EGYPT COUNSELS DIALOGUE ON DARFUR, NOT SANCTIONS;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 001189 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2017 TAGS: PREL UNSC KPKO EG SU SUBJECT: EGYPT COUNSELS DIALOGUE ON DARFUR, NOT SANCTIONS; WILLING TO OFFER TROOPS REF: A. SECSTATE 51828 ¶B. SECSTATE 52648 Classified by Minister Counselor for Economic and Political Affairs William R. Stewart for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: During an April 22 meeting to deliver ref demarches, MFA Assistant Minister for African Affairs Maasoum Marzouk said Egypt would commit "large numbers" of troops for the UN Darfur peacekeeping operation (DPKO) once an effective political solution is reached between the government and Darfur rebels. Marzouk, echoing his minister's public criticism of U.S. sanctions threats, believed "confidence building" and diplomacy were needed rather than heavy-handed pressure in light of Sudanese President Bashir's acceptance of the heavy support package (HSP). Egyptian Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit and Intelligence Minister Soliman will deliver a message from President Mubarak to Bashir in Khartoum on April 23, encouraging Bashir to show "maximum flexibility" on the hybrid force issue. On GOE support for Darfur, Marzouk said Egypt had offered 100 police officers for the HSP, but that the DPKO had accepted only 10, and those for the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) instead of Darfur. Marzouk said he would check on a DPKO request for 36 APCs from Egypt. Egypt recently proposed to Chad and Sudan UN buffer troops along the border, but was rebuffed by both sides. End summary. -------------- Egypt Offers Troops For Darfur -------------- ¶2. (C) In response to ref A demarche on publicly committing to provide forces for UN operations in Darfur, MFA Assistant Minister for African Affairs Maasoum Marzouk told poloffs on April 22 that Egypt is ready to provide "large numbers" of troops for the Phase III hybrid UN/AU force, but only when an effective peace deal is in place in Darfur. Marzouk was unmoved by arguments that public commitments to provide troops would pressure the GOS to move forward on the UN/AU hybrid force in Darfur, and suggested first pressuring non-signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) to come to a political solution. -------------- -------------- "Bad Timing" For New Sanctions, Need "Confidence Building" -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Marzouk strongly objected to ref B USG threats of sanctions and a new UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) on Sudan, arguing that this would torpedo efforts to get GOS acquiescence on the hybrid force. It is "bad timing" given recent Sudanese "cooperation," he said, continuing that "the idea that pressure will make the Sudanese more flexible is not accurate." Instead, said Marzouk, now is the time for "confidence building" and "strengthening contacts," which was also the crux of Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit's April 19 note verbale to UNSC P5 states. The "good work" of diplomacy is working, he said, and we know China will not support another resolution on sanctions," so "why raise the stakes now?" ¶4. (C) When pressed for examples of cooperation in light of the GOS pattern of obstruction, Marzouk cited deployment of the light support package (LSP),Bashir's April 16 letter renewing his acceptance of the HSP, including agreement on helicopters for the HSP. Marzouk emphasized the helicopter acceptance, saying it was a particularly sensitive sovereignty issue for Bashir. Marzouk questioned USG policy, particularly after senior USG officials had indicated that things were moving in the right direction in Darfur as the result of patient, coordinated diplomacy. -------------- Aboul Gheit and Soliman in Khartoum -------------- ¶5. (C) Marzouk said that FM Aboul Gheit and Egyptian General Intelligence Service (EGIS) Chief Omar Soliman were to meet Bashir in Khartoum on April 23 to deliver a message from President Mubarak, attempting to convince Bashir to "show maximum flexibility" on the HSP and hybrid force. Pressed on the meaning of this, Marzouk said that the two would press for acceptance of all conditions agreed upon in Addas Ababa November 16, 2006, particularly that the hybrid force must come under UN command and control systems. An April 22 MFA press release stated that the trip is to "encourage the Sudanese government to proceed with implementing the suggested UN support packages to the African peacekeeping mission," but it also warned "against the danger of threatening to impose sanctions on Sudan at the time when the CAIRO 00001189 002 OF 002 Sudanese government has shown readiness to respond to the demands of the international community." -------------- Delay On Egyptian Contribution to the DPKO -------------- ¶6. (C) Marzouk asked for USG assistance to clear up a delay on an Egyptian offer to send more police officers to Darfur for the HSP. Egypt had offered 100 officers, said Marzouk, but the DPKO accepted only 10 and wanted to send those officers to UNMIS in South Sudan instead of Darfur. (Note: Egypt currently has 50 monitors and 35 police trainers deployed in Darfur. End note.) Marzouk did not have any information about a DPKO (and USG supported) request for Egypt to supply 36 APCs for the Darfur mission, but said he would check with the Ministry of Defense. -------------- Egyptian Attempts to Calm Chad/Sudan Border -------------- ¶7. (C) Asked about the possibility of an Egyptian troop contribution to a UN peacekeeping force on Sudan's borders with Chad and the CAR, Marzouk said that Aboul Gheit sent a letter to the foreign ministers of Chad and Sudan after the recent clash on the Chadian border, suggesting that UN troops should deploy to establish a buffer zone between the two countries. Both Chad and Sudan rebuffed this suggestion, he said. Egypt has also been actively engaging with Sudan to lobby against any counter-attack on Chad, said Marzouk. JONES