EGYPT IN TRANSITION: SADAT AND MUBARAK

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 002871 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/ELA; NSC FOR RWATERS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR EG SUBJECT: EGYPT IN TRANSITION: SADAT AND MUBARAK REF: A. CAIRO 2839 ¶B. CAIRO 2825 Classified By: ECPO Minister Counselor William R. Stewart for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Egypt faces uncertainty as it moves towards a post-Mubarak future. It has been almost exactly twenty-six years since Egypt last faced such a transition. Although one could argue that some of the elements that led to the dramatic events of September and October 1981 are back in place -- shortages of basic foodstuffs, external political pressures, and crackdowns on political adversaries -- tensions now are different, and not on the same scale. While we should not place too much weight in analogy, it can nevertheless be instructive to review the events of September and October 1981 to see what useful comparisons can be made. End summary. -------------- Rumors Run Amok -------------- ¶2. (C) This September, as in past late summers, salon talk and front page headlines have focused on that most sensitive of topics: the health of the president and the eventual transfer of power. Talk has been so pervasive, Prime Minister Nazif felt obliged to announce that "there is a system for the smooth transfer of power." Rumors of President Mubarak's deteriorating health -- and even his demise -- have been so insistent, even Suzanne Mubarak felt the need to publicly assert that he is alive and well. ¶3. (C) At least half a dozen editorials have compared the tensions and rumors of this September to September 1981. Although the majority of Egyptians are too young to recall personally those momentous times, the lore of it remains deep in the national consciousness. Even young Egyptians recall hearing of the great "round up" of September 3, 1981 when Sadat seemed to "go crazy" as one commentator recalled, arresting and imprisoning opponents and critics of every stripe. Communists, Nasserists, Muslim Brothers, academics, and liberal-minded journalists found themselves cell-mates that late summer day. Even Coptic Pope Shenouda was placed under house arrest. Although Mubarak has hardly gone so far, some observers have argued that his feuds with Ayman Nour, Anwar Esmat El-Sadat (the late president's nephew),Saad Eddin Ibrahim, independent editors, and other perceived opponents, combined with his sweeping roundup of the Muslim Brotherhood -- arguably his only real political threat -- is reminiscent of 1981, and they fear it could lead to similar consequences. -------------- Mubarak Is No Sadat -------------- ¶4. (C) According to some of Egypt's most astute political observers, this is over-analyzing the situation and drawing very wrong -- and dangerous - comparisons. Mohammed El-Bassiouni, chairman of the Majlis al-Shura's National Security Committee (which also has responsibility for Foreign Affairs and Arab Affairs),believes that the two Septembers have very little in common. El-Bassiouni recently told MinCouns that in 1981, when he was Egypt's military attach in Tel Aviv, President Sadat was under extreme pressure for not providing the "peace dividend" he had promised would be the result of his bold move towards Israel, and his deepening friendship the United States. When prosperity for all did not appear, Sadat felt under enormous pressure. Combined with Egypt's isolation in the Arab world, it seemed that his gamble had failed. In his pride, he lashed out at perceived opponents. -------------- No Comparison? -------------- ¶5. (C) Such a scenario simply does not exist today, El-Bassiouni opined. Egypt's economy is growing, the fruit of President Mubarak's reform program launched in 2004. While relations with Israel are still "problematic," Mubarak has taken Egypt back to its rightful position as leader of the Arab world. The external pressures that helped stoke the tension of September 1981 "simply do not exist today." ¶6. (C) Another alleged similarity between the present and Sadat's September is the shortage of basic commodities. Egyptians have been angered in recent weeks by reports of villages without access to drinking water -- in some cases, for years (ref A). Shortages of subsidized bread have also been in the headlines, as the poorest Egyptians wait in queues for shrinking loaves. At least one observer has made the case that September 2007 is more reminiscent of January 1977 -- when riots erupted throughout Egypt due to price increases for bread and other basic foodstuffs -- than September 1981. But Dr. Galal Amin, economics professor at AUC (as he was in 1981) thinks there is little in common, economically, between the two eras. Egypt under Sadat, he argued, was actually better off in many ways: unemployment, which he sees as the single greatest problem facing Mubarak today, was lower then, and the overall standard of living was higher. The average Egyptian, he said felt that opportunities were greater in 1981, leading to general optimism. Sadat's "infitah" program, opening up Egypt's economy to foreign investment appeared to be working and creating jobs. Tourism was taking off, and the average Egyptian "felt good" about his life and better about his future than Egyptians today, according to Amin. Economic statistics refute Amin's assertions, but there is a perception within a certain statist/elite/academic demographic, represented by Amin, that somehow Sadat's were "the good old days." -------------- Economic Reform Still Masks Underlying Woes -------------- ¶7. (C) Sadat trumpeted economic reform, touting privatization, pointing to a freer market that would benefit all Egyptians. These thoughts have been echoed under Mubarak, especially since the appointment of Prime Minister Nazif and his cabinet of economic reformers in 2004. However, as in 1981, recent economic advances are incomplete. Gigantic government subsidies then, as now, have served to brake greater economic reform. In 1981, 21.5% of the Gross National Income (GNI) went to the wealthiest 5% of the population, while the poorest 20% of the population received a mere 5% of Egypt's income. In 2007, there remains the general sense that Egypt's economic growth is benefiting only a tiny portion of the population. 17% of today's population lives under the poverty line, almost identical to the percentage in 1981, and the poorest 20% of the population received 4.8% of the GNI in 2004/05, while the richest 10% of the population received 30% of GNI. Although statistically the standard of living has not dramatically deteriorated, neither has it improved, leaving Egyptians with the feeling that others have passed them by to a brighter economic future. -------------- The Odd Couple -------------- ¶8. (C) What the two periods unquestionably do have in common are a pair of increasingly isolated dictators, set in their ways and fearful of any kind of dissent. But though alike in certain personal characteristics (particularly paranoia), there are at the same time some very fundamental differences, including age (Sadat was a robust 63 years old when assassinated; Mubarak is a slowing 79) and length in office (barely 11 years for Sadat, closing on 26 years for Mubarak). Importantly, Sadat had a clear successor -- his vice president, Hosni Mubarak. Mubarak, in turn, has scrupulously avoided naming a VP, and although most believe that son Gamal will succeed him, no one can say for certain how that will play out. Another dissimilarity: Minister of Information Enas El-Fiqi, under intense scrutiny and pressure himself for allowing the rumors about Mubarak's health to get out of control, recently told the Ambassador that "there is no comparison" between Sadat and Mubarak because, "Mubarak never loses his temper." (El-Fiqi, though, admitted that the stress of his job was literally driving him to drink.) ¶9. (C) Mubarak relishes his self-image as a benign, paternal leader, tough but fair. Still, he has shown signs of moving toward Sadat's modus operandi in dealing with political opponents. In the past year, Mubarak has arrested upwards of a thousand Muslim Brothers. While some have subsequently been released and only 40 are facing trial before a military tribunal so far, the message is unmistakable: after allowing the MB to participate in the 2005 parliamentary elections as "independents" (in which they won 88 seats, 20% of the Assembly),Mubarak is cracking down. Another similarity is the recent phobia Mubarak has developed towards the press. The Egyptian media, arguably as free as it has ever been (and certainly freer than it was under Sadat),is suddenly facing a cost for that liberty. In early September, four editors of independent newspapers were convicted of insulting the president and other GoE officials, while another editor is facing trial October 1 for allegedly spreading false rumors about Mubarak's health which were damaging to Egypt's reputation and to its economy. These arrests have been widely seen here as blatant attacks on the freedom of the press, much as Sadat's rounding up of journalists was in ¶1981. -------------- Love and Hate For the USA -------------- ¶10. (C) One of the more striking similarities between the two leaders is their uneven relationship with the United States. Sadat's September madness came close on the heels of a profoundly disappointing trip to the United States to meet the new President, Ronald Reagan. By discarding the Soviet Union and reaching out to the United States -- and Israel -- he had taken considerable political risk. He had calculated that the payoff in tangible and intangible terms would more than justify that risk. But as his international stature increased spectacularly as the Arab world's "Man of Peace," his standing at home did not keep pace, as heightened expectations for peace and prosperity were unrealized. Still, in the U.S. he felt he had found a faithful ally, one that would stand by him even when his own people did not. Unfortunately, President Reagan's reception of Sadat in August 1981 was lukewarm, and Sadat came under severe criticism by the U.S. press for not delivering true peace to the Middle East. According to Mohamed Heikal, Sadat's former Minister of Information (who was himself arrested on September 3, 1981),Sadat returned to Egypt a bitter man, feeling betrayed by the Americans. Shortly afterwards came the arrests. -------------- Twin Twilights -------------- ¶11. (C) At the end of the day, and the end of their reigns, Sadat faced and Mubarak faces similar situations. But Mubarak seems to have managed the dilemma better in at least one key area: he has systematically and "legally" eliminated virtually all political opposition, leaving only the MB standing, having foresworn violence and politically emasculated. Mubarak's internal security apparatus, an estimated 1.4 million strong, is at least twice the size it was under Sadat. Its ubiquitous presence and monopoly of the legitimate use of armed power makes any kind of violent change of leader unlikely. -------------- The One Certain Thing -------------- ¶12. (C) The two presidents share another undeniable point in common: their mortality. Mubarak's street credibility, like Sadat's, is very low. The was illustrated by the insistent rumors of Mubarak's illness and death, despite numerous official denials. This lack of faith by the people of Egypt in their political leaders could well come back to haunt Mubarak's successor, whomever he may be. Will it make the transition more difficult? Yes. Will it matter in the end? Probably not, as long as the successor enjoys the support of the elite and the security apparatus, including the military. And even if there is a valid analogy to draw between September 1981 and September 2007, it is at best uneven. The world -- and Egypt -- have fundamentally changed. While President Mubarak clearly faces significant challenges, and has reacted with at least some measure of Sadat's paranoia, we do not foresee September 2007 leading to another October ¶1981. JONES