Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07CAIRO1766
2007-06-11 07:05:00
SECRET
Embassy Cairo
Cable title:  

SCENE SETTER FOR AFRICOM CONSULTATIONS

Tags:  PREL PGOV MOPS KPAL KMFO EAID EG IS IR SU IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0008
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHEG #1766/01 1620705
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 110705Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0544
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5607
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T CAIRO 001766 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

RABAT (MCCARY, SOLOMON) PLEASE PASS TO AFRICOM DELEGATION

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS KPAL KMFO EAID EG IS IR SU IZ
SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR AFRICOM CONSULTATIONS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stuart Jones
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

Introduction
-------------

S E C R E T CAIRO 001766

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

RABAT (MCCARY, SOLOMON) PLEASE PASS TO AFRICOM DELEGATION

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS KPAL KMFO EAID EG IS IR SU IZ
SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR AFRICOM CONSULTATIONS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Stuart Jones
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

Introduction
--------------


1. (S) Mr. Henry, we warmly welcome you and your delegation
to Cairo for AFRICOM consultations with Ministry of Defense
(MoD) officials. A series of difficult, but unrelated issues
have brought the mil-to-mil relationship to a sensitive
juncture, and your primary interlocutor, Assistant Minister
of Defense for Policy MG Mohamed Al Assar, questions overtly
the US commitment to the strategic relationship. Because of
these tensions, your visit provides a particularly important
opportunity for positive engagement on an issue of mutual
concern. MoD officials expressed concern that the US did not
ask them if Egypt would prefer to be part of CENTCOM or
AFRICOM, but they are happy that you have asked to consult
with them now. End introduction.

Mil-to-Mil Issues
--------------


2. (C) AFRICOM: On AFRICOM, the Egyptians will complain
that we did not consult. In general, the Egyptian military
sees AFRICOM as a setback for Egyptian influence in the
region. They fashion themselves as the pre-eminent military
in Africa. We believe that Al Assar will offer cooperation
with AFRICOM that bolsters Egypt's regional influence. We
should hear him out and press for specifics. Frankly, this
may not be a long discussion, and you may also have an
opportunity to address other pressing issues in the
relationship.


3. (C) FMF: The mil-to-mil relationship, and the US
commitment to provide Egypt with USD 1.3 billion in annual
Foreign Military Financing (FMF),have been the pillars of
the broader bilateral relationship since the Camp David Peace
Accords. President Mubarak personally views the FMF as a
symbol of the strength of the US-Egyptian partnership. GOE
officials consider the FMF "Egypt's money," given

unconditionally to be spent as Egypt sees fit. Because of
this perspective, MoD officials were furious with the June 5
House Sub-Committee mark-up of the FY2008 Foreign Operations
bill. The mark-up proposes to make USD 200 million in FMF
conditional on Secretary Rice's certification that Egypt has
taken steps to implement legislation to protect the
independence of the judiciary, as well as steps to curb
police abuses and to counter smuggling along the border with
Gaza. Conditioning the assistance, GOE officials have said,
will represent a down-grade in the relationship. Some GOE
officials also believe that some Administration officials
support conditioning the aid. MG Al Assar will most certainly
raise this issue with you. You should reassure him that the
US is committed to maintaining a strong relationship with
Egypt, but stress the need to demonstrate to Congress the
myriad ways in which FMF supports US regional objectives.


4. (C) BRIGHT STAR 2007: ADM Fallon recently advised
Minister of Defense Field Marshal Tantawi that our troop
commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan compelled him to reduce
US participation in BRIGHT STAR 2007 to a command post
exercise, a senior leaders' seminar, a paratrooper jump, and
a small naval exercise. MoD officials have accepted this
explanation, but are worried about the future of BRIGHT STAR.
We have also shared with MoD officials that US BRIGHT STAR
planners were frustrated with the MoD's reluctance to ensure
that exercise costs were not extortionate and that the
exercise had some training value. We believe that ADM
Fallon's decision to scale back participation this year may
increase GOE cooperation in planning future exercises. But
MG Al Assar may invoke the downgrade of BRIGHT STAR as an
example that the US does not value the bilateral security
relationship as much as in the past.


5. (C) MFO: Secretary Gates advised Field Marshal Tantawi
in April that the US is moving forward with plans to reduce
our MFO troop commitment to approximately 200. At Tantawi's
request, Secretary Gates agreed to review the proposal. GOE
officials are concerned that other nations will reduce their
commitment to the MFO if the US reduces its presence. MG Al
Assar will likely seek your reassurance that the US has not
made a final decision on the reduction. Again, the Egyptians
see the MFO reduction as one of a basket of issues in which
the US seems to be moving away from Egypt.

Regional Issues
--------------


6. (C) Egypt's regional influence has waned in recent years,
but President Mubarak remains our staunch ally on the issues
we care about most. On Israel-Palestine, Egypt is a key
mediator, works to strengthen Abu Mazen and Fatah in
anticipation of Palestinian elections in the coming year, and
will host the next International Quartet meetings in Cairo on
June 26-27. Egypt's 750 border guard forces, deployed since
September 2005 on the Gaza border, have increased the
interdiction of terror-related smuggling attempts through
that border. We believe the GOE could do more to combat
smuggling. On Iraq, President Mubarak has supported PM Nur
al Maliki, despite his personal doubts about Maliki's ability
to serve as a national leader, and has called for the US not
to withdraw troops precipitously. Deeply suspicious of
Iran's growing regional influence, Egypt has rebuffed
Tehran's recent requests to normalize relations. On Sudan,
Egypt disagrees with US support for sanctions and presses us
to focus instead on bringing Darfur rebels into the Darfur
Peace Agreement, but has nonetheless offered significant
military support (transport, signals, infantry, command,
medical) for the UN/AU Heavy Support Package. The UN is
still considering Egypt's offer.

Domestic
--------------


7. (C) Elections for the Shura Council (the "advisory"
house of Parliament) will occur on June 11. Candidates will
compete for 88 seats in the 264-member Council, and President
Hosni Mubarak will appoint another 44 members. The banned
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) plans to compete for 19 seats, but
GOE detentions of large numbers of campaign organizers in
recent weeks has disrupted the group's campaign efforts. We
expect that voter turn out will be modest and that the ruling
National Democratic Party (NDP) candidates will win the
majority of contested seats. MoD officials will not raise
domestic politics with you, and we suggest you not raise it
with them.
JONES