EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ABOU GHEIT ON IRAQ

S E C R E T CAIRO 003209 SIPDIS SIPDIS NEA FORFO E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2017 TAGS: PREL IZ LE SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ABOU GHEIT ON IRAQ Classified By Ambassador FrancisJ. Ricciardone for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 1.(C) Summary: Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker met ith Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit n Cairo October ¶26. Aboul Gheit claimed that hehad told Hizballah representatives in Beirut Octber 25 that they are "agents of Iran." Ambassado Crocker reviewed progress in Iraq. He stronglyurged Egypt to increase activity in Iraq, especialy as a counter-weight to Iran. Aboul Gheit agred that Iranian influence in Iraq is worrisome, bt was unclear as to any Egyptian strategy to dete it. He said Egypt was weighing the return of a ambassador to Baghdad, and asked several questins in connection with this possibility. He claime that under appropriate circumstances, he would e willing to visit Iraq himself. Aboul Gheit woried that the formulation of the Secretary,s recet testimony to Congress on Iraq (that the U.S. i "here to stay" in the region) could be misinterreted as aggressive, rather than reassuring. End summary. ¶2. (C) Egyptian FM Aboul Gheit, joinin the conclusion of a meeting between Ambassador rocker and Arab League Secretary General Amre Mossa (septel),reported that he had spoken by phoe with Secretary Rice on his return from Beirut th previous evening. He reported that he had held leven meetings in Beirut, including with Hizballh representatives, whom he claimed to have critiized directly as "agents of Iran" acting against Arab interests. ¶3. (C) Ambassador Crocker gave examples of progress in Iraq. Anbar had turned 180 degrees in a short time, as local residents decided they were fed up with Al Qaeda insurgents and had taken control of the situation. The level of fear was decreasing in Baghdad and elsewhere, and Sunni-Shia reconciliation was progressing, albeit slowly. Iraqi forces were increasing in their effectiveness. ¶4. (C) More active Arab engagement, especially from Egypt, would help maintain momentum resulting from the surge in U.S. troop levels. Specifically, the return of the Egyptian ambassador would have an enormous impact. Ambassador Crocker said he understood that the Arab League was going to return a high-level envoy, and that Saudi Arabia was going to reopen its embassy (septel). Aboul Gheit said he did not believe the Saudis would follow through. He said Egypt was weighing the decision seriously, but security concerns still were paramount. He referred to a recent attack on the Polish ambassador, as well as the attack on attack on the American diplomatic convoy that triggered the Blackwater controversy, as indicators that security of diplomats was still a major concern. ¶5. (S) Continuing to think about the idea, Aboul Gheit said it would be politically difficult for the Egyptian ambassador to be under U.S. protection; he wondered whether the Iraqis had the capability to do it, and asked about Iraqi force levels and capabilities in the Green Zone. He noted that Egypt currently owns property suitable for a diplomatic mission, but that it was outside of the Green Zone. Ambassador Crocker said that if Egypt was serious about returning its ambassador, the Iraqis would be ecstatic and would do whatever is necessary to make it happen. Pointing to the impact of Amre Moussa's early 2006 visit on Iraqi opinion, he asked Aboul Gheit if he would consider visiting Baghdad; Aboul Gheit was caught off guard, and claimed he was personally ready to visit, under appropriate circumstances -- this was not a matter of security, for he was unafraid -- but would require careful planning. ¶6. (S) Both agreed that the big player (besides the U.S.) is Iran. Despite clear concerns, Aboul Gheit struggled to articulate an Egyptian or Arab strategy to counter Iranian influence. Ambassador Crocker said that Iranian influence has limits, and its overreaching is provoking a Shia backlash. Now is the time to signal to the Iraqi people that they have the support of the Arab world. Iraqi Shia are Arabs, and they cannot be abandoned to Iran. Ambassador Crocker suggested building on the recent, successful visit of Vice President al-Mahdi by inviting other Iraqi Shia leaders. Aboul Gheit digressed, and said that Egypt will not invite Iraqi religious figures (to hold political talks) "because it is against our philosophy." "Al-Sadr and Sistani -- these are people we detest. Whoever visits should not wear turbans because "it is enough already what they are doing to this country." Ambassador Crocker said that the point is to engage in a way that strengthens the Iraqi government, encourages reconciliation, and counter-balances Iranian influence. ¶7. (C) Aboul Gheit commented on the Secretary,s recent testimony to Congress. He said that American presence is vital, necessary, and supported by Egypt. But formulations, such as "we are here to stay" often translate into Arabic as overly-aggressive, rather than reassuring, and can be seized on by opponents in the region. ¶8. (U) Ambassador Crocker cleared this message. RICCIARDONE