. End note).


5. (SBU) According to Egyptian security officials, the
revisions are the culmination of years of effort, following
on the 2001 issuance by EIJ's sister organization, the
Islamic Group (aka Gamaat Islamiyya),of "conceptual
revisions" to its violent modus operandi. Since then, the
Egyptian security apparatus has facilitated visits of leading
moderate religious leaders, including Egypt's current Grand
Mufti Aly Gomaa, to prisons housing EIJ detainees, where a
series of lengthy theological discussions reportedly have
ensued. According to our security and religious
establishment contacts, out of these discussions (often
termed the GOE's "counter-radicalization program"),the EIJ
revisions were born. Sharif's new document is only the latest
in a series of revisions from previous senior members of the
group, all now jailed. The previous EIJ revisions, however,
failed to secure the support of many members of the
organization. It is the hope of the GOE that Sharif, as
EIJ's first leader, has the necessary authority to gain the
support of the group's various factions, whether imprisoned
or abroad.

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WHAT IS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE REVISIONS?
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6. (U) The lengthy text of "Rationalizing Jihadist Action in
Egypt and the World" seeks to reinterpret the meaning of
jihad and to set new parameters for it - rather than outright
rejecting the concept of violent jihad, Sharif attempts to
establish Shari'a-based rules with which to govern it, while
also offering non-violent alternatives to pursue the goals of
jihad. Some highlights of the document:

- While still considering jihad an ultimately noble action,
Sharif condemns indiscriminate killing by jihadists, which he
judges to be against Shari'a.

- One should not engage in jihad if: (1) you do not possess
sufficient funds to support both the waging of jihad and
fulfilling all financial obligations (including the support
of one's family),(2) you do not have the permission of your
parents, (3) you are in an unequal battle with clear
inferiority in numbers and preparation, (4) you are unable to
defend yourself, or (5) you are exiled in a foreign land.

- It is forbidden to attack tourists and foreigners in Muslim
countries, because (1) Muslims may be among the group, and
killing them constitutes the greatest of sins, (2) many
foreigners come to Muslim countries by invitation or for work
and therefore become protected under the terms of a treaty
with other Muslims, and killing them is equally a great sin,
(3) even though most of these foreigners are considered
unbelievers, they include children, women, and the elderly,
who are protected, 4) as many Muslims living in the lands of
the unbelievers are treated fairly, reciprocal treatment must
then be observed, (5) if foreign governments are considered
enemies of Islam, the innocent part of the population of
these countries should not pay the price, and (6) in general,
those who come to Muslim lands do not come to fight us. We
should therefore treat them fairly.

- Islam forbids treachery against foreigners, even inside
their countries. Muslims today are part of these countries
and these operations jeopardize their lives. Indiscriminate
aggression by some of these countries against Muslims does
not allow us to respond in kind .... Entering these nations
with a work, tourism, study or business visa forbids
betraying their people, even if the visa is forged. Bombing,
killing, and destroying property on the grounds that it
belongs to infidels is treachery, hypocrisy, and a cardinal
sin.

- It is not permissible to finance jihad by burglary and
abductions.

- The propagation of Islam can also be accomplished by peace
treaties whenever necessary.

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- The preservation of Muslim lives is paramount, rather than
exposing them to losses which can be avoided.

- It is not allowed to fight the ruler in a Muslim country,
unless he is declared an "unbeliever."

- It is forbidden to kill a person (simply) because he is a
citizen of a particular country.

- Not all who are unbelievers should be killed, as this is
left to the Day of Judgment.

- Egypt's history proves that Islamic groups are incapable of
toppling the regime, which can be changed only by an external
invasion or from within the ruling establishment.

- Declaring people in general and without distinction as
apostates ("kafirs") is an incorrect thing. The declaration
of someone as an apostate should be a judgment based on
Shari'a, not on possibilities and illusions.


7. (C) The text of "Rationalizing Jihadist Action in Egypt
and the World," while clearly a major departure from EIJ's
previous ideology, remains undeniably extremist, featuring a
range of intolerant rhetoric. As Egypt's Grand Mufti told us
in a recent meeting, the EIJ doctrine "still includes many
mistaken interpretations and radical positions that I do not
condone - they remain extremists, but at least are no longer
advocates of killing" (ref B). As noted above, the document,
rather than outright condemning violent jihad, favors
deferring it, noting that Muslims currently are "powerless
and weak," and that "weak ones should not perform jihad," but
rather should wait until circumstances are more favorable.
Sharif also does not explicitly condemn the killing of
apostates, and collectively identifies polytheists,
apostates, Jews, and Christians as those who are to be fought
in the jihadi quest. According to his new doctrine, there
are still appropriate times to declare another Muslim an
unbeliever ("takfir"),but as noted above, the practice must
be regulated in accordance with Shari'a.

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GET OUT OF JAIL FREE CARD ...
--------------


8. (SBU) As part of their overall counter-radicalization
initiative, over the past several months the Egyptian
security services have facilitated "lecture tours" by Sharif
and other repentant EIJ leaders of Egyptian prisons, where
they speak to audiences of jihadist detainees. According to
Egyptian press reports, in the past 4-6 months, a staggering
3,000 EIJ detainees who signed up to the revisions have been
released from prison. Currently, less than 1,000 EIJ
detainees remain in Egyptian jails, at least thirty of whom
have been in touch with various Egyptian newspapers,
complaining about the revisions, and the harsh treatment they
are allegedly receiving due to their refusal to subscribe to
Sharif's ideas. While there have been rumors that Sharif
could potentially be released, he currently remains in Torah
prison.


9. (SBU) Some contacts have noted to us that it was
imperative for the GOE to move large numbers of jihadi
detainees out of Egyptian prisoners prior to the planned
expiration of Egypt's state of emergency in June 2008. Many
of the detainees had never been tried or were only tried by
military courts, and were being held under the auspices of
the Emergency Law. Therefore, their legal status would have
become complicated following the lifting of the state of
emergency (Note: Egypt's draconian Emergency Law has been in
force since 1981. Its current writ is set to expire in June
2008, and the GOE has said it will not be renewed, as new
anti-terror legislation is planned to be drafted, approved by
parliament, and in force by then. See ref C for further
details. End note). In an effort to smoothly re-integrate
released jihadi detainees (some of whom have spent decades in
Egyptian prisons) into society, the GOE is reportedly
providing them with assistance in finding employment, and
until they do, a modest monthly stipend.

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REACTIONS SPLIT
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10. (SBU) We have spoken about Sharif's revisions with a
range of Egyptian experts and analysts of extremist groups,

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as well as several GOE officials and establishment religious
figures. A few analysts view Sharif's new stance as an
opportunistic jailhouse change of heart, brought about either
due to GOE coercion, or by a desire to improve his treatment
in prison or create the possibility for an early release.
However, the majority of experts we spoke with were convinced
of Sharif's sincerity, and see the revisions as an authentic
re-evaluation of the use of violence and of EIJ's goals, and
a credible attempt to provide an alternate jurisprudence for
EIJ. One called it, "a historic turning point in the history
of jihadist thought, and a major blow to the foundations of
Al Qaida's thought and discourse."


11. (C) The key issue our contacts focused on was whether
Sharif's revisions will have any impact on current
practitioners of violent jihad. The experts we spoke with
assessed that, "regrettably," there will be negligible
impact. One asserted that, as someone who left the EIJ
movement in 1993, Sharif is an "out-of-touch old man" who
wields "zero influence" on today's extremists. Another told
us that, "Sharif's wing of EIJ is simply not influential
anymore," and that Sharif is "old school" compared to current
range of jihadist discourse. One contact explained that,
"the 1980's generation of jihadis are now passe. They
operated in highly centralized organizations that were based
on advanced theology and highly theoretical approaches.
Today's jihadists join 'the struggle' more for political and
social reasons than because of a particular theoretical or
theological approach. The new generation also operates in
much less centralized organizations - more of an independent
franchise system - and therefore, changes by one senior
leader are less likely to trickle down, because there are not
followers per se. In addition, Sharif's revisions are highly
theoretical, using very complicated language and
argumentation. This would be difficult for your average
young extremist to grasp. The only extremists I can imagine
Sharif's changes impacting are the very organized and
centralized Salafi groups in Morocco." A senior analyst at
the Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies told
us that, "in this age of electronic media, and proliferation
of websites, including those of jihadists, it is more
difficult for a movement's leadership to be a centralized
authority, or have a monopoly over discourse. A fair amount
of jihadists will probably look at Sharif's document, but few
are likely to fundamentally change their views because of
it." Even a State Security Investigative Services (SSIS)
general involved in the counter-radicalization effort, when
queried by poloff about the possible impact on
extremist-minded youth, noted that Sharif "is an old man ....
it is unlikely that today's youth, who feel aggrieved on a
range of issues, will listen to him."


12. (C) Other analysts have drawn parallels with the similar
revisions of the Islamic Group (IG),issued in 2001, as well
as its disavowal of violence in 1997. Concluding that the IG
revisions had "zero impact," some commentators expect the
same from the EIJ revisions. One noted, "Al Qaida managed to
develop an extremely radical, ideological, doctrinal, and
organizational framework for itself only a short period after
the IG announced it's initiative to put an end to violence.
Accordingly, is it conceivable that anyone today would find
in Dr. Sayid Imam Sharif and his document anything that could
turn around their world view?" Khalil Anani, another Al
Ahram Center analyst, mirrored his discussions with us in a
recent newspaper article: "Even if Al Qaida leaders Osama Bin
Laden or Ayman Al Zawahiri attempted to revise their
ideology, not much would change. On the contrary, new Al
Qaeda leaders would emerge, adopting the same vision and
message of their godfathers. They would always find evidence
to support their righteousness claiming that those who
recanted either strayed from the right path or were coerced.
It would be extremely naive to expect such revisions to have
a substantial effect on Al Qaida cells and their followers
with whom they merely maintain a spiritual relationship. The
ideological and spiritual relationship between Sharif and the
post-9/11 Afghanistan and Iraq jihadi generation seems very
weak. This is not only due to the lack of direct interaction
between the two, but also because the old shaykhs have been
supplanted with new ones who have monopolized the theories
influencing new Al Qaida members."


13. (SBU) The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB),which
renounced violence decades ago, has welcomed the revisions,
but not the jihadis themselves. Senior MB member Essam El
Erian has been quoted in the local media as hailing the
revisions, as "they help in halting extremism and putting
aside the violence that has distorted the image of Islamic

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action." However, when asked if the EIJ leaders could join
the MB, now that they have abandoned violence, El Erian noted
that, "the MB does not want among its ranks figures who
exercised violence before. Also, such figures are not ready
to embrace the MB approach in full."

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VIEWS OF OTHER EXTREMISTS
--------------


14. (U) In a sign that Al Qaeda has taken note of the
revisions, Zawahiri referenced the EIJ changes (which had
been previewed in the pan-Arab and Egyptian press) in a video
released by As-Sahab Productions to jihadist web sites on
July 4, 2007. Zawahiri said, "I read a ridiculous bit of
humor in Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper, which claimed that it
received a communiqu from one of the backtrackers, who faxed
it from prison. I laughed inside and asked myself, do the
prison cells of Egypt now have fax machines? And I wonder,
are these fax machines connected to the same wire as the
electric shock machines, or do they have a separate line?
.... (This is) the blackmailing of the tortured and mutilated
captives ... who have been stripped of their thoughts and
beliefs, and had their convictions removed for them to
declare their remorse, regret, and retractions .... I caution
my Muslim brothers everywhere against the statements and
retractions of the graduates and guests of the prisons, on
the peninsula and in Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, Indonesia and all
the lands of Islam. They are either those who have been
coerced and before whose eyes the memories of the torture,
lashing, suspension and shocks play like a film, or are those
who are disheartened and fallen and looking for a way out of
prison and a little comfort. Neither type is to be listened
to or relied upon in his statements and opinions .... Thus, I
tell these enemies: This is not a noble fight, to be alone
with an isolated prisoner and to squeeze him physically and
psychologically until he agrees with you, and for you then to
applaud that. If you are real men, then compete with us by
yourselves, in the arenas of ideology, invitation, and
information, which are the arenas in which you yourselves
have admitted your defeat."


15. (U) In a December 2 article, pan-Arab newspaper Asharq
Al-Awsat reported that the "Shura Council for the Egyptian
Jihad Group Outside of Egypt" issued a November 30 statement
warning "the youth of the nation" against listening to the
revisions of "old jail birds," noting that the revisions
"pained and saddened us ... Even though we expected something
similar, because we already knew the psychology of the
Shaykh, it never occurred to us that one day he would turn
into a tool to destroy and discourage mujahedeen in this
manner."

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COMMENT
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16. (C) The EIJ revisions, and the government's approach of
releasing former jihadis en masse, is a telling indication of
the focus of the GOE's concerns when dealing with Islamist
groups. There is a certain dichotomy in the regime's
approach of finding a modus vivendi with former EIJ
terrorists, who were released from prison by signing on to
what is still a fairly extreme document, and the simultaneous
policy of mass arrests of Muslim Brotherhood members, who
espouse an ideology notably less radical than the revised EIJ
doctrine. Reportedly, all of the EIJ detainees, as one of
the conditions of their release from prison, had to pledge to
not participate in Egyptian politics. It appears that the
GOE's focus currently is the political threat posed by these
Islamist groups, along with the threat of violence against
the government.
RICCIARDONE