EGYPT: COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT ON THE RELEASE OF

UNCLAS CAIRO 003255 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/ELA(IRWIN) AND PM(ARCHETTO) E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL MASS MARR EG SUBJECT: EGYPT: COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT ON THE RELEASE OF AN/PVS-7B NIGHT VISION GOGGLES (NVG) REF: A. EGYPTIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LETTER OF REQUEST 04/LP/022 03 MAR 06 ¶B. DRAFT PRICE AND AVAILABILITY DATA (P&A) FOR FOREIGN MILITARY SALES (FMS) CASE (EG-P-BCW) ¶C. EGYPTIAN NAVY ARMAMENT DEPARTMENT LETTER F-07-350 10 SEP 07 Sensitive but unclassified. Please protect accordingly. ¶1. (SBU) Description: In Ref A, the GOE requested price and availability data for sixty-six (66) replacements for Night Ranger Viewers and associated spare parts to support two (2) ex-Knox Class Frigates and four (4) ex-Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigates. The Night Ranger Viewers were originally transferred to the GOE during the transfer of ex-Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigates. These Night Ranger Viewers are now obsolete and the AN/PVS-7B (NVG) has been identified by the program manager as the appropriate replacement (Ref B). These NVGs and spare parts are intended to help modernize Egyptian Naval Forces and aid in counter-terrorism activities. Comment: Ref B has not been finalized and will not be presented to the GOE until the release authorization for these NVGs has been approved. ¶2. (SBU) Reason the purchaser desires NVGs: The Egyptian Navy (EN) requires the upgraded NVGs to operate effectively at night. The NVGs would improve the EN's capability to operate with U.S. Forces in a coalition environment. The AN/PVS-7B is also more easily sustainable through the U.S. supply system. ¶3. (SBU) How the NVGs would affect Egypt's force structure: These NVGs will replace older Night Ranger Viewers already present in Egypt. There will be no increase in force structure, however there will be an increase in EN capability to operate effectively at night. ¶4. (SBU) How the NVGs would contribute to both U.S. and Egyptian defense/security goals: NVG sales are consistent with DOD's Security Cooperation Guidance as it enhances the territorial security of regional states. It also supports three of CENTCOM's Security Cooperation objectives for Egypt: (1) enabling allies and partners, and (2) protecting U.S. and partner interest. This NVG purchase would also support two of CENTCOM's Security Cooperation Desired Effects (SCDE) for Egypt: -- SCDE 3.2 "Support the defense modernization and �00A;transformation of allies or partners to reduce their vulnerability external aggression and coercion" -- SCDE 4.2 "Improve their capability to operate independently or in coalition with U.S. Forces" ¶5. (SBU) Justification for the type and quantity of NVDs requested: 66x AN/PVS-7B are consistent with the quantity of NVDs required within the U.S. Navy to operate two (2) ex-Knox Class Frigates and four (4) ex-Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigates. This quantity would allow the EN to equip each operational ship with minimum night vision capability for a fully manned pilothouse navigation team and to provide sufficient spares. ¶6. (SBU) Combatant Commander's concurrence to the introduction of a new war fighting capability to the nation or region: Combatant Commander's concurrence will be provided separately. ¶7. (SBU) Anticipated reactions of the neighboring nations: Release of NVGs should not impact the regional balance of power or cause negative reactions from any of Egypt's neighbors. This sale does not introduce new technology to Egypt or the region and will not impact Israel's qualitative military edge. ¶8. (SBU) Assessment of the nation's ability to account for, safeguard, operate, maintain, and support the articles: The Egyptians have demonstrated the intent and ability to protect sensitive, classified military technology over an extended period. Egypt signed a General Security of Information Agreement with the U.S. and, as a customer, has purchased and protected the sensitive technology of other U.S. weapons systems. Egypt has procured night vision technology in the past to include AN/PVS-7Bs and has met all previous security and monitoring requirements. ¶9. (SBU) Training required either in-country or in the U.S. and anticipated reactions resulting from the presence of U.S. trainers in-country: No additional training would be required for the sale of these NVGs. There is no additional presence that would be required beyond normal U.S. interaction with the EN personnel. ¶10. (SBU) Source of financing and the economic impact of the proposed acquisition: Egypt plans to procure NVDs utilizing Foreign Military Financing and has already allocated sufficient funds within their FY07/08 funding priority listing to finance a potential NVG purchase. ¶11. (SBU) Human rights considerations relevant to the proposed acquisition: None. ¶12. (SBU) Plan for end-use monitoring and plan for compliance verification: The Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) Egypt has a robust Golden Sentry Program. The Golden Sentry point of contact, working in close coordination with the security assistance program officer, will review and maintain copies of the purchaser's physical security and accountability control plan, maintain a serial number list of all NVGs and intensifier tubes that may be offered or transferred, and stands ready to assist with or conduct inventories and inspections as required. The Egyptian military currently has over 2500 Night Vision Devices of various configurations in-country and has maintained accountability and security of those devices without unauthorized loss, theft, or access to date. ¶13. (SBU) Operational Plan and specific end-users: The operational plan for the NVGs states that the devices will be issued to those ships conducting Surface Ship Warfare operations two (2) ex-Knox Class Frigates and four (4) ex-Oliver Hazard Perry Class Frigates. The EN will increase its interoperability with U.S. Forces as demonstrated by combined training exercises Bright Star and Eagle Salute. The extent of anti-terrorism missions may include countering intrusions of terrorists through the territorial waters of Egypt to include the Suez Canal. The GOE has indicated a willingness to meet U.S. guidelines for accountability and security of NVGs, and the Office of Military Cooperation will conduct End Use Monitoring (EUM) of the devices if the transfer is approved. ¶14. (SBU) Recommendation whether the USG should approve the transfer of NVGs: The country team recommends USG approval for transfer of the NVGs. This is a coordinated mission position. RICCIARDONE