TRADE MINISTER'S POLITICAL AMBITIONS INFLUENCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 002889 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/RA USAID FOR ANE/MEA MCCLOUD AND DUNN USTR FOR SAUMS COMMERCE FOR 4520/ITA/ANESA/OBERG E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2017 TAGS: ECON EAID ETRD EAGR PINR PREL IS EG SUBJECT: TRADE MINISTER'S POLITICAL AMBITIONS INFLUENCE REFORM DRIVE REF: A. CAIRO 2726 ¶B. CAIRO 2577 ¶C. CAIRO 2111 ¶D. CAIRO 2787 ¶E. CAIRO 1531 ¶F. CAIRO 2200 Classified by Charge d'Affaires Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Minister of Trade and Industry Rachid Rachid, a leader of the cabinet's economic reformers, has been hesitant this year to confront bureaucratic opposition to key reform priorities. At the same time, he has laid out a bold public vision for the future of economic reform in Egypt and challenged powerful tycoons who profit from state subsidies. Rachid's parry-and-thrust reform approach is tuned to public opinion and internal political dynamics, more so than that of his less politically ambitious colleagues on the cabinet. He appears to have sacrificed some initiatives to leave himself enough political capital for future struggles. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) Rachid Mohamed Rachid joined the cabinet in 2004, becoming the first private-sector entrepreneur to hold a cabinet position in Egypt. (He had previously established Fine Foods, now one of Egypt's leading food brands, and formed a joint venture with Unilever, among other business endeavors.) He has been a leading proponent of economic reform and private-sector-led economic development in the government of Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif, which has achieved economic growth, tax cuts, monetary reform, and some privatization while encountering stiff domestic resistance to the hardest reform measures such as continued privatization and business deregulation (ref A). Rachid, an ally of presidential son Gamal Mubarak, has been rumored a leading candidate to succeed Nazif (ref B). Rachid will travel to Washington with the US-Egypt Business Council in November for USG meetings, followed by visits to other cities in the United States to encourage US-Egyptian trade. -------------- Slow-going reform, rejected wheat -------------- ¶3. (C) Early this year Rachid told Ministry staff he had three key priorities for reforming Egyptian trade policy: revise the import-export law to eliminate inefficient procedures, redundant regulations, and other impediments to 
trade; rationalize the inspection regime for products in the domestic and export markets; and streamline food-safety rules and regulations to eliminate duplication and institute "risk-based" analysis. According to a USAID contractor who works in the Ministry, Rachid has made little progress on that agenda. Revisions to the import-export law have bogged down in infighting between various trade officials hesitant to relinquish their overlapping responsibilities. Similarly, Rachid abandoned attempts to revise the inspection regime in the face of entrenched bureaucratic resistance. The reform of food safety regulations is moving forward, but slowly: more than half a year after Rachid declared the issue a priority, a new steering committee is still in the process of establishing a task force to tackle the problem. ¶4. (C) Rachid, who is responsible for importing wheat for Egypt's highly subsidized "baladi" bread, went passive in the face of press reporting on a supposedly bug-infested US wheat shipment in July (ref C). When local newspapers and the Muslim Brotherhood accused Rachid's ministry of buying "cancerous" U.S. wheat, Rachid refused to let the wheat enter Egypt, despite the common industry practice of refumigating and retesting any questionable shipments. Rachid later acknowledged to the Ambassador that the problem was not with the wheat, but with the Ministry of Agriculture's wheat inspectors (ref D). He said that he had privately asked the Minister of Agriculture to look into ongoing problems with the inspectors. -------------- Taking on the "millionaires" -------------- ¶5. (U) In contrast, Rachid has staked out a bold public position in his challenge to powerful industrialists who benefit from state subsidies on gas and electricity. On August 14, he announced plans to increase natural gas and electric prices, phasing out fuel subsidies for heavy industries such as cement, steel and petrochemical companies. The move strikes at the pocketbooks of some National Democratic Party stalwarts such as steel magnate Ahmed Ezz, winning Rachid media praise as an economic populist. One columnist wrote recently that Rachid is "fighting a monopoly of millionaires" in favor of the poor. Some investors also praised the rollback of subsidies as a fiscally prudent policy that clarifies future utility costs. The Ministry's website even highlighted a press account from Nairobi that welcomed the move because it would benefit Egypt's Kenyan competitors in COMESA, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. ¶6. (SBU) Another example of Rachid's leadership was his decision earlier this year to impose an export tax on cement, which was intended to encourage more domestic sales by offsetting the price advantage exporters gained from the utility subsidies. Cement companies have challenged the tax, which has yet to be imposed, according to recent press accounts. He also moved to impose an export tax on rice to recover the government's cost for the water required to grow it. One rice exporter told Foreign Agricultural Service Cairo that the modest fee would do little to discourage exports because the price will still be competitive on the world market. Regardless, Rachid stands to gain from the public perception that he is keeping Egyptian rice at home for Egyptians. ¶7. (U) More generally, Rachid has publicly urged that economic reforms work to the benefit of all Egyptians. Economic reforms that benefit only the wealthy are doomed, he said in a speech to European investors last month. "Many governments have failed to do it, and by failing to do it, have disappeared," he warned the gathering of business elites. He also has not been shy about offering solutions far removed from his trade portfolio such as improving education and infrastructure. "Millions of people in Egypt have not yet seen the reward of our economic reform. It is unfortunate that they are seeing the bad side of it and we cannot ignore that," Rachid said in a speech to the Amcham in May (ref E). Like other reformers, he has been reluctant to put himself in front of the people, however. His public appearances are generally before elite business groups and often in English. -------------- Public opinion as a roadmap -------------- ¶8. (C) Whether charging forward or tacking sideways, Rachid appears particularly sensitive to public opinion. That is in contrast to other economic reformers on the cabinet, according to one Embassy contact and investment analyst. He noted to econoff that Finance Minister Yousef Boutros Ghali and Investment Minister Mahmoud Mohieldin have developed strong international credibility but have not been as attentive to maintaining domestic support. Minister of Social Solidarity Ali El-Moselhy told the Ambassador that he has the support of Rachid and Mohieldin to replace the popular bread subsidy with targeted welfare payments to the most needy (ref F). Rachid supports the change, but he will be happy to let Moselhy take the lead. Dozens of Egyptians died in rioting and clashes with security forces in January 1977 following the last (and much more draconian) reduction in bread subsidies, which the government hastily reinstated. ¶9. (C) Rachid has taken the lead in an ambitious new interministerial regulatory reform effort financed by USAID. The effort, known as the "Guillotine" project, has the potential to significantly improve the business climate in Egypt by eliminating unnecessary and redundant regulations. Rachid may view the project as a way to overcome internal bureaucratic resistance to reform, but he will need to show resolve over the next two years to ensure that the project reaches its full potential. ¶10. (C) Rachid will no doubt maintain his visible role championing the successful Qualified Industrial Zone (QIZ) agreement with the USG and Israel, particularly if he completes an agreement with his Israeli counterpart to reduce the required level of Israeli content in QIZ exports to the United States. Although the engagement with Israel does leave him politically vulnerable with a significant element of Egyptian society, more than 100,000 Egyptians work in QIZ factories, and industrialists would like to expand the program to other areas of Egypt. ¶11. (C) Comment: Rachid remains a natural ally in promoting economic reform in Egypt and strengthening USG-GOE relations. He appears to have maintained the domestic credibility necessary to survive politically -- and perhaps move ahead -- as a friend of the United States in a difficult time in the bilateral relationship. We will continue to make the most of his advice and support on issues ranging from regulatory reform to the QIZ to the Bilateral Investment Treaty, while recognizing the constraints imposed by his dicey political environment. JONES