Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07CAIRO3292
2007-11-20 11:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Cairo
Cable title:  

SUDAN: CAIRO-BASED OPPOSITION LEADERS MAHDI,

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM EG SU 
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VZCZCXRO1014
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #3292/01 3241147
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201147Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7484
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 003292 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

AF FOR SPG; SE NATSIOS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM EG SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN: CAIRO-BASED OPPOSITION LEADERS MAHDI,
MIRGHANI REQUEST NEW APPROACH

REF: A. CAIRO 2560

B. KHARTOUM 1164

C. CAIRO 2109

D. CAIRO 1443

Classified by Minister Counselor for Economic and Political
Affairs William R. Stewart for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 003292 SIPDIS SIPDIS AF FOR SPG; SE NATSIOS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM EG SU SUBJECT: SUDAN: CAIRO-BASED OPPOSITION LEADERS MAHDI, MIRGHANI REQUEST NEW APPROACH REF: A. CAIRO 2560 ¶B. KHARTOUM 1164 ¶C. CAIRO 2109 ¶D. CAIRO 1443 Classified by Minister Counselor for Economic and Political Affairs William R. Stewart for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In separate Cairo meetings with Sudanese opposition figures Mohamed Osman Al Mirghani and Sadiq Al Mahdi, both emphasized that current USG efforts on Sudanese unity are overly-focused on the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM),leaving out opposition groups such as Al Mirghani's Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Al Mahdi's Umma Party. Their analyses of Sudan's problems are based on long personal histories in that country, but also seemed angled to propel themselves, and their movements, back to political relevancy. End summary. Mirghani -------------- ¶2. (C) On November 19, we met with Cairo-based exiled Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) chief, National Democratic Alliance (NDA) head, and spiritual leader of the Khatimyn Sufi Order, Mohamed Osman Al Mirghani. Al Mirghani thanked us for the "constructive" U.S. role in Sudan, but said that the situation has devolved into "totalitarian regimes" in both the north and south, as represented by the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). The DUP represents a democratic and popular alternative, he said, highlighting what he considers to be long-standing DUP acceptance and inclusion of Christians. He also claimed that the DUP consistently received the most votes in Sudanese elections. We emphasized that the U.S. is working to support the Sudanese people as they strive to maintain a unified Sudan based on democratic principles. ¶3. (C) Al Mirghani complained that, while he had met with former Secretary of State Powell in November 2004, President Bush has only been willing to meet Sudanese who are "black and Christian." Mirghani contended that President Bush should consult equally with all Sudanese leaders, be they Arab or African, Christian or Muslim. ¶4. (SBU) On Darfur, Al Mirghani claimed strong ties to "all the parties" and that he consistently meets with them to push for unity. He discussed again the DUP strategy on Darfur, focusing on wealth- and power-sharing principles with the DPA as a starting-point (ref D). Mahdi -------------- ¶5. (C) In a separate late October meeting, Sadiq Al Mahdi, head of the Sudanese opposition National Umma Party, Imam of the Ansar, and former prime minister of Sudan, outlined his vision for a new, "comprehensive" approach towards peace in Sudan. Reiterating statements often made to USG officials (refs B and C),Al Mahdi explained that the three peace agreements for the south, Darfur, and east are all "fragile" because they dealt only with bilateral issues between the local rebelling party and the ruling NCP, to the exclusion of other regions of Sudan and the opposition parties. Now, with continued strife in Darfur and the SPLM withdrawal from the government, "we are facing that fragility." All three agreements are bound to fail unless a comprehensive approach is taken across Sudan as a whole, he continued, but warned that the NCP gains from the current approach because they can better protect their position of power. ¶6. (C) Al Mahdi advocated a charter, in which all Sudanese groups except the NCP would participate in formulating; they would then present such a charter to the NCP. If the NCP agrees, great; if not, "there will be a popular uprising to force them out." Although the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) has the right "building blocks," he said that some points must be clarified and contradictions ironed-out, protocols on religious relations, culture, accountability, and foreign policy must be added, and the phrase "the two parties" (read: the NCP and SPLM) must be changed to read "all parties." He asked for USG and international support on this idea. ¶7. (C) Al Mahdi acknowledged that his vision departs significantly from current U.S. policy of supporting the CPA and the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),but argued that current U.S. policy is not based on a "proper diagnosis" of the problem. Nevertheless, Al Mahdi praised strong USG support CAIRO 00003292 002 OF 002 for Sudan over recent years, and the efforts of Special Envoy Natsios and Khartoum Charge Fernandez in particular. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Both Al Mirghani and Al Mahdi have analyses of Sudan's problems based on long, personal histories and deep knowledge of the country. However, both seemed to be angling for any support they can muster to propel them back into relevancy in a political environment that seems to have shut them out. RICCIARDONE

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