G7 AMBASSADORS ON MIAMI ARRESTS:

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 002361 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2027 TAGS: PREL SNAR CJAN KJUS ASEC KPAO VE AR SUBJECT: G7 AMBASSADORS ON MIAMI ARRESTS: TAKE THE HIGH ROAD REF: A. BUENOS AIRES 2359 ¶B. BUENOS AIRES 2346 ¶C. BUENOS AIRES 2345 ¶D. BUENOS AIRES 2336 Classified By: AMBASSADOR E. ANTHONY WAYNE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary. Ambassador briefed the Ambassadors and Charges of Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom on the December 11 arrest of three Venezuelans and one Uruguayan in Miami on charges of operating as unregistered foreign agents. Ambassador Wayne said the GOA's reaction indicates a lack of understanding of how U.S. institutions work. The other diplomats recommended that the USG educate the Argentine public by explaining next steps in the U.S. judicial system and offering concrete examples that demonstrate judicial independence and impartiality. The diplomats opined that the GOA's outrage over the issue is typical of the House of Kirchner and demonstrates that President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (CFK) does not represent a real change from the policies of her husband, ex-President Nestor Kirchner. The UK and Spain suggested that Kircher's polling data indicated the anti-U.S. line was popular. They worried that CFK's response will tie her closer to Venezuela's Hugo Chavez and ultimately work against Argentina's long-term interests of resolving outstanding problems such as Paris Club debt and attracting foreign investment. All of the diplomats agreed that the United States should continue to take the high road, seeking opportunities to clarify the issue as a matter of fact. End Summary. -------------- Setting the Record Straight -------------- ¶2. (C) On December 18, Ambassador Wayne met with several other resident ambassadors to brief them on the December 11 arrest of three Venezuelans and one Uruguayan in Miami on charges of operating as unregistered foreign agents. In attendance were Australian Ambassador Peter Hussin, British Ambassador John Hughes, Canadian Ambassador Timothy Martin, Dutch Ambassador Henk Soeters, German Ambassador Rolf Schumacher, Italian Ambassador Stefano Ronca, Japanese Charge Masaru Watanabe, and Spanish Charge Rodrigo Aguirre de Carcer. Deputy Chief of Mission, A/LEGATT, and poloff (notetaker) also attended. ¶3. (C) After the Ambassador briefed the group on the arrests, the Spanish Charge asked if the timing of the arrest two days after CFK's inauguration was to avoid embarrassing her on the eve of her inauguration. Ambassador Wayne explained that the arrests occurred because four of the five suspects met on December 11, making the arrest possible. The Dutch Ambassador then asked about the status of Argentina's extradition request. Ambassador Wayne noted that the GOA filed its extradition request on September 4, but had not requested a status update from the USG until the Miami case hit the press. ¶4. (C) LEGATT added that the USG was still reviewing the GOA's request to determine whether there is probable cause that U.S.-Venezuelan dual national Alejandro Antonini Wilson committed an extraditable crime. He indicated that sometimes GOA extradition requests do not meet U.S. legal standards due to differences in our judicial systems. Even though Antonini is a U.S. citizen, he can be extradited to Argentina, but it depends on the circumstances, charges, and whether or not there is an appeal. He noted that the GOA could request that the USG conduct a deposition through our Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, but that the GOA has not made such a request. ¶5. (C) When the Australian Ambassador asked how long the Miami case would take to work through the U.S. judicial system, LEGATT explained that it could take anywhere from 90 days to two years. He stated that the arrests were based on probable cause, and that the case must now go before a federal grand jury to review the evidence and issue an indictment. If the suspects are indicted, the case then is transferred to a district court, where the defendants will enter a plea of guilt or innocence and a judge will decide whether to offer bail to the suspects. Many things can happen in the interim, such as a defense request to have different trials for each of the suspects, evidence suppression hearings, or a motion to dismiss, he stated. The Dutch Ambassador suggested that it might help say the Argentine public if the U.S. Embassy posted on its website an explanation of the case's next steps in the U.S. judicial system. Another Ambassador suggested that the Embassy offer examples of cases where the FBI has investigated, prosecuted, and convicted U.S. officials to demonstrate the impartiality of the U.S. judicial system. -------------- -------------- GOA Reaction Reflects Poor Understanding of US Institutions -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Turning to a discussion of the GOA's reaction to the arrests, Ambassador Wayne suggested that the Casa Rosada's strong reaction likely stems at least in part from its lack of understanding of how U.S. institutions work. He stated that the investigation is not on whether or not $800,000 was smuggled into Argentina for CFK's election campaign. Rather, the investigation is focused on unregistered foreign agents operating on U.S. soil. As of now, it is not known if the defendant quoted is telling the truth, he continued, but the U.S. legal officials in Miami are reporting what he said. Despite the harsh reaction from the Casa Rosada, he pointed out that the GOA has not issued a statement explicitly denying any wrongdoing. In the United States, there have been many cases of reported illegal campaign funding, for example, and many quickly deny any intentions to accept illegal money and send it back, he stated. -------------- We're Not the Only Ones... -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador noted that the GOA reaction may not only bode ill for U.S.-Argentine relations, and asked if others thought that it foretells the default GOA strategy when problems with other countries emerge in the future. The Italian Ambassador agreed and remarked the USG is not the only one the Kirchners have or will rail against. The Italian Embassy, he disclosed, has kept tabs on all of the public attacks the Kirchners have made against the Italian government. "We all have experienced similar attacks made on us", he stated. The British and other Ambassadors subsequently detailed the Kirchners' ferocious and personal attacks launched against the former French Ambassador. (See para 11.) -------------- Same Job, Different K -- or is it? -------------- ¶8. (C) The British Ambassador observed that the GOA reaction is typical of the House of Kirchner, first under former President Nestor Kirchner and now under CFK. He asked rhetorically, where do you draw the line between the two? The Kirchners' political vision is purely short-term, he asserted, reacting only to what is in the headlines. Rightly or wrongly, they have interpreted the arrests in Miami as a U.S. political challenge to their administration. In a regime that reduces everything to domestic political advantage, the Kirchners' instincts tell them to lash out against the United States, and their private polls tell that their popularity has improved as a result, he concluded. He said he understands that the Kirchners' own internal polls suggest that they have risen in popularity since the Kirchners' anti-U.S. attacks. The Spanish Charge agreed with this assessment, adding that CFK's harsh response is no different from her husband's behavior when events do not go his way. This shows that CFK does not represent any change in policy direction, he surmised. He said his information was also that the polls show the anti-American rhetoric as very popular with the Kirchners' electoral base. -------------- -------------- CFK Reaction a "Fiasco" for GOA Long-Term Interests -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) The Italian Ambassador opined that CFK can not continue to attack the United States indefinitely. Ambassador Wayne pointed out that new evidence and other developments in the legal case may well emerge over time, keeping the issue alive. The Spanish Charge indicated that CFK's reaction was "a fiasco", given her intention to improve relations with the United States and the American Jewish Community and distance herself from Chavez. Now, she will align herself even more closely with Chavez, he predicted. Ambassador Wayne lamented this possibility, as the USG honestly thought that under CFK there could be an opening for resolving Paris Club debt, attracting foreign investment, increasing education and technical exchanges, and encouraging Argentina to play a more constructive role the region, including perhaps in Bolivia. ¶10. (C) The British Ambassador then asked whether the Ambassador had received any private GOA signals that CFK's reaction to the arrest was temporary. Ambassador Wayne stated that he had not and that the only reactions he had received thus far had been through the press. He stated that the GOA had turned down his offers to talk and explain the situation, but he reminded the group that he would be seeing Foreign Minister Jorge Taiana later in the day. -------------- Take the High Road -------------- ¶11. (C) All of the other ambassadors agreed that the United States should continue to take the high road, seeking opportunities to clarify the issue in a matter-of-fact manner, without apologies. Neither should the USG add to the fire, by rising to the bait of the Casa Rosada's conspiratorial accusations, they counseled. The UK Ambassador pointed out that at least the Casa Rosada had not made any personal attacks against Ambassador Wayne, unlike their backlash against French Ambassador Francis Lott for publicly saying just prior to mid-term elections in October 2005 that Kirchner's "populist" policies had endangered French investment in Argentina. (He privately contended that the Ambassador and Embassy should be alert for attempted provocations.) WAYNE