Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07CAIRO3080
2007-10-18 14:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Cairo
Cable title:
GAMAL MUBARAK: CONCENTRATING ON RULING PARTY AS
VZCZCXRO3129 RR RUEHROV DE RUEHEG #3080/01 2911441 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 181441Z OCT 07 FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7240 INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 003080
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR SINGH AND WATERS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2027
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EG
SUBJECT: GAMAL MUBARAK: CONCENTRATING ON RULING PARTY AS
HIS VEHICLE TO THE PRESIDENCY
REF: A. 2006 CAIRO 2010
B. CAIRO 1417
C. CAIRO 2577
Classified By: Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 003080
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR SINGH AND WATERS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2027
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EG
SUBJECT: GAMAL MUBARAK: CONCENTRATING ON RULING PARTY AS
HIS VEHICLE TO THE PRESIDENCY
REF: A. 2006 CAIRO 2010
B. CAIRO 1417
C. CAIRO 2577
Classified By: Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Over the past several months, presidential
son and National Democratic Party (NDP) assistant secretary
general Gamal Mubarak has focused his energies on
re-vitalizing the party. With no military background to draw
on as his power base (the army being the traditional source
of Egypt's presidents),Gamal appears to be increasingly
turning to the NDP machinery, and away from his reform
platform, as the legitimizing vehicle for his presidential
aspirations. End summary.
--------------
"PRESIDENT GAMAL" SEEMS INEVITABLE TO MANY
--------------
2. (C) Despite Gamal Mubarak's continued public insistence
that he is not interested in following in his father's
footsteps to the Egyptian presidency, there is an increased
grudging acceptance about the "inevitability" of his
succeeding his father, both among Cairo's political
cognoscenti, as well as from the proverbial "man on the
street." Contacts who two years ago were telling us Gamal is
"not the right guy" are now opining, "he is not the right
guy, but there is nothing we can do about it." Many among
Egypt's business elite seem to have concluded that not only
is Gamal's ascension an unstoppable force, but that it would
serve their business and political interests. In their
analysis, Gamal would likely maintain the status quo
favorable to them. While others across the spectrum of the
political opposition find the notion of Gamal's succession
objectionable, they are becoming gradually more resigned to
it, "unless the military steps in with a candidate." While
Gamal remains unpopular on the Egyptian "street," the
apparent lack of other contenders make even his critics
increasingly reconciled to the likelihood that he will one
day be Egypt's president.
--------------
GAMAL FOCUSED ON REVITALIZING
RULING PARTY
--------------
3. (C) In the past year, Gamal has focused his attention on
the NDP. Taking a far more active and prominent role than
the other two assistant secretary generals of the party
(Zakaria Azmy, the President's de-facto Chief of Staff, and
old-guard cabinet veteran Mufeed Shehab),Gamal and his
allies recently spearheaded an unprecedented series of
internal elections within the organization. NDP
secretary-general Safwat El Sherif recently told journalists
SIPDIS
that the elections resulted in enormous turnover within NDP
leadership ranks, stating that at the village and district
levels, "almost 50 percent of the leaders are new." "We have
seen the emergence of a new generation of leaders committed
to the NDP's new style of thinking," he added. Many Cairene
observers doubt the legitimacy of the elections. Our
observation of one electoral contest featuring abysmal
turnout raises serious questions. Nevertheless, the
elections are a clear step aimed at re-energizing the party,
and demonstrating, through supposed participation across the
country, its grass-roots legitimacy. The elections were
organized and controlled by Gamal's coterie in the NDP, led
by steel magnate and NDP secretary for organization Ahmed Ezz.
4. (C) Following the announcement this summer that, for the
first time in the NDP's 29-year history, the party's
president will be elected, at the party conference in
November, speculation abounded that President Mubarak would
be replaced as party chief (ref C). However, NDP officials
recently assured us that the NDP's top two leaders will not
be changed - Mubarak will remain as the party's president,
and Safwat El Sherif as secretary-general. Gamal and his
inner circle now appear to be angling for the appointment of
Gamal loyalists in less senior positions throughout the party
apparatus. Through the party elections, Gamal has also
consolidated his position within the NDP, driving out a
significant chunk of the calcified old guard at local levels,
and bringing on board new faces with presumed loyalty to him.
--------------
NDP AS GAMAL'S POWER BASE ...
--------------
CAIRO 00003080 002 OF 002
5. (C) With no military background to draw on as his power
base, Gamal increasingly seems to be turning to the NDP as
the legitimizing vehicle for his presidential aspirations.
This apparent focus on the NDP as the means to create the
pretext of popular support for Gamal contrasts markedly with
his approach in past years of casting himself as a
liberalizing reformer. Egypt's reform agenda now appears to
be solidly on the back burner, and Gamal himself seems to
have backed away from it, leaving technocratic ministers to
spearhead domestically controversial economic reform
initiatives. As for the limited political reforms that have
been undertaken over the past year, such as the 34 amendments
to Egypt's constitution approved in March, they appear to be
designed largely to ensure the continuation of the status
quo, and engineer Gamal's own ascension.
--------------
... BUT CAN THE PARTY MAKE HIM POPULAR?
--------------
6. (C) Gamal's heightened focus on the NDP seems to have had
a largely positive effect on the party as an institution.
Overall, it appears more energized than in recent years. One
opposition MP recently noted to us the NDP's increased
effectiveness at dispensing patronage and extracting loyalty.
He highlighted the NDP's heightened ability to deny business
opportunities to non-party members in his countryside
district. While other contacts still view the NDP as a
"paper tiger," and a" political party in name only," it
appears that, with Gamal's encouragement, the NDP now has at
least the trappings of a "real" political party, with a Cairo
election operation center staffed by hundreds of young party
operatives calling out to their counterparts nationwide,
membership drives, glossy posters spread throughout the
country with the slogan, "The Door is Open," and plans afoot
for an enormous party conference November 3-5. The facade is
thin. But the party is clearly aiming to project more
grassroots appeal and enhance its credibility, which will
reflect on Gamal when the presidential succession ultimately
occurs.
7. (C) Significant numbers of Egyptians see the NDP and the
Mubarak regime as one and the same. They regard the party as
tainted with the abuses, excesses and corruption of the
government. Gamal and his team have learned from the NDP's
failures in the 2005 and 2006 elections, and seem to have
recognized that they need to "re-brand" the party with the
Egyptian people. But it is not clear that they can
successfully do so. Gamal's attempt to achieve populist
appeal via the NDP may thus be fated to founder. Ultimately,
in the event of a presidential election (which Egypt's
constitution calls for should the president die or be
permanently incapacitated),Gamal's actual popularity will
not really matter, given the inevitable government
interference and manipulation of election results, as well as
the limited pool of candidates that would be allowed due to
constitutional restrictions. If Gamal is the NDP's
candidate, and there is no military coup or other
extra-constitutional succession, then he will be president.
But he recognizes that he needs the party for continued
legitimacy.
RICCIARDONE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR SINGH AND WATERS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2027
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EG
SUBJECT: GAMAL MUBARAK: CONCENTRATING ON RULING PARTY AS
HIS VEHICLE TO THE PRESIDENCY
REF: A. 2006 CAIRO 2010
B. CAIRO 1417
C. CAIRO 2577
Classified By: Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone,
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Over the past several months, presidential
son and National Democratic Party (NDP) assistant secretary
general Gamal Mubarak has focused his energies on
re-vitalizing the party. With no military background to draw
on as his power base (the army being the traditional source
of Egypt's presidents),Gamal appears to be increasingly
turning to the NDP machinery, and away from his reform
platform, as the legitimizing vehicle for his presidential
aspirations. End summary.
--------------
"PRESIDENT GAMAL" SEEMS INEVITABLE TO MANY
--------------
2. (C) Despite Gamal Mubarak's continued public insistence
that he is not interested in following in his father's
footsteps to the Egyptian presidency, there is an increased
grudging acceptance about the "inevitability" of his
succeeding his father, both among Cairo's political
cognoscenti, as well as from the proverbial "man on the
street." Contacts who two years ago were telling us Gamal is
"not the right guy" are now opining, "he is not the right
guy, but there is nothing we can do about it." Many among
Egypt's business elite seem to have concluded that not only
is Gamal's ascension an unstoppable force, but that it would
serve their business and political interests. In their
analysis, Gamal would likely maintain the status quo
favorable to them. While others across the spectrum of the
political opposition find the notion of Gamal's succession
objectionable, they are becoming gradually more resigned to
it, "unless the military steps in with a candidate." While
Gamal remains unpopular on the Egyptian "street," the
apparent lack of other contenders make even his critics
increasingly reconciled to the likelihood that he will one
day be Egypt's president.
--------------
GAMAL FOCUSED ON REVITALIZING
RULING PARTY
--------------
3. (C) In the past year, Gamal has focused his attention on
the NDP. Taking a far more active and prominent role than
the other two assistant secretary generals of the party
(Zakaria Azmy, the President's de-facto Chief of Staff, and
old-guard cabinet veteran Mufeed Shehab),Gamal and his
allies recently spearheaded an unprecedented series of
internal elections within the organization. NDP
secretary-general Safwat El Sherif recently told journalists
SIPDIS
that the elections resulted in enormous turnover within NDP
leadership ranks, stating that at the village and district
levels, "almost 50 percent of the leaders are new." "We have
seen the emergence of a new generation of leaders committed
to the NDP's new style of thinking," he added. Many Cairene
observers doubt the legitimacy of the elections. Our
observation of one electoral contest featuring abysmal
turnout raises serious questions. Nevertheless, the
elections are a clear step aimed at re-energizing the party,
and demonstrating, through supposed participation across the
country, its grass-roots legitimacy. The elections were
organized and controlled by Gamal's coterie in the NDP, led
by steel magnate and NDP secretary for organization Ahmed Ezz.
4. (C) Following the announcement this summer that, for the
first time in the NDP's 29-year history, the party's
president will be elected, at the party conference in
November, speculation abounded that President Mubarak would
be replaced as party chief (ref C). However, NDP officials
recently assured us that the NDP's top two leaders will not
be changed - Mubarak will remain as the party's president,
and Safwat El Sherif as secretary-general. Gamal and his
inner circle now appear to be angling for the appointment of
Gamal loyalists in less senior positions throughout the party
apparatus. Through the party elections, Gamal has also
consolidated his position within the NDP, driving out a
significant chunk of the calcified old guard at local levels,
and bringing on board new faces with presumed loyalty to him.
--------------
NDP AS GAMAL'S POWER BASE ...
--------------
CAIRO 00003080 002 OF 002
5. (C) With no military background to draw on as his power
base, Gamal increasingly seems to be turning to the NDP as
the legitimizing vehicle for his presidential aspirations.
This apparent focus on the NDP as the means to create the
pretext of popular support for Gamal contrasts markedly with
his approach in past years of casting himself as a
liberalizing reformer. Egypt's reform agenda now appears to
be solidly on the back burner, and Gamal himself seems to
have backed away from it, leaving technocratic ministers to
spearhead domestically controversial economic reform
initiatives. As for the limited political reforms that have
been undertaken over the past year, such as the 34 amendments
to Egypt's constitution approved in March, they appear to be
designed largely to ensure the continuation of the status
quo, and engineer Gamal's own ascension.
--------------
... BUT CAN THE PARTY MAKE HIM POPULAR?
--------------
6. (C) Gamal's heightened focus on the NDP seems to have had
a largely positive effect on the party as an institution.
Overall, it appears more energized than in recent years. One
opposition MP recently noted to us the NDP's increased
effectiveness at dispensing patronage and extracting loyalty.
He highlighted the NDP's heightened ability to deny business
opportunities to non-party members in his countryside
district. While other contacts still view the NDP as a
"paper tiger," and a" political party in name only," it
appears that, with Gamal's encouragement, the NDP now has at
least the trappings of a "real" political party, with a Cairo
election operation center staffed by hundreds of young party
operatives calling out to their counterparts nationwide,
membership drives, glossy posters spread throughout the
country with the slogan, "The Door is Open," and plans afoot
for an enormous party conference November 3-5. The facade is
thin. But the party is clearly aiming to project more
grassroots appeal and enhance its credibility, which will
reflect on Gamal when the presidential succession ultimately
occurs.
7. (C) Significant numbers of Egyptians see the NDP and the
Mubarak regime as one and the same. They regard the party as
tainted with the abuses, excesses and corruption of the
government. Gamal and his team have learned from the NDP's
failures in the 2005 and 2006 elections, and seem to have
recognized that they need to "re-brand" the party with the
Egyptian people. But it is not clear that they can
successfully do so. Gamal's attempt to achieve populist
appeal via the NDP may thus be fated to founder. Ultimately,
in the event of a presidential election (which Egypt's
constitution calls for should the president die or be
permanently incapacitated),Gamal's actual popularity will
not really matter, given the inevitable government
interference and manipulation of election results, as well as
the limited pool of candidates that would be allowed due to
constitutional restrictions. If Gamal is the NDP's
candidate, and there is no military coup or other
extra-constitutional succession, then he will be president.
But he recognizes that he needs the party for continued
legitimacy.
RICCIARDONE