PULP MILL DISPUTE: GUARDEDLY HOPEFUL THAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 002223 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EINV SENV UNGA AORC FI UY AR SUBJECT: PULP MILL DISPUTE: GUARDEDLY HOPEFUL THAT ARGENTINE CONCERNS ARE EASING REF: A. MONTEVIDEO 964 ¶B. BUENOS AIRES 1776 ¶C. BUENOS AIRES 1707 Classified By: ECONOMIC OFFICER IAN SHERIDAN, REASONS 1.4 (B and D) ¶1. (C) INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. Concerns over the pulp mill dispute have calmed down in Buenos Aires, despite the sharp words and protests generated last weekend when Uruguayan President Tabare Vazquez gave the order to commence operations November 9 at the pulp mill in Fray Bentos, western Uruguay. The first shipment of cellulose destined to Europe left port on November 15 (ironically transported on an Argentine-flagged vessel). Although Post understands that, on the Uruguayan side, there are concerns about a possible escalation of the conflict, most Argentines (apart from a vocal minority) are tired of the issue and do not anticipate the GOA trying to escalate this dispute. Since the start of the mill operations, we have seen some possibly encouraging signs. Embassy has kept its distance from this issue and believes that the USG is best served by continuing to stay out of this dispute. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- Starkly different views of the dispute between Argentina and Uruguay -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Ref A portrayed a serious Uruguayan preoccupation about the dispute and possible reactions from its giant neighbor, now that the mill has begun operations. Yet, as previously reported, Argentine public opinion continues to be either tired of or indifferent towards the issue. The GOA and public are now more focused on the change of government, and coming summer holidays. There has always been a lot of criticism of the Gualeguaychu activists here, and sympathy for the Uruguayan side. Argentine tourists who vacation in Uruguay, those who have family ties there, and business people near the border continue to suffer from these roadblocks. -------------- -------------- Recent actions: More posturing, tensions, lost opportunity -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) While for some, last week's Ibero-American summit was the last best chance for any resolution, many observers believe there never was any real chance of a resolution, so long as the bridge in Gualeguaychu leading to Uruguay remains blocked (GOU's position) and the protesters' bottom line remained that the mill be moved (always an unrealistic option). And no matter when the mill began - before, during or after the summit - there was going to be some kind of outcry. ¶4. (SBU) Ref A noted that President Vazquez reportedly felt that the Spanish mediators were not honest brokers, and possibly too beholden to their own vast economic interests here. Local press reports also noted that the scheduled GOA-GOU "technical meetings" in Santiago ended in disaster, as the GOA side arrived with no authority to negotiate some kind of compromise. That, coupled with Kirchner's public support of 20-odd Argentine paper mill protesters at the summit, was the last straw. The Kirchners and the GOA sought to put blame for the break-down of Spanish mediation efforts on the Uruguayans' shoulders, but many local commentators blame both sides. Even observers who have sympathized with the GOU felt that Vazquez could have gained sympathy by ordering the commencement of the plant after the summit, not during it. The GOA was also reportedly infuriated with Vazquez's comparing of the Argentine bridge blockages with the United States' "blockade" of Cuba, a charge that this rhetorically left government found intolerable. -------------- -------------- Still, some possibly encouraging signs since the mill has begun -------------- -------------- ¶5. (SBU) GOA environment officials have apparently begun monitoring the River Uruguay down river from the plant -- or at least they're seen to be doing so. A federal judge has also ordered tests, in response to a separate Entre Rios Province complaint. This is important because it is a change in GOA's position - and precisely what the protesters reportedly strongly opposed. It marks a GOA shift of strategy from a demand to move the plant to monitoring its performance, and a tacit admission that the GOA recognizes the plant's existence and even GOU's right to place it where it is. This is a small but possibly significant development. The test results, surely one of many that will be performed by various parties, will reportedly be used in the pending International Court of Justice (ICJ) case (ref A to C). Monitoring the plant also moves the dialogue, ever subtly (and hopefully) towards a more scientific basis, and away from politics and posturing. ¶6. (SBU) Second, the GOA has continued its policy - as it has throughout this conflict - of consistently limiting these protests. Federal Police were out in full force on November 13 during the latest protest in front of the Uruguayan Embassy (where protesters burned cauliflower and eggs to simulate what they said was the plant's smell),and reportedly kept the protesters a full block away. In fact, the GOA has never allowed anything more than limited street protests in Buenos Aires. Attempts to stop the ferry service in Buenos Aires, a widely used alternative to travel to Uruguay, have also been stymied. Also, even the most fervent protesters have never resorted to violence, even during last weekend's protests (in Buenos Aires and in Gualeguaychu),the first since the mill began operating. ¶7. (U) Finally, the Kirchners themselves have -- in candid moments -- openly acknowledged that the mill is a reality. Cristina Kirchner recently said that the mill will function, "sooner or later." President Kirchner, despite his stated support for the protesters in Chile, himself said in New York in September that the mill cannot realistically be moved. -------------- "Military option" not at all likely -------------- ¶8. (C) There is absolutely no indication that GOA is considering a military "solution" to this dispute, and the GOA's own military operational capacity is very limited. Any suggestions of a military "solution" here actually brings about expressions of humor or disbelief. At the recent Embassy-hosted Veterans Day event, a military contact only barely jokingly said that as a matter of fact, right now, the GOU probably has more active and usable aircraft and other military assets than does the GOA, due to the latter's sustained military budget cuts in recent years. For his part, the Uruguayan defense attache in Argentina said that he was unaware of even the remotest GOA or GOU military plans related to this dispute. -------------- -------------- So, what will happen? Probably a continuation of the deadlock -------------- -------------- ¶9. (SBU) There is clear evidence that the GOA and public would love to get this problem behind it; perhaps the only possible solution is some kind of face-saving solution for all. Although impossible to predict, what we expect is that, over time, as Argentines become accustomed to the mill's presence and learn that there is (hopefully) minimal environmental impact, sympathy for the protesters will further decrease. (Although there is no evidence indicating future violence, there is always the possibility of an isolated event getting out of hand.) November 15 preliminary environmental tests from the GOU indicated that the mill was operating within normal ranges. We still understand from the Finnish Embassy here and local press that any ICJ decision could take months, if not over a year, and even then, its "verdict" might very well be ambiguous. We expect that if there is any clear-cut GOA ICJ "victory" or even an ambiguous ICJ ruling, the activists and GOA will duly cite the ICJ's legitimacy and claim victory. If there is a clear-cut "win" for the GOU, the GOA and activists might very well ignore the ruling, and even question the ICJ's legitimacy. We do not have much optimism that the protesters will cease their bridge blockade any time soon, no matter what the test results or ICJ decisions indicate. And the GOA continues to be loathe to interfere in any kind of public protests, especially those that are seen to be non-violent, even if they appear to violate basic tenets of Mercosur and the free movement of people and trade. -------------- Comment: Best that we continue to stay out of this dispute -------------- ¶10. (C) As we have done so all along, the USG is best served by continuing to stay out of this dispute. This is particularly relevant if we seek a better relationship with the incoming GOA. Our hunch still is that Cristina Kirchner will be a more subtle hand in managing this dispute and we see very little gain in lining up up on one side or the other at this time. We should discourage any Uruguayan suggestions (ref A) that we would intensify military cooperation to protect Uruguay from Argentina, or using an ostensible military alliance with us as leverage with the Argentines. WAYNE